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Abstract
Although human causal reasoning is widely acknowledged as an object
of scientific enquiry, there is little consensus on an appropriate measure
of progress. Up-to-date evidence of the standard method of research in
the field shows that this method has been rejected at the birth of modern
science.
We describe an instance of the standard scientific method for model-
ling causal reasoning (causal calculators). The method allows for uniform
proofs of three relevant computational properties: correctness of the model
with respect to the intended model, full abstraction of the model (function)
with respect to the equivalence of reasoning scenarios (input), and formal
relations of equivalence and subsumption between models. The method
extends and exploits the systematic paradigm [Handbook of Logic in Artificial
Intelligence and Logic Programming, volume IV, p. 439-498, Oxford 1995] to
fit with our interpretation of it.
Using the described method, we present results for some major models,
with an updated summary spanning seventy-two years of research in the
field.
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«Peer review is anonymous, and thus write your reviews as you like,
abusing the author if you wish. Peer review comes once, and thus write
your camera-ready copy as you like, changing the content if you wish.
Nobody will complain. This is the standard practice.»
(zh, april 1999)
Thus spoke my senior colleague and room-mate in London. I did not re-
ceive his words of wisdom. Years passed by, until April 2002, when a letter
from Elsevier Science rejected my classification of a family of symbolic lo-
gics, being an invited paper. The reviewer displayed lack of expertise with
the method of research and its known results, only to abuse the author by
«suggesting», through rejection, «to skip the proofs» in favour of «test ex-
amples», being my paper full of proofs. Such review, dated April 18th, was
followed by my comments on April 26th. After two months of silence, I
had to call Elsevier’s Secretariat. I was told that they received the letter, but
did not manage to contact the editor, and thus suggested to submit else-
where. This was my first submission to the very press which delivered one
of Galilei’s works from dogmatic Inquisition. Four hundred years later, to
my formal appeal against dogma and abuse, the same press did not dis-
play the slightest hint of embarrassment. I had similar rejections, but none
so upsetting. However, as my pre-press readers kept questioning the very
method of research, there was no purpose in describing new results. I had
to change my method of research, because I could no longer publish with it.
I found myself reading in the words of my anonymous pre-press rea-
ders, to understand what they meant. All I had from them was the «sug-
gestion» to «skip the proofs» in favour of «test examples». I then looked
for enlightenment elsewhere, reading more closely the classics on method,
and collecting descriptions by other authors in my field. In September 2002
a report on Peer Review by the British Parliamentary Office of Science and
Technology confirmed my feeling when stating that «some scientists believe
that anonymity provides an opportunity for settling old scores and bury-
ing rival research». While reading from the British Parliament, I recollec-
ted the original words of wisdom by my colleague. I still did not receive
them, and kept reading. While reading Kuhn, and a monograph on Scien-
tific Controversies by Engelhardt and Caplan, I also learned that a possi-
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ble closure happens by the natural death of one of the opponents. I began
having Orwellian nightmares as soon as I merged the above with the «Pu-
blish or Perish» dogma which is forced upon us by the publishing business.
I saw authors exploited as sheep by the editorial economic powerhouse. I
saw rival authors intellectually murdered under the dogmatic and occlusi-
ve system of anonymous pre-press review. I saw authors becoming editors
to grant themselves an upper level of fairness in peer review. I felt increa-
singly sick. Where they only nightmares? The filling of the relevant session
with papers by the very editor of a recent ijcai congress now seemed less
than casual. Further, I had the certainty of being exploited when I realised
that ieee acquired the copyright of one of my works using the carrot-and-
stick approach, namely by threatening me not to include my accepted work
in the proceedings while offering broad distribution via their «not-for-pro-
fit» publishing system. I discovered, in fact, that several well-known book
retailers were selling the ieee proceedings using a highlight of my inclu-
ded paper as advertisement. I then realised that copyright is a certificate
of property, and the assets of each known academic press consisted in mil-
lions of such properties, acquired royalty free using the carrot-and-stick
approach. In so doing, it was no longer a surprise that the financial state-
ment of academic publishers revealed multi-million-euro businesses, with
Elsevier Science and other publishers now hitting the news because of their
greed [21, 137, 3]. It also became clear to me that I was not free to set my
own research agenda, because I could not pay for my own research via
teaching, consulting and royalties. Indeed, still using the carrot-and-stick
approach, authors are discouraged to teach by the low wages, and encou-
raged to apply for research grants, through yet another «peer review» sy-
stem of research proposals. As money goes where anonymous peers want,
the authors choose those research topics for which money is available, and
the only money available is through such research grants. I realised that,
with my independent work, I was moving against stream. Both the aim
and method of my research were being opposed to at pre-press review. I
also realised that authors of favoured research were still miserable, because
their intellectual properties, namely copyright and patents, were acquired
royalty free by the press and their funders respectively. Independent work
leading to author owned copyright was impossible, due to the absence of
both sufficient funds to produce it and of academic publishers who would
pay royalties to the author to publish it. Independent work leading to au-
thor owned patents was also impossible, due to the unreasonable cost of
patents. The legal system of patents has been invented in Italy as a means
to help individual authors gain credit and profit from their useful inventi-
ons. However, as presently implemented, with its costs, the patent system
moves against the individual authors and in favour of corporations, which
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originally invented. To my eyes, the whole system was thoroughly enginee-
red to control and exploit the work of researchers, ruled by the «carrot and
stick» method of persuasion. The researchers did not earn the knowledge
for themselves, and thus did not take any responsibility for it. I have also
been plagiarised, both as researcher and consultant, and thus learned to be-
ware of colleagues. As I turned out to be the sole author of my works, I ha-
ve been refused a Lecturing chair by a committee who wanted a co-author.
When listening to Apt’s comments at Dijkstra’s retirement banquet, I lear-
ned that nowadays, it is very rare to encounter researchers who put their
own name on their own work only. I had confirmation of Apt’s words when
reading surveys on the ethics of coauthorship [69, 194, 193, 93]. Science tur-
ned out to be an Industry without Ethics. It became clear to me that I had
to focus not only on my method of research but also on my method of con-
ducting ethical business, to finally have credit and profit.
I fell ill. In September 2007, after years of trial and errors with various
physicians and the side effects of their experimental therapies, I have been
certified with a history of bipolar disorder in co-morbidity with anxiety
and panic disorder. In my struggle for self control, I now had to reshape
my whole life.
Once upon a time, I found myself surrounded by people inclined in
truth fabrication; they were dogmatic, being always necessarily right, to
pretend authority over me. They also were abusive, attacking me and de-
nying my own vital sphere. In my struggle for understanding, I found
myself observing that their truths did not correspond to my observations.
I also found that they were contradicting themselves with their own ac-
tions. Their information was at times unsound or inconsistent. I despised
the community I was living in, and felt a slave in it. I wanted to live in a
nurturing community of peers, ruled by fairness and persuasion instead
of force and conditioning. Using what was left of my self-esteem, I de-
cided to conquer my own freedom by becoming a Scientist, rejecting the
generations-old family business and its wealth. However, as a Scientist, I
discovered that the scientific community is as dogmatic and abusive as the
community I escaped from, and thus feel an unbearable pain. My quest for
freedom shall continue.
This monograph is an exercise of Scientific research, being a report of in-
dependent and unbiased research in the field of human reasoning. It serves
no trend, political or economic interest.
I am indebted to Edmund Robinson for a discussion on chapter 1, to
Jon Rowson for reading the same chapter, to Murray Shanahan for reading
the first result in chapter 5, and to Wilfrid Hodges for reading chapter 6.
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PREFACE
Context of the problem
Four hundred years after Galilei and Bacon, supported by studies on the
foundations of mathematics, references to the Aristotelian notion of truth
and statistical evidence, Alfred Tarski defined the semantic notion of truth
and referred to it as a mathematical model of human common sense rea-
soning [198, p. 341,360]. Tarski’s explicit aim was not to formalise a notion
of truth, but to formalise the notion of truth. Therefore, for any problem,
rephrased as an Hilbertian entscheidungsproblem (decision problem), does
its solution by Tarski’s theory agree with a relevant history of natural and
experimental facts? The interesting question is not what the theory cannot
do [85, 37, 38, 209], but how well it models what we can do.
We are unable to solve all possible decision problems by pure reason-
ing, and Tarski’s theory models this fact correctly, being both incomplete
[202, p. 198] (there exist true sentences which are not provable) and unde-
cidable [85, p. 607] [37, 38] (there exist sentences which cannot be proved
or disproved within the theory, and adding such sentences as axioms to
the theory does not solve the decision problem, because more similar sen-
tences can be formulated in the extended theory). On the other hand, we
perform common sense causal reasoning, but Tarski’s theory fails to model
this fact correctly; for example, it is unable to deduce the non-effects of
actions, and adding axioms to the theory for all possible non-effects of ac-
tions violates Ockham’s law of parsimony. This triggers the frame problem
[134, §3.3]: given m features of objects in the environment and n actions to
change their values, how do we avoid writing mn no-change axioms? The
problem admits the obvious solution of linear complexity; the real chal-
lenge, however, is not to implement the brute force solution, but to model
human reasoning, which avoids the no-change axioms altogether.
Tarski is the father of formal common sense reasoning, and solving the
10
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frame problem served as a growth direction. The literature records various
attempts to model causal reasoning, and in particular to solve variants of
the frame problem. In the sixties, following relevant criticism on Turing’s
thinking machines [184], McCarthy proposed the philosophical, informal
Calculus of Situations [123, 124, 134], with no solution to the frame prob-
lem. In 1972 [165] Sandewall solved the frame problem by introducing
formal non-monotonic reasoning. Following Sandewall, various formal-
isms have been proposed as «a form of non-monotonic reasoning», in-
cluding the Closed World Assumption inference rule and default reasoning
in 1978 [159] [160, 161], predicate completion and negation as failure in
1978 [41, 42], abduction in 1979 [101, p. 241] [65, 94], McDermott-Doyle
non-monotonic logic in 1980 [135], predicate circumscription in 1977–1986
[125, 126, 128], the Calculus of Events in 1986 [103], and the stable model
semantics in 1988 [81]. This is the genesis of a field where each researcher
delivered extensions to existing theories or at least one new theory of causal
reasoning. In 1999 [171] the relevant community consisted of three-hun-
dred researchers worldwide. See Gabbay et al. [74], Shanahan [180] and
Reiter [164] for the most recent surveys.
Already in 1987, Shoham observed that «the non-standard nature of the
various systems and their diversity has made it hard to gain a good under-
standing of them and to compare among them». He then proposed to con-
sider any suitable compositional model-theoretic semantics as base logic,
including Tarskian and modal logic, and extend it to non-monotonic reas-
oning using a model-preference criterion [185, 186, 187, 121]. He named
the resulting logic as preference logic. Shoham’s approach turned out to be a
generalization of predicate circumscription [126, 115], being it itself a gener-
alization of predicate completion [162]. The works of Bossu and Siegel [23],
of Halpern and Moses [88], of Doyle [60, 34] and variants of Reiter’s de-
fault logic [161] were subsumed under Shoham’s framework. Further work
led to Sandewall’s filtering technique [166], also used in Shanahan’s cir-
cumscriptive axiomatisations of the Calculus of Events [180, 103]. In 1993
[168] Sandewall observed that the various models available to date were
the result of informal arguments, rapidly followed by refutations via coun-
ter-examples. This suggested the need for more systematic research, and a
method was presented and used therein, namely the formal assessment of
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the range of correct applicability of Discrete Fluent [Preference] Logics [169].
The Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming [174]
refers to the informal arguments approach [46] as the «classical paradigm»,
and refers to the formal assessments approach [169] as the «systematic
paradigm».
Statement of the problem
According to the history of Science, and in particular to Kuhn [105, 104],
any scientific paradigm has the following three characteristics: (i) it is a
«fundamental scientific achievement, one which includes both a theory
and some exemplary applications to the results of experiment and obser-
vation»; (ii) it is an «open-ended achievement, one which leaves all sorts of
research still to be done»; (iii) it is an «accepted achievement, in the sense
that it is received by a group whose members no longer try to rival it or to
create alternatives for it; instead, they attempt to extend and exploit it in
a variety of ways». Neither the «classical paradigm» nor the «systematic
paradigm» qualify as scientific paradigm.
On the «classical paradigm», some researchers contend explicitly that
the field is constrained by appeals to intuition [20, 180]. Most researchers fol-
low and go along with this constraint, using it as if it were the standard sci-
entific method. Appeals to intuition, however, are everything but a system-
atic classification of scientific evidence. Therefore, the «classical paradigm»
meets only the third of the above requirements to qualify as scientific para-
digm.
On the «systematic paradigm», some researchers try to rival it [20, 180,
183] or to ignore it deliberately [47]. Although originally expected that
«much more will happen in this area in the years to come» [174, p. 472], the
number of formal assessments in the literature is hard evidence suggesting
that the community has not received this approach. With a single exception
[170], no report of research by the «systematic paradigm» has ever been
recorded in a journal.
Original contribution of this work (summary)
We describe the method of research that we have endeavoured to use, as
resulting from the analysis of the above problem (chapters 1-2). We then
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describe and discuss the results obtained using this method (chapters 3-7).
chapter 1 Although human causal reasoning is widely acknowledged
as an object of scientific enquiry, there is little consensus on an appropriate
measure of progress. Up-to-date evidence of the standard method of re-
search in the field shows that this method has been rejected at the birth of
modern Science.
chapter 2 We describe an instance of the standard scientific method
for modelling causal reasoning. The method allows for uniform proofs of
three relevant computational properties: correctness of the model with re-
spect to the intended model, full abstraction of the model (function) with
respect to the equivalence of reasoning scenarios (input), and formal re-
lations of equivalence and subsumption between models. The method ex-
tends and exploits the «systematic paradigm» [Handbook of Logic in Artificial
Intelligence and Logic Programming, volume IV, p. 439–498, Oxford 1995] to
fit with our interpretation of it. An updated summary of results is included,
spanning seventy-two years of research in the area. The results show the
adequacy and broader scope of the method, in a humble search for a coher-
ent thematic view.
chapter 3 Background: Classical Mechanics is a renown mathematical
model of causal reasoning that no mathematical logic has yet succeeded
to emulate. What are its epistemological and ontological characteristics?
Methods: We used the systematic paradigm as gold standard. Findings: Ac-
cording to the present taxonomy, the relevant family of epistemological and
ontological characteristics is Ksp-RAdCi. Interpretation: The result shows
the distance and growth direction of classified logics with respect to the
target class.
chapter 4 Background: The Horn-clause fragment of Tarskian first-or-
der logic, or angelic fragment of positive logic programming, is a renown
theory of both human reasoning and general purpose computation. A
thirty years old orthodoxy, based on «appeals to intuition», insists that pos-
itive logic programming is inadequate as a model of causal reasoning and,
specifically, as a solution to the frame problem. We classified and compared
this theory with two of its non-monotonic extensions, namely, Answer Set
Programming (asp) and Abductive Logic Programming (alp). Methods: We
used the systematic paradigm as gold standard. Findings: The compos-
preface 14
itional model-theoretic fixpoint semantics of positive logic programming
belongs to the class Ksp-IAd; we divided the reasoning model from its ori-
ginal object language, and used K-IA’s own language for the classification.
The correctness result implies the full abstraction of this theory with respect
to the equivalence of causal reasoning scenarios. Interpretation: The formal
classification rejects the named orthodoxy. The comparisons show that part
of the original problem-solving power has been lost in the non-monotonic
extensions. In the case of alp, the epistemological characteristics improved
from Ksp to full K, but the ontological characteristics regressed from IAd
to IbsAd. In the case of asp, the ontological characteristics regressed from I
to Ibs. This suggests a growth direction for both theories.
chapter 5 Background: The Calculus of Events is a model of causal
reasoning available in various Circumscriptive axiomatisations (cce), all
based on the Horn-clause fragment of Tarskian first-order logic. The design
of this model was «constrained by appeals to intuitions», and thus its lit-
erature does not include any assessment result. We aimed to fill this la-
cuna. Methods: We used the systematic paradigm as gold standard. Find-
ings: The collection reduced to five models: Boolean cce belongs to the
class Ksp-IbA; our redesigned Continuous cce belongs to Ksp-RA; Dis-
crete cce is belongs to Ksp-IA; Abductive cce is not correctly applicable
to K-IA \ Ksp-IA; Concurrent cce is not correctly applicable to Ksp-RACi.
The correctness of Boolean, Discrete and Continuous cce depends on care-
ful coding of the reasoning scenarios, and thus we devised a technique to
synthesise and verify those scenarios. The full abstraction of each model
with respect to the equivalence of reasoning scenarios holds as corollary
of its correctness result. Interpretation: The results show a general limita-
tion of the cce models to the family Ksp of epistemological characteristics.
This answers negatively to the open question whether there can be some
cases of incompletely known initial state where cce behaves correctly. Fur-
ther, no cce model proved adequate for solving problems in the full class
K-RACi, especially in its fragment K-RACi \ Ksp-RA. This suggests a pre-
cise growth direction, namely the integration of Concurrent and Abductive
cce into a single model. The technique to synthesise and verify the scen-
arios answers to an open question by Shanahan. The whole work answers
to an open question by Sandewall.
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chapter 6 Background: We know that positive logic programming is
correctly applicable to Ksp-IAd with a language shift. Its classification
shows the model’s ability to simulate the game semantics for K-IA when the
environment has a fixed strategy. We described and assessed its non-sim-
ulative version with relevant extensions. The theory models our own ap-
proach to causal reasoning. Methods: We used the systematic paradigm
as gold standard. Findings: The new model belongs to the class K-RACi
of epistemological and ontological characteristics. The result implies the
full abstraction of the model with respect to the equivalence of reasoning
scenarios. Interpretation: The comparison of the model with former classi-
fied models, spanning seventy-two years of research in the field, it shows
its strictly broader range of correct applicability. The model is correctly ap-
plicable to a superclass of Classical Mechanics. Among the subsumed mod-
els are the Answer Set Programming, Abductive Logic Programming, two
variants of McCarthy’s Calculus of Situations and the Calculus of Events
in its various circumscriptive axiomatizations.
chapter 7 Background: We classified the epistemological and ontolo-
gical characteristics of Turing’s model of a man in the process of computing
a real number. Methods: We used the systematic paradigm as gold stand-
ard. Findings: Turing’s automatic machines belong to the class Ksp-IAd,
Turing’s choice machines belong to the class Ksp-IA, Turing’s comput-
ing machines belong to the class Ksp-IbAd. Interpretation: Turing’s auto-
matic machines are equivalent to Positive Logic Programming, the com-
puting machines are subsumed by the Circumscriptive Boolean Calculus
of Events, and the choice machines are equivalent to the Circumscriptive
Discrete Calculus of Events.
The table at page 63 summarises the results.
We conclude the present monograph with notes and comments on theories
by McCarthy, Allen, Kuipers and Shults.
1METHODS (PART I)
1.1 Introduction
It is the paramount duty of any scientific community to foster the funda-
mental understanding of its subject and sustain the critical assessment of
its literature. The usual fulfilment of this duty consists in a three-step pro-
cess: describe the method of research, describe the results obtained using
this method, discuss these results and show in what respects they advance
the study of the subject. Any scientific community is defined by its peers,
and their independent critical judgement is its driving force. What is most
compelling is not whether independent critical judgement is allowed by
authority, but whether we understand it and choose to exert it, as a free act
of the individual when making a moral commitment. As Galilei has it, «in
questions of science, the authority of a thousand is not worth the humble
reasoning of a single individual». As Bacon has it, the absence of indi-
vidual commitment leads to addiction «from prejudgement and upon the
authority of others; so that it is a following and going along together, rather
than consent», as «true consent is that which consists in the coincidence of
free judgements, after due examination» [18, I-63,77]. The good scientist
does not seek for truth in authority; they rather seek for internal coher-
ence of theories and their agreement with natural and experimental facts.
Scientific truth is neither absolute nor arbitrary, but always relative to the
natural and experimental history. The standard scientific method, namely
Galilei’s experimental method, is so successful that any fair resolution of
controversies consists in a direct appeal to available facts and to rigorous
reasoning about those facts [18, ii-10 111][63]. However, there seems to
be much space for disagreement. An editor laments that forty-five experts
reviewing exactly the same paper reported extreme judgements, from un-
acceptable to excellent, thus raising the problem of the reproducibility of
anonymous pre-press review [207, p. 19]. After twenty-five years of ser-
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vice, another editor describes peer review as «an ineffective lottery prone
to bias and abuse [87]» [190, 215]. According to the British Parliament-
ary Office of Science and Technology, «some scientists believe that anonym-
ity provides an opportunity for settling old scores and burying rival re-
search» [4]. The persistence of editorial disorder suggests that either Ba-
conian peer review needs to be improved, or anonymous pre-press re-
view fails to implement it. Any peer should be able to use any relevant
instance of the standard scientific method for verifying its results. In prac-
tice, however, peers gather in schools of method, and their community has
no binding code of ethics whenever an author and an anonymous pre-press
reader belong to rival schools [4, 2, 104]. As different schools use different
methods, editorial control has the moral duty to be independent of spe-
cific schools. The general demand is to describe both the method of re-
search and its results in sufficient detail to allow verification by any peer
reviewer. The resulting scientific literature must ultimately reflect proven
science. To ease the closure of scientific controversies, Frege invented the
begriffsschrift, a method to detect and eliminate any jumping to conclusions,
to proceed step-by-step by preventing anything intuitive from penetrating
the Cartesian long chains of elegant thoughts, where «elegant» means «in-
geniously simple and effective» in persuasion. The begriffsschrift is widely
acknowledged as the founding work of symbolic logic.
Following the seminal work by Tarski [198] on modelling common sense
truth, and by Turing [209] on modelling actions and change of a human
calculator, a community of logicians aimed at modelling common sense
causal reasoning, to explore farther than the computational limits of Tur-
ing machines. After much research in science departments, does the liter-
ature reflect proven science or only the opinion of individuals? What is the
standard method for measuring scientific progress in the field? Our aim is
to collect evidence of what this method is, discuss it, and consider how it
might be improved.
1.2 Evidence
We expect the standard method of research in the field to emerge from
Baconian consent. A selection of the collected views of individuals is ar-
ranged in a dialogue, from Frege to McCarthy. We also describe the stand-
1·2 methods (part i) 18
ard structure of reports on the field, because aims and methods influence
the structure of reports.
Frege: «To prevent anything intuitive from penetrating here unnoticed,
I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps. [The]
demand is not to be denied: every jump must be barred from our deduc-
tions. What is so hard to satisfy must be set down to the tediousness of
proceeding step-by-step.» (1879 [71, p. 5-6], 1884 [72, p. 102-3])
Turing: «All arguments which can be given are bound to be, funda-
mentally, appeals to intuition, and for this reason rather unsatisfactory
mathematically. [The] arguments which I shall use are of three kinds: (a)
A direct appeal to intuition. (b) A proof of the equivalence of two defini-
tions (in case the new definition has a greater intuitive appeal). (c) Giving
examples of large classes of numbers which are computable.» (1936 [209, p.
249])
Tarski (on logical truth): «The desired definition does not aim to
specify the meaning of a familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on
the contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of an old notion.
We must then characterize this notion precisely enough to enable anyone
to determine whether the definition actually fulfils its task. [As] far as my
own opinion is concerned, I do not have any doubts that our formulation
does conform to the intuitive content of that of Aristotle. [Some] doubts
have been expressed whether the semantic conception does reflect the no-
tion of truth is its common sense and everyday usage. [In] spite of all this,
I happen to believe that the semantic conception does conform to a very
considerable extent with the common sense usage—although I readily ad-
mit I may be mistaken. [I] believe that the issue raised can be settled sci-
entifically, though of course not by a deductive procedure, but with the
help of the statistical questionnaire method. As a matter of fact, such re-
search has been carried on, and some of the results have been reported at
congresses and in part published [142]. [I] was by no means surprised to
learn (in a discussion devoted to these problems) that in a group of people
who were questioned only 15% agreed that ‘true’ means for them ‘agree-
ing with reality’, while 90% agreed that a sentence such as ‘it is snowing’
is true if, and only if, it is snowing. Thus, a great majority of these people
1·2 methods (part i) 19
seemed to reject the classical conception of truth in its ‘philosophical’ for-
mulation, while accepting the same conception when formulated in plain
words.» (1944 [198, p. 341,360,374])
Tarski (on logical consequence): «The sentence X follows logically
from the sentences of the class K if and only if every model of the class K is
also a model of the sentence X.» (1936 [201, p. 417]) «I have the impression
that everyone who understands the content of the above definition will
admit that it captures many intuitions manifested in the everyday usage of
the concept of following.» (1936 [203, p. 186]) — «Since we are concerned
here with the concept of logical, i.e. formal, consequence, and thus with a
relation which is to be uniquely determined by the form of the sentences
between which it holds, this relation cannot be influenced in any way by
empirical knowledge, and in particular by knowledge of objects to which
the sentence X or the sentences of the class K refer.» (1936 [201, p. 414-5])
Turing: «The popular view that scientists proceed inexorably from
well-established fact to well-established fact, never being influenced by
any unproven conjecture, is quite mistaken. Provided it is made clear
which are proved facts and which are conjectures, no harm can result.
Conjectures are of great importance since they suggest useful lines of re-
search.»1 — «I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’ The
[question] can be described in terms of a game which we call the ‘imitation
game’.» (1950 [212, p. 422, 433])
McCarthy: «Consider the problem of designing a machine to solve
well-defined intellectual problems. We call a problem well-defined if there
is a test which can be applied to a proposed solution. In case the proposed
solution is a solution, the test must confirm this in a finite number of steps.
If the proposed solution is not correct, we may either require that the test
indicate this in a finite number of steps or else allow it to go on indefin-
itely.» (1956 [122])
Dijkstra: «When an automatic computer produces results, why do we
trust them, if we do so? What measures can we take to increase our con-
fidence that the results produced are indeed the results intended?» (1965
1Turing’s praise of conjectures and refutations in 1950 will find support by Lakatos in
1961 [107], Kuhn in 1962 [104], Popper in 1963 [152], and a formal model by Sandewall in
1972 [165].
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[55]) «We must not forget that it is not our business to make programs: it is
our business to design classes of computations that will display a desired
behaviour. [Today] a usual technique is to make a program and then to
test it. But: program testing can be a very effective way to show the pres-
ence of errors, but it is hopelessly inadequate for showing their absence.»
(1972 [56])2
Sandewall: «The introduction of the Unless operator is a drastic modi-
fication of the logic. It even violates the extension property of almost all
logical systems, which says that if you add more axioms, everything that
used to be a theorem is still a theorem.» (1972 [165, p. 199])3
McCarthy: «The intuitive idea of circumscription is as follows: We
know some objects in a given class and we have some ways of generating
more. We jump to the conclusion that this gives all the objects in the class.
Thus we circumscribe the class to the objects we know how to generate.
[...] Circumscription is not deduction in disguise, because every form of
deduction has two properties that circumscription lacks—transitivity and
what we may call monotonicity.» [125]
Shoham: «The non-standard nature of the various systems and their di-
versity has made it hard to gain a good understanding of them and to com-
pare among them. We propose a unifying framework for nonmonotonic
logics, which subsumes previously published systems. The basic idea be-
hind the construction is the following. In classical logic A  C if C is true in
all models of A. Since all models of A ∧ B are also models of A, it follows
that A ∧ B  C, and hence that the logic is monotonic. One gets a non-
monotonic logic by changing the rules of the game, and focusing on only
a subset of those models, those that are ‘preferable’ in a certain respect. In
the new scheme we have that A  C if C is true in all preferred models of A,
but A ∧ B may have preferred models that are not preferred models of A.
In fact, the class of preferred models of A ∧ B and the class of preferred
2Dijkstra’s argument reminds us of Locke: «it is one thing to show a man that he is in an
error, and another to put him in possession of truth» [120, iv.7,§11].
3Sandewall’s 1972 formalisation of non-monotonic reasoning for solving the frame prob-
lem had numerous followers, including Reiter’s Closed World Assumption rule in 1978
[159], Clark’s predicate completion in 1978 [41, 42], McCarthy’s predicate circumscrip-
tion in 1977-80 [126, 162, 115], Shoham’s general notion of model preference in 1986
[185, 186, 187, 121], Kowalski and Sergot’s calculus of events in 1986 [103], and Shanahan’s
circumscriptive calculus of events in 1995-7 [179, 180].
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models of A may be completely disjoint.» (1987 [186])
Hanks and McDermott: «Nonmonotonic formal systems have been
proposed as an extension to classical first-order logic that will capture the
process of human ‘default reasoning’ or ‘plausible inference’ through their
inference mechanisms, just as modus ponens provides a model for deduct-
ive reasoning. But although the technical properties of these logics have
been studied in detail and many examples of human default reasoning
have been identified, for the most part these logics have not actually been
applied to practical problems to see whether they produce the expected res-
ults. We provide axioms for a simple problem in temporal reasoning which
has long been identified as a case of default reasoning, thus presumably
amenable to representation in nonmonotonic logic. Upon examining the
resulting nonmonotonic theories, however, we find that the inferences per-
mitted by the logics are not those we had intended when we wrote the ax-
ioms, and in fact are much weaker. This problem is shown to be independ-
ent of the logic used; nor does it depend on any particular temporal rep-
resentation. Upon analyzing the failure we find that the nonmonotonic lo-
gics we considered are inherently incapable of representing this kind of de-
fault reasoning.» (1986 [89]) «It almost certainly is the case that nonmono-
tonic inference is idiosyncratic and domain dependent.» «The relationship
between these logics and human reasoning is not well understood.» «We
can no longer engage in the logical ‘wishful thinking’ that led us to claim
that circumscription solves the frame problem [127].» (1987 [90])4
Davis: «The basic approach used here, as in much of the research in
automating commonsense reasoning, is to take a number of examples of
commonsense inference in a commonsense domain, generally deductive
inference; identify the general domain knowledge and the particular prob-
lem specification used in the inference; develop a formal language in which
this knowledge can be expressed; and define the primitives of the language
as carefully and precisely as possible. Only occasionally is there any dis-
4From 1972 to 1986, the correctness of non-monotonic solutions to the frame problem
has been conjectured using tests and appeals to intuition. In 1986 Hanks and McDermott
refuted the method using a counter-example. The community awarded the paper, but per-
sisted with the old method; the counter-example has been adopted as a positive test, known
as Yale Shooting Problem, and more similar tests have been adopted as benchmarks [113].
A survey of this development in the decade 1987–1997 is available from Shanahan [180].
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cussion here of the algorithms, the control structures, or the organization
of data that would be used in an actual reasoning system. There is almost
no discussion of domain-independent techniques.» (1990 [46, p. 4])
Brooks: «Traditional Artificial Intelligence has tried to tackle the prob-
lem of building artificially intelligent systems from the top down. It tackled
intelligence through the notions of thought and reason. These are things we
only know about through introspection. [Recently] there has been a move-
ment to study intelligence from the bottom up[.] Some of this work is based
on engineering from first principles[.]» «The idea is to first build a very
simple complete autonomous system, and test it in the real world.» (1991
[32, p. 88,134-5])
Sandewall: «There has been much research in recent years on meth-
ods for reasoning about actions and change, and on finding solutions to
the so-called frame problems. New variants of non-monotonic logics for
common sense reasoning have been proposed, only to be quickly refuted
by counter-examples. According to the standard research method in the
area, the evidence in favour of a proposed logic should consist of intuit-
ive plausibility arguments and a small number of scenario examples for
which the logic is proven (or claimed) to give the intended conclusions
and no others. Clearly there is a need for more systematic results, where a
proposed logic is verified for a whole class of reasoning problems and not
only for single examples.» (1993 [168]) — «There are sometimes ‘clashes of
intuitions’ where different informers make incompatible statements about
what are the admissible common sense inferences for a given example. This
means that the empirical data for the research are unreliable. Also, since
the informer is usually the researcher himself, there is always a danger
that the researcher will be influenced by the particular theory he has de-
veloped [208]. A major reason for the uncertainty is that it is difficult to
delimit the ‘general domain knowledge’ that has been used for a particu-
lar inference.» «In practice, the systematic methodology and the example-
based methodology have to be used together. The argument for a system-
atic methodology is not intended to imply that common-sense examples
are useless, but only that they are not sufficient as a basis for developing a
logic of common-sense reasoning.» (1994 [169, p. 64,69])5
5Sandewall moves along points (b) and (c) of Turing’s method, criticizing but still ac-
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Gabbay: «We still have conceptual problems with the subject. There are
lots of nonmonotonic mechanisms. It is not clear how they fit into a co-
herent thematic view. I believe, however, that it is possible to present a
good framework. It must be possible. After all, these logics are supposed
to analyse human practical reasoning. We humans are more or less coher-
ent so there is something there! [We] are developing the necessary tools for
modelling human reasoning. However, [we] should be careful not to give
too much emphasis to the tools. [Developing] and comparing formal non-
monotonic systems should serve the study and analysis of human practical
reasoning.» (1994 [75, p. v])
Sandewall and Shoham: «The classical paradigm or paradigm of com-
mon-sense examples [has] been concisely summarised by Davis[.]» «The
methodology of common sense examples has resulted in a somewhat
chaotic development; logics, examples, and counter-examples, have been
confronted, and it has not always been clear which property of a logic was
to be given the credit for its success, or the blame for its failures. It has
not even always been clear what was a success or a failure in terms of the
proposed reasoning examples. The most important weakness, however,
is that various logics have been proposed to be ‘solutions to the frame
problem’ just on the basis of intuitions and a few examples, only to be very
quickly refuted by the arrival of more examples. The systematic paradigm
[169] attempts to structure the problem area a bit better. [We] expect that
much more will happen in this area in the years to come.» (1995 [174, p.
441,468,492-3])
Bell: «An experimental justification of a formal theory of common
sense causal reasoning, consists of intuitive plausibility arguments for the
theory in question, together with a demonstration of how it succeeds in
representing scenario examples. [The] experimental approach is, after all,
just standard scientific method. [By] contrast, formalist justifications, for
example [118, 114, 95, 96], establish relationships between formal theories
of common sense causal reasoning. Sandewall criticizes justifications of
this kind because the results they provide are entirely ‘within the frame-
work of logic’; the results relate pairs of theories but do not attempt to
cepting point (a). In moving along point (c), he implicitly agrees with Dijkstra on classes of
computation.
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square either of them with our intuitions about common sense causal
reasoning. He then proposes his own formal game-theoretic trajectory
semantics and proves a series of theorems relating his logic to them. How-
ever, as he does not attempt to justify his trajectory semantics by appealing
to our intuitions about causal reasoning, he is, in effect, repeating the form-
alist move. Any justification [must] (ultimately) relate the intuitive notion
and the formal theory. [...] Our intuitions about common sense causal reas-
oning are even less clear than those about effective computability.» (1995
[20, §5])
Sandewall: «[I] have [noticed] that it is apparently much easier to get
articles published if they use situation calculus. This may possibly be due
to notational chauvinism [on] the side of some reviewers: If one really be-
lieves that (e.g.) the situation calculus is the best answer to all problems,
then why accept a paper from someone that hasn’t seen the truth? — If our
research area is going to conserve an older approach to such an extent that
essential new results can’t make it through the publication channels, then
the whole area will suffer.» (1997 [173])
Shanahan: «The style of work I have adopted emphasizes the indi-
vidual example. It can be argued that an approach to the frame problem
can only properly be assessed by establishing formal correspondence with
a more abstract formal framework that encompasses a large class of ex-
amples. According to this argument, appeals to intuition through single
example scenarios are suspect. Without denying the importance of es-
tablishing correspondences between different formal frameworks, I would
contend that the field is constrained by appeals to intuition until its formal-
isms are deployed in the design of working systems. After all, any abstract
framework that is used to assess an approach to the frame problem is itself
open to assessment. How do we know that the abstract framework itself is
correct? Only by appealing to our intuitions in an examination of its per-
formance on a judiciously chosen set of representative examples.» (1997
[180, p. xv,xvi])
Dijkstra: «[The] notion of a ‘convincing argument’ immediately raises
the question ‘convincing to whom?’: if the audience to be convinced is
sufficiently gullible, the argument can be gloriously defective! It became
the task of the mathematical community to cultivate the scepticism against
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which the quality of the ‘convincing argument’ would be checked. [The]
ultimate consequence of the adoption of the postulational method is the in-
adequacy and subsequently the irrelevance of the consensus model[,] as the
latter reflected a form of interaction with the community which was needed
to compensate for the major shortcomings of informal intuitive reasoning.
[Regrettably] this evolution seems to be ignored [and] a sort of feel-good
mathematics is promoted in which rigorous arguments don’t seem to play
a role[.] This is a tragedy.» (1998 [57])
Sandewall: «Shanahan adopts, and argues for the example-based
methodology, where approaches to formalizing actions are explained and
motivated through a small number of scenario examples, and where an ex-
isting approach can also be refuted by showing an example where it does
not provide the intended conclusions. Some of the research in this area
uses another, systematic approach, where one attempts to characterize the
properties of various known approaches. The example-based and system-
atic methodologies need not be mutually exclusive. It is perfectly possible,
and in fact advisable, to use them together. [It] is a pity that Shanahan has
not taken the opportunity to include any assessment results in his book,
even informally. [Shanahan’s] omission in this respect is even more sur-
prising in view of the book’s subtitle: ‘A Mathematical Investigation of
the Common Sense Law of Inertia’. Assessment results have a reasonable
generality and require a certain degree of mathematical investigation. The
plentiful formal propositions in his book, by contrast, are only statements
about one particular toy example at a time. [There] is one single ‘abstract
framework’ that has been used extensively for [the assessments], namely
state transition systems and various generalizations of them. In particular,
state transitions systems were introduced in the early nineties for defin-
ing the underlying semantics in both the Features and Fluents approach
(Sandewall) and in action languages such as A (Gelfond and Lifschitz).
They are also a widely used framework in other branches of engineering
and in computer science, and they are much more transparent than the
modern, relatively complex logics for the frame problem. Therefore, it is
not a circular exercise to assess logics for actions and change relative to a
transition-system framework. On the contrary, doing so provides a better
understanding of when the logic works correctly and when it doesn’t, and
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it helps relate research in this area to neighboring disciplines. Shanahan’s
strict adherence to only one of the two methodologies is therefore unfor-
tunate. These critical comments illustrate that, not surprisingly, the field
of actions and change is characterized by a multiplicity of approaches and
less than total agreement about methodology.» (2000 [172])
Dijkstra: «[Most] books are recommended for being intuitive instead
of formal, for being chatty instead of crisp, for being vague and sloppy in-
stead of rigorous. [This] disrespectful, almost contemptuous attitude has
not only affected teaching and publishing, it has affected the academic re-
search agenda as well[.]» (2000 [58]) «The Concise Oxford Dictionary gives as
one of the meanings of ’elegant’: ’ingeniously simple and effective’. Why
has elegance found so little following? Elegance has the disadvantage, if
that’s what it is, that hard work is needed to achieve it, and a good educa-
tion to appreciate it.» (2001 [59])
Reiter: «What is available is more like a Tower of Babel than a unifying
representational and computational formalism. To be fair, this state of af-
fairs is the natural outcome of disciplines organized by their applications.
We all solve problems that arise in our own, sometimes narrowly circum-
scribed fields of specialization[.]» (2001 [164, p. 1-2])
McCarthy: «The engineering approaches to [Artificial Intelligence] re-
gard the world as presenting certain kinds of problems to an agent trying
to survive and achieve goals. It studies directly how to achieve goals. The
logical approach [to Artificial Intelligence] is a variety of the engineering
approach. A logical agent represents what it knows in logical formulas and
infers that certain actions or strategies are appropriate to achieve its goals.
[...] The logical approach also has the advantage that when we achieve hu-
man-level AI we will understand how intelligence works. Some of the evol-
utionary approaches might achieve an intelligent machine without anyone
understanding how it works. [...] Human-level intelligence is a difficult
scientific problem and probably needs some new ideas. These are more
likely to be invented by a person of genius than as part of a Government or
industry project.» (2003 [132, p. 76ff])
The above dialogue on method describes the views of individuals. To
see which of the views has been received by the community, we shall now
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describe the structure of reports on the field. Raw evidence of it is plenti-
fully available.
For any given «leading formalism in the field», a research report con-
sists in evidence of its failure through a test, or benchmark problem, the
description of an ad-hoc extension, and appeals to intuition to support the
claim that the extended formalism solves the problem. The report is di-
vided in essentially four sections. The first section describes the problem
in plain English and discusses relevant known information. The second
section describes the principles of adequacy for the proposed solution. The
third section describes the formalism and uses its language to represent
the given problem. The fourth section literally claims «the formalisation
demonstrates that sophisticated kinds of common sense reasoning [can] be
captured by the reasoning model», and concludes with «a few words of
comparison» with selected works.
In general, aims and methods of research influence the structure of re-
ports, and reduce them to three broad categories: theoretical, experimental,
and developmental [91]. If one reads the «appeals to intuition» and the
«few words of comparison» as fulfilment of the given principles of ad-
equacy, then the standard structure of research reports on the field matches
the structure of developmental (engineering) papers.
We find it appropriate to close the above dialogue by quoting from pre-
press review, where the reviewers share without inhibitions, believing their
text to be anonymous and off the record. The following is a passage from a
paradigmatic pre-press review in our own record. Editorial control implies
editorial accountability [4].
C. Bettini and A. Montanari (ed.): «The paper suffers from the lack
of examples, without which the subtleties of the formal assessment are dif-
ficult to understand intuitively. I’d suggest to skip the proof.» (Elsevier
Science, 2002)
The synthesis of diverse views outlines three schools of method. Ac-
cording to a first school, appeals to intuition must be barred from the liter-
ature; tests can only show the presence of errors, when refuting conjec-
tures. According to a second school, progress is measured by informal
assessments of correctness with respect to individual tests, moving along
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point (a) of Turing’s method, criticising and rejecting points (b,c); this is
«just standard scientific method» by some, and «a variety of the engineer-
ing approach» by others. According to a third school, progress is meas-
ured by formal assessments of correctness with respect to classes of tests,
moving along points (b,c) of Turing’s method, criticizing but still accepting
point (a). Although there are three rival schools of method, the structure
of reports follows the second school. Authority, namely pre-press review,
it is biased, contending through rejection that the field is constrained by
appeals to intuition.
1.3 Discussion
The evidence shows the absence of Baconian consent on method. In our
discussion, we shall separate the people from the problems, and thus we
shall not argue about individual positions. We shall rather focus on in-
dividual interests, to identify opportunities for a resolution of the contro-
versy, and insist on using objective criteria, to avoid arbitrary judgement.
We resolved to use a single objective criterion, namely the consistency of in-
dividual interests with the standard scientific method [66, 18]. The reason
for this is plain: any local paradigm of scientific research must serve the
general interests of science.
1.3.1 On the first school
The first school of method knows the limitations of theoretical truth [92, 85,
86, 43]. Both proof theory and model theory are affected, and subsequent
research reports no objective progress on this front, showing that the com-
munity is still affected by the Gödelitis. Indeed, there is a gap on the fun-
damental adequacy of a strictly theoretical method in conducting scientific
research. The community insists in its purely theoretical method while ig-
noring its original, scientific aim of modelling human reasoning. By word
of Tarski himself, the very concept of logical consequence is not influenced
by empirical knowledge, and doubts have been expressed whether the se-
mantic conception of truth reflects the Aristotelian notion of truth. Al-
though we have no record of such doubts, and thus are unable to verify
them, we have doubts of our own, expressed as follows.
The Aristotelian notion of truth conforms to common sense, it is the
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core method of experimental enquiry [8, iii.10][79, i], and Tarski spent
twenty-five years to formalise it within mathematical logic, leading to the
model-theoretic definitions of logical truth and logical consequence in 1953
[204]. In 1944, Tarski described his aim in plain English (we quoted it at
p. 18). To pursue his aim, Tarski used the Cartesian method [52, regula
xii] [54, part ii] [198, p. 352-3]. The resulting work benefits from it, but
also inherits its weakness. The Cartesian method is similar, although not
identical, to Caesar’s art of war divide et impera. Descartes retained Caesar’s
approach to structure a complex problem into its simpler components, but
replaced the physical solution to the simplest problem with a sentence that
he judged true beyond doubt: «cogito ergo sum» [54, p. 18-9 32–34]. The
observation that «our senses sometimes deceive us» misled Descartes away
from the experimental method. Descartes himself demonstrated the weak-
ness of his method when claiming: «it is evident that vacuum does not
exist» [53, xvi]. Despite the inadequacy of the Cartesian method for exper-
imental research, the method is still in the highest regards for theoretical
research. Tarski used the Cartesian method, both to define the notion of
a sentential function in formalised languages and to obtain a definition of
satisfiability, where he replaced the experimental facts with context free
meta-level objects, and most notably, he did so as a proposed solution to
the liar paradox. Although the Tarskian notion of truth conforms to the
Cartesian notion, Tarski did not display awareness of it; on the contrary, he
believed explicitly that it conforms to that of Aristotle (p. 18). To qualify in
that sense, however, the meta-level objects should rather be experimental
facts, like objects of the physical environment, or properties of objects, or
relations between objects, as resulting from perception and reasoning, but
Tarski did not develop a model of critical perception. Properties and re-
lations can change in time, and thus critical perception requires perform-
ing actions that lead to context dependent experimental facts, but Tarski
did not develop a model of causation. Finally, modelling common sense
(causal) reasoning involves modelling a context dependent notion of truth
(relative truth), but Tarski modelled a notion of truth for context free sen-
tences (absolute truth).
A comprehensive programme for a relevant extension of classical,
Tarskian logic, aiming at Tarski’s intended goal of modelling the Aris-
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totelian notion of truth, should then include the following: the three-
fold extension of classical logic to include a materially adequate model
of perception, causation, and context dependent truth. This identifies the
research problem with more precision than the frame problem [116], and
states the inadequacy of purely theoretical methods of research in this field.
We remark the difference between the above programme and McCarthy’s aim to
merely use classical logic to axiomatize knowledge of actions and their effects. It
is clear to us that classical Tarskian logic is fundamentally inadequate to model
human causal reasoning, due to its Cartesian notion of truth.
1.3.2 On the second school
The Oxford Dictionary defines «intuition» as «the immediate apprehension
of an object by the mind without the intervention of any reasoning process»
[189]. The «classical paradigm» is «constrained by appeals to intuition»,
and thus it demands for «immediate apprehension» of a formal model of
human reasoning «by the mind», through a written test, but «without the
intervention of any reasoning process». This leads to the absurd conclusion
that to peer review a formal model of human reasoning we would have to
suspend critical judgment.
To avoid the absurd, the «classical paradigm» should have been de-
scribed in terms of a more appropriate word than «intuition», to describe
correctly the meaning acquired by habit, such as: «intuitive plausibility
arguments» without «formalist justifications». The following key words
match semantically [189]: (i) assumption: «a belief or feeling that some-
thing is true, although there is no proof of it»; (ii) conjecture: «a ground
or reason for conclusion (not amounting to demonstration)»; (iii) opinion:
«judgement resting on grounds insufficient for complete demonstration»,
«distinguished from knowledge».
The «classical paradigm» turns out to be the exact converse of the stand-
ard scientific method, because Science is «clear and certain mental appre-
hension», «knowledge as opposed to belief or opinion» [189], and it does
not consist of assumptions, as also stated by Ockham’s Law of Parsimony.
Key references supporting this conclusion are Galilei [77, 78] [79, i][77, 78]
[79, i] and Bacon [18, I-65-6] at the birth of modern science, but also Plato
[149, 98a] and Aristotle [8, iii.10] [10, vi.10] [9, I,2,71 b ff.] [12, I,100 a 27]
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[13, I,33,89a 38;I,31,87b 27;I,2] [11, VI,2,1027 a 20;VII,6,1031 b 5]. Bacon’s
Novum Organum summarises and still popularizes both the standard sci-
entific method and the principles of peer-review, standing as the manifesto
of the Royal Society of London and any academy of science since 1660 [191].
The «classical paradigm» moves away from the very principles that have
been fostering modern science in the past four centuries, and it does so with
no explicit and well-argued reason. By rejecting proofs in favour unsup-
ported claims, it is also cunningly eluding the proper role of conjectures, as
explained by Turing himself.
The rejection of the method raises doubts on the literature obtained us-
ing this method. The «classical paradigm» comes with the following ques-
tion, usually at pre-press review: «As we know well, there are several lead-
ing formalisms in the field (e.g. the situation calculus [...]), so what is the
substantial reason for introducing another [formalism] instead of work-
ing with the existing ones?» This classical question has its classical answer
from Galilei, Bacon, and four hundred years of European academy. The
«substantial reason for introducing another formalism instead of working
with the existing» «leading formalisms» is that writing scientific models is
what scientists do. We are free from the orthodoxy that you shall have no
other formalisms before the leading formalism, because the paramount duty of
Science is to model Nature, not to acknowledge authority. The adjective
«leading», when referred to the «classical paradigm», it is an adjective un-
supported by evidence: it is indeed the case that the «classical paradigm»
does not use any objective measure of progress for the systematic analysis
and comparison of relevant formalisms. Its «leading formalisms» are not
the measure of scientific progress, via fair classification and comparison,
but the measure of the ability of their school to bury rival research with
dogmatic and abusive pre-press review. The anonymous pre-press review-
ers abuse their role by conditioning authors to use a non-scientific method
when conducting scientific research. The use of editorial control to gain
competitive advantage, preventing the work of rival schools to appear on
the record, it is less than fair play. Under the publish or perish dogma, the
act of conditioning by rejection is an intellectual crime.
It certainly is an attractive quality to show respect for the past, with all its
embarrassing mistakes, but we must beware of its devious influence. Em-
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barrassment occurs when people’s opinions are mixed with their egos, and
thus independent critical judgement triggers defence mechanisms such as
authority and prejudgement. Proper scientific work is objective, dispas-
sionate, not bound to anyone’s intuition, or ego, or authority. As Cicero
has it, «anyone is liable to make mistakes; but no one persists in mak-
ing them, except the unwise person» [40, Philippica xii]. The «classical
paradigm» shows its respect for the past by compulsively persisting in the
embarrassing mistakes, forcing the community to commit more of them,
through dogmatic and abusive pre-press review.
1.3.3 On the third school
According to the «systematic paradigm», scientific progress in the field is
measured by formal assessments of correctness with respect to a state trans-
ition semantics. The father of the «systematic paradigm» acknowledges the
engineers Ljung and Nebel for the research problem and inspiration for the
research method respectively [169, p. vi], but leaves a gap in knowledge on
the fundamental adequacy of an engineering method in conducting sci-
entific research.
From our standpoint, Science and Engineering have different aims and
methods, and are therefore distinct. We read the «systematic paradigm» as
a Linnean method of binomial nomenclature for the classification of mod-
els based on their epistemological and ontological characteristics. These
characteristics are stated as constraints on a state transition system which
mimics the common sense causal inferences step-by-step. The criterion of
classification consists in proving soundness and completeness of the model
(its observational behaviour) with respect to the intended model (the state
transition semantics). Based on our reading, we use this method to arrange
the collection of raw data in tables, which fulfills the second point of the
standard scientific method, as described by Bacon.
1.3.4 Pathologies
In modelling human behaviour, it is important for us to be aware of patho-
logies, to see non-trivial errors in past research and the directions to avoid
them in our own models. The field of Psychiatry discriminates between
two disorders that are expecially compelling in our research: neurosys and
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psychosis, or perceptual bias and inferential bias [1].
Any agent by the Cartesian method is psychotic. The agent reasons and
acts upon its internal representations only, displaying lack of awareness
of the external environment. We identify as examples of psychotic agents,
Tarski’s semantic theory and Nilsson’s shakey [144]. McCarthy’s circum-
scriptive calculus of situations has the «jumping-to-conclusions» inferential
bias, which is a symptom of clinical paranoia [22].
Any agent by Brooks’s method [31, 32, 33] is neurotic. Given the agent’s
lack of internal representations, and thus of memory, the agent would re-
peat certain actions over and over, displaying the symptoms of obsessive-
compulsive disorder [67].
Both methods lead to incomplete models of human behaviour, all re-
quiring human assistance. By comparison, any good agent by Aristotle’s
method would model both perception and reasoning, to use them properly,
thus requiring less human assistance in Cognitive Robotics.
1.3.5 Conclusion
We collected evidence of the standard method of research in the subject,
and conclude that the community has not yet reach Baconian consensus.
There are indeed three schools of method. Methodological limitations of
the first school include inferential bias through the failure to model percep-
tion. Methodological limitations of the second school include inferential
and perceptual bias, and the more general failure to measure progress ob-
jectively. The third school, in our interpretation, fulfills the second point of
the standard scientific method.
2METHODS (PART II)
2.1 Introduction
We are interested in modeling human causal reasoning. Our motive is plain
curiosity, with no specific application in mind. Our aim is to foster the fun-
damental understanding of the subject via the systematic arrangement of
raw data, through analysis of its structure. To pursue this aim, we need a
suitable instance of the standard scientific method for the collection, classi-
fication and comparison of data. We outline this method as follows.
collection of raw data Language is the medium of thought; it
makes human reasoning observable. The raw data, therefore, is plentifully
available. The relevant history, both natural and experimental, consists of
explicit reasoning and observation of salient behaviour. Test examples are
not suitable as raw data, because they describe problems, not the reasoning
behind their solution. Existing theories are suitable as raw data, because
they are, albeit in part, an explicit and concise description of the reasoning
of their respective authors. We shall use corpus-based grammars of natural
language [157] to fasten the collection to experimental evidence of relevant
linguistic structures, such as the use of time points and continuous change
in progressive tenses.
classification of collected data We read Sandewall’s «systematic
paradigm» [174, 169] as a suitable method of binomial nomenclature based
on epistemological and ontological characteristics of collected data. The bi-
nomial nomenclature reminds us of Linnaeus, and the denotation of char-
acteristics and subcharacteristics reminds us of Berzelius (with subscripts
instead of superscripts). These characteristics are stated as constraints on
a state transition system which mimics the causal inferences step-by-step.
The criterion of classification consists in proving soundness and complete-
ness of each theory (its observational behaviour) with respect to the state
transition semantics (the intended models). Our intuitions are recollected
34
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by reading the classification, formally proved by structural induction on
the length of the causal chains. We revise and extend this classification
method to solve a number of open problems. The resulting method is
independent of specific models. To describe time points and continuous
change in progressive tenses, the state transition system is redefined in
terms of lattices and continuous fluents. The method encompasses models
of perception (function of reality-testing), causation (including continuous
change, concurrency of actions, cause-and-effect chains, delayed effects of
actions, causal qualification and structure-based ramification), and contex-
t-dependent truth. The given notion of perception renders the local notion
of truth fair to facts.
comparison of classified data We compare the classified data by as-
sessing equivalence and subsumption relations, formally proven by set-
theoretic inclusions. IfM is the set of classified data, the structure (M;⊆)
is a partially ordered set. We adopt this structure as the coherent thematic
view of which we were in search.
In what follows, we describe the above method in detail, namely,
the general method for classifying and comparing data (§2.2.1) and spe-
cific epistemological and ontological characteristics for the classifications
(§2.2.2). Our design is not to teach the method which each should follow,
but only to describe the one we have endeavoured to use. In the last part
of this report, we present and discuss an updated summary of the results
obtained using this method.
2.2 Method
Note on the register. The word «model» has different meanings in different
contexts and fields of research. The Oxford English Dictionary [189], for
example, records fifteen core meanings and about twenty-five submean-
ings of this noun. In general, scientific models are theories which aim at
explaining what Nature does or may be made to [18, aph. I-10]; they aim
at describing Nature and are the results of scientific discovery. Engineer-
ing models are descriptions of objects made by humans, that is, objects that
do not exist in Nature and are the result of human invention. Classical,
Tarskian, mathematical logic is a scientific model of human reasoning. For
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any set Γ of well-formed formulae of classical logic, a «model of Γ» is a
certain mathematical structure S such that all formulae in Γ are true in S,
as defined by Tarski in 1953 [204] [198, p. 352-3]. «Model theory» is the
branch of meta-mathematics announced by Tarski in 1954 [199]. Preferen-
tial logics [186, p. 389] are the result of associating a preference relation
on interpretations to any base logic with compositional model-theoretic se-
mantics. Classical and modal logic are an example of such base logics. In
Sandewall’s monograph [169, p. 185,176-177,132-134], and in the following
def. 2.2.1, we read «classical models» as «models of a compositional mod-
el-theoretic semantics» rather than «models of classical logic», because the
specific work is more general than classical logic and uses base logics other
than classical logic. In the same references, «intended models» are formal
models by the transition-system describing the epistemological and onto-
logical characteristics of discrete-fluent preferential logics. We shall use the
same noun to mean either scientific theories or semantic models, and let
the reader disambiguate from the context.
2.2.1 How to classify and compare models
Definition 2.2.1 (Correctness) «If Γ is a set of propositions, we write [[Γ]]
for the set of classical models for Γ and Σ(Γ) for the set of intended mod-
els. The research problem is how to obtain Σ(Γ) in terms of operations
on formulae in Γ. [Rather] than allowing the definition of Σ(Γ) to rely on
intuitions that are independently applied for each particular choice of Γ,
[the method] requires a formal definition of Σ(Γ) as the set of intended
models. The task for any proposed nonmonotonic logic is then to correctly
identify this Σ(Γ). In fact one needs not just one but several such func-
tions Σi. [Sandewall] [168] defines Σ using an underlying semantics based
on a notion of possible trajectories that characterize the various ways of
performing each action. This may be understood as a way of having an
auxiliary language with only its semantics but without any syntax. [It] is
important that the definition of the function Σ shall [capture] our notions
of common sense. [Once] one or more Σi have been defined, one can ana-
lyse some of the nonmonotonic logics that have been described above, or
some new ones. [Each logic is] characterized by its own model-selection
function S. [Each] logic must then be formulated as a function S from a set
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of axioms to a set of models, and one can ask the following question: For
a given logic S and a given Σi, does the logic obtain exactly the intended
conclusions, i.e. is S(Γ) = Σi(Γ) for all Γ? [In] order to characterize the
range of applicability of each S it is natural to first define a common and
fairly broad base logic, i.e. a logic in the conventional sense of a syntax and
a Tarskian semantics.» [174, p. 445,468-470]
The above criterion of correctness admits the existence of an object lan-
guage and a meta-language. The object language is the preferential logic.
The meta-language is a formalized language; its syntax is identical to the
syntax of the object language, its semantics is the underlying semantics, and
its models are defined using the same structure of interpretations of the ob-
ject language. The equivalence of preferred models and intended models is
the correctness criterion. The evidence of this intimate relation between the
two languages is available in Sandewall’s monograph, where a base logic
is used to define both S and Σ [169, p. 201,239].
This intimate relation between object language and meta-language is es-
sential to Sandewall’s notion of correctness. The assessment of correctness
standardizes the object language; it must use the same syntax and structure
of interpretations of the meta-language. Factual evidence of this is avail-
able in Sandewall’s monograph, where the pgm entailment [169, p. 243] is a
reformulation of a model by McCarthy [127, 128], an instance of the gmon
entailment [169, p. 242] [174, p. 485,486] is a reformulation of a model by
McCarthy [127, 128], and the ocm entailment [169, p. 243] is a reformula-
tion of a model by Kautz [97]. The base logic for both ocm and pgm is the
discrete-fluent logic dfl-1. The base logic for gmon is the discrete-fluent
logic dfl-2. The reformulation is also instrumental to examine any ques-
tion of interpretation that may occur during the assessment of an imprecise
language; the cited work by McCarthy is evidence of this [169, p. 242-3].
The same intimate relation between object language and meta-language
raises serious difficulties. In this field, any model embodies the history
and identity of its community, which would rather reject the assessment
method than reformulate the model. Further, the assessment of correctness
does not necessarily succeed immediately, because the assessment aims at
identifying Σi, reformulating the model at each attempt. The reformulation
may also change the model, like an inaccurate diagnostic instrument whose
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usage changes the very properties it aims at diagnosing.
We solved the above problems by lifting the need for reformulations.
We introduced and used this solution to assess Logic Programming, the
Circumscriptive Calculus of Events [28] and the Calculus of Fluents [26].
We describe the solution in the following definition. We perfect the method
introducing the term «classification» of models, which occurs neither in
Sandewall’s monograph [169] nor in the Handbook [174].
Definition 2.2.2 (Classification) Let Γ be any set of sentences in the
meta-language (reasoning problem). Let S be any causal logic (reason-
ing model), defined as a function from a set of sentences to a set of se-
mantic models. We refer to the language of S as the object language. Let
T1 and T2 be functions whose respective purpose is to translate the syn-
tax of the meta-language into the syntax of the object language, and the
structure of interpretations of the meta-language into the structure of in-
terpretations of the object language. We say that S is correct for Γ if and
only if S(T1(Γ)) = T2(Σi(Γ)), that is, for any intended interpretation I,
T2(I) ∈ S(T1(Γ)) if and only if I ∈ Σi(Γ). The correctness of the causal
logic is expressed as equivalence between the logic and the underlying
semantics. The equivalence is formally proved by structural induction on
the length of the causal chains, comparing the observable behaviour of
causal steps in S(T1(Γ)) with those in T2(Σi(Γ)). The correctness criterion
reduces to S(Γ) = Σi(Γ) if T1 and T2 are the identity function. The range of
applicability of S, or problem-solving power, is the class of all Γ such that S
is correct for Γ. The classification of S is the formal assessment (proof) of the
range of applicability of S.
The above criterion of correctness is more demanding than Milner’s
bisimulation [175]. The standard bisimulations compare the observable be-
haviour of a computational step in one system with that of another, es-
sentially checking the labels of transitions. In our theory, the observable
behaviour must correspond at any given point in time, including the times
between transitions (inertia) and during transitions (discrete or continuous
change).
The classification of a model is its certificate of correct applicability. When
applied to any reasoning problem in its class, the model always gives the
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correct (intended) set of conclusions. There are uncountably many reason-
ing problems in each non-trivial class, and thus the assessment holds true
with respect to the general characteristic properties defining this class. In
practice, we use the above definition as follows: given a reasoning model
and a reasoning problem, we say that the model solves the problem only if
the problem belongs to the class for which the model is provably correct.
The cost of introducing a new model is the number of fair and accurate
comparisons with all pre-existent models. The following definition reduces
this cost to the single classification of the new model, with the added value
of a result whose validity holds up to future additions into the set of clas-
sified models. Using the same definition, the task of assessing equivalence
and subsumption relations among models reduces to deciding set-inclu-
sions between their respective range of applicability, and thus, once classi-
fied, detailed knowledge of the models is not a requirement for their formal
comparison.
Definition 2.2.3 (Equivalence and Subsumption) Let Si and Sj be classi-
fied models of causal reasoning. We define a binary relation, Si ⊆ Sj, which
satisfies the property of reflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity. If Si and
Sj have the same class, we write Si = Sj and say that Si and Sj are equival-
ent. If Si ⊆ Sj and Si 6= Sj, we write Si ⊂ Sj and say that Sj subsumes Si.
LetM be the set of all classified models. The structure (M;⊆) is a partially
ordered set.
Our ability to offer equivalent answers to equivalent questions in equi-
valent contexts is supporting evidence of coherence. We describe this abil-
ity as the property of full abstraction of the reasoning model (function S)
with respect to the equivalence of reasoning problems (input). The term
was inspired to us by Levi [76] and Milner [136].
Definition 2.2.4 (Full abstraction) Let Γ and Γ′ be sets of sentences in the
meta-language. Let T be a translator. Let = be the usual set-theoretic iden-
tity. We define the following relations.
• Equivalence of Γ and Γ′ with respect to the set of intended models:
Γ ≈ Γ′ ⇔ Σ(Γ) = Σ(Γ′)
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• Correctness of S with respect to ≈:
Γ ≈ Γ′ ⇐ S(T(Γ)) = S(T(Γ′))
• Full abstraction of S with respect to ≈:
Γ ≈ Γ′ ⇔ S(T(Γ)) = S(T(Γ′))
Proposition 2.1 For any given model S and intended model Σ, the correct-
ness of S with respect to Σ implies the full abstraction of S with respect
to ≈.
Proof The proposition holds true by mere transitivity of =. q.e.d.
As observed by Milner, proving full abstraction of formal models is
non-trivial. In the above case, by proposition 2.1, this proof is a corollary of
classification. Proving full abstraction for non-classified models falls back
to Milner’s observations.
The wide variety of existing models has made it hard to gain a good
understanding of them, to compare among them, and fit them into a coher-
ent thematic view [186] [75, p. v]. We solve this open problem by deem-
phasising the importance of individual models. We proceed as follows:
(step 1) we collect models as raw data, clearly stated and free of appeals to
intuition; (step 2) we arrange the collection in tables, according to shared
epistemological and ontological characteristics (def. 2.2.2); (step 3) we com-
pare the classified data with each other by assessing equivalence and sub-
sumption relations (def. 2.2.3). This describes an instance of the standard
scientific method in its usual reading of data collection, data analysis and
data interpretation, as concisely described by Bacon [18, aph. II-10], and it
aims at meeting Bacon’s and Frege’s advice to proceed free of gaps in the
production and verification of results [18, aph. I-65, I-66] [72, p. 102,103]
[71, p. 5,6].
The standard scientific method of research suggests a uniform structure
for its reports, namely, four standard sections with a clear understanding
of their individual contribution and mutual relation.
• The first section describes the research aims in context. Examples of
application do not qualify as scientific aims.
• The second section describes the method of research, being a relevant in-
stance of the standard scientific method. If the method is well described
in a published paper or standard text then a reference to the source will
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be sufficient. Any new extension used in the report must be described
explicitly. The criterion for a well-written section on method is that a
reasonably knowledgeable colleague could reproduce the results after
reading the description.
• The third section presents the results, as obtained using the above
method. In our field, the results consist of classifications (def. 2.2.2).
• The fourth section is the discussion, namely, the interpretation of the
results with respect to the original aims, and the comparison between
these results and former relevant work (def. 2.2.3).
We separate the results from the discussion because it helps preserving
the objectivity of the results. Cautious «appeals to intuition» are allowed
in the discussion. Different people may have different interpretations of
the results, but the results themselves must appeal to facts and to rigorous
reasoning about those facts. Given this division, a «test example» may only
be described in the discussion, although proper examples of application are
best presented in engineering papers.
Throughout the above description, we used the formal notion of inten-
ded model Σi. We shall now describe this notion, followed by three in-
stances as used in various reports when classifying and comparing models.
This concludes the description of the method.
2.2.2 Epistemological and ontological characteristics
In the above definitions, Σi describes the epistemological and ontological
characteristics of a class. These characteristics are stated as constraints on
a state transition system which mimics the observational behaviour of the
human mind when reasoning about actions and their effects in the envi-
ronment.
Informally, the structure of the transition system consists of a directed
graph whose nodes are states, whose arrows are labelled by actions, and
causal laws justify the state transitions. The graph is rooted in the initial
state σ0, which may either be unspecified or partially specified. There is at
least one state σt for each time point t > 0, with a single incoming arrow
and at least one outgoing arrow. The predecessors of any state σt, t > 0,
are linearly ordered and define a causal chain or path (σ0, . . . , σt) in the state
transition system. The set of causal chains is the set of intended models
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(def. 2.2.1). We use state transition systems because of their standard struc-
ture and theorem-proving technique. We prove correctness (def. 2.2.2) by
structural induction on the length of the causal chain. In so doing, we fol-
low Bacon’s recommendation to use induction. Such proofs are uniform
and free of gaps or appeals to intuition, as advocated by Frege.
Formally, Σi is defined in terms of a board-game between the physical
environment and a Freudian ego (the one of the three parts of the mind
that connects a person to the physical environment) [73], and it mimics
the causal inferences step-by-step. We use a binomial nomenclature of the
form E-O, to represent the epistemological and ontological characteristics
respectively.
We shall now describe three specific Σi by successive extensions, namely
K-IA, K-RA and K-RACi. In K-IA, the environment is a discrete descrip-
tion of an imaginary environment whose dynamics obeys to temporal in-
ertia and boolean causal laws. K-RA extends K-IA to the case of continu-
ous time and continuous change. The extension to the continuum solves
an open problem formulated in [169, p. 293-4] [174, p. 493]. K-RACi ex-
tends K-RA to the case of non-interleaving concurrency of independent ac-
tions. In K-RACi, the environment is close to Newtonian Mechanics, and
the given notion of truth renders the environment realistic. The mature
version of K-IA appeared in print in [169]; the concise definition in this sec-
tion is our interpretation, revision and simplification of the original, with
precise references for side-by-side comparison. The first version of K-RA
and K-RACi appeared in print in [25]; their definition in this section is the
mature version, as used in previous works to classify the Circumscriptive
Calculus of Events [28, 29] and the Calculus of Fluents [26].
Definition of the class K-IA
We describe a game for two, played on a board where each piece is moved
according to specific rules. The board represents the environment. The two
players are the agent’s mind, or «ego», and the environment itself. The
agent’s body is an object in the environment. It is useful to picture the
two players in front of the board, with a set of pieces for each player (def.
2.2.6). The game has two sets of rules that must be obeyed. The first set
ensures that the configuration of the board is correct at each stage in the
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development of the game (def. 2.2.8). The second set describes how the
pieces can be used by each player (def. 2.2.10). The players take turns. As
the games unfold, the state transitions are recorded (def. 2.2.11). The set of
all correct state transitions is the set of intended models (def. 2.2.12).
Definition 2.2.5 (Features and Fluents) Let O be a finite collection of
names representing objects of the environment, as perceived by the agent.
Let F be a finite collection of names representing features, i.e. perceivable
properties of objects or perceivable relations among objects. We specify
objects as parameters for features, for example on(blockA, blockB). Fea-
tures have values at points in time. Let T =N∪ {0} be the domain of time
points, and let the symbols= and< represent the usual relations on natural
numbers. Let V be a discrete domain of values for features. An observation
is an element of H = T × F × V , for example (0, on(blockA, blockB), true).
A state of the environment at time τ is a set στ of elements of S = F × V ,
for example στ = {( f1, v1), . . . , ( fn, vn)}. The agent’s body is an object in
the environment; it has individual properties, as perceived by the agent
itself, and relationships with other objects in the environment. A distinct-
ive ability of the agent is to change the value of features by performing
actions. The actions start and end at time points. Let E be a finite collec-
tion of names for actions. We specify objects as parameters for actions, for
example move(obj, (x, y, z), (x′, y′, z′)). Features change over time. We call
fluent any feature traced over time.
Definition 2.2.6 (Configuration of the board) We define a board with five
places the game is played on, formally represented as the five-tuple
(B, M, H,P , C), where
• B = [0, nB ] ⊂ T , where nB represents the present time.
• M is a mapping which assigns values in B to some or all the temporal
constant symbols, and values in O to all the object constant symbols.
• H : B → S is the history, where S ⊂ F × V .
• P ⊂ B × B × E is the past-action set.
• C ⊂ B × E is the current-action set.
For any time point t ∈ T and feature f ∈ F , the state of the environment
at t is H(t), and the value of f at t is H(t, f ). We define configuration of the
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board any instance of its formal representation. [169, p. 18]
Definition 2.2.7 (Perception) «Let SM be a material-level state domain,
and S an image-level state domain. A perception function is a mapping Perc
from finite histories for SM to finite histories for S which satisfies the fol-
lowing characteristics: (1) the parameter and value are histories over the
same time period; (2) if H is a history over [0, t], s < t, and H[0,s] is the
restriction of H to the period [0, s], then Perc(H)[0,s] = Perc(H[0,s]).» [169,
p. 5]
Definition 2.2.8 (Correct revision of the board) Let J and J′ be configura-
tions of the board. We say that J′ is a correct revision of J iff the following
conditions hold:
• B ⊆ B′. If b ∈ B′ \ B then is b > nB .
• M ⊆ M′.
• The restriction of H′ to [0, nB ] is equal to H.
• P ⊆ P ′. If (s, t, A) ∈ P ′ \ P then both t = nB′ and (s, A) ∈ C \ C ′.
• If (s, A) ∈ C \ C ′ then either s = nB or (s, nB′ , A) ∈ P ′.
If (s, A) ∈ C ′ \ C then s = nB . [169, p. 19]
Definition 2.2.9 (Causal Laws) A causal law describes the patterns of fea-
tures’ change over a time period, as resulting from the execution of an ac-
tion. We write causal laws using the following three-step process.
step 1 We collect a natural and experimental history of the action that
we want to model. This collection represents the action’s observational
behaviour.
step 2 We write the action’s observational behaviour in a table, like a
Wittgenstein’s truth-table in propositional logic states the truth-value of a
sentence on a case-by-case basis. We do so as follows. Let A ∈ E be the
name for the action that we are modelling. Let σs = H(s) be a state of
the environment at time s. We define the function In f l : E × S → ℘(F ),
such that ℘(F ) is the power set of F and In f l(A, σs) ∈ ℘(F ) is the set of
those features whose value changes if the action A starts at time point s.
We define the function Trajs from E × S , such that Trajs(A, σs) is a set of
trajectories for In f l(A, σs). A trajectory in Trajs(A, σs) is a finite nonempty
sequence of partial states (σs+1, . . . , σt), where t ≥ 1, assigning values to
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features in In f l(A, σs) only. For the given action name A in E , varying σs
over all possible states in S , the elements (σs, In f l(A, σs), Trajs(A, σs)) form
a table stating the action’s observational behaviour. We shall refer to it as
the set-theoretic description of the action A. Varying A in E and σs in S ,
the resulting elements form tables stating the complete observational be-
haviour of the environment. We shall refer to the collection of these tables
as the set-theoretic description of the environment. [169, p. 75, 80–2, 170]
step 3 For a given table, as resulting from step 2, we interpret its in-
formation to identify all patterns, and then we write a logical formula to
represent these patterns. This formula is the causal law that models the
action. In the present definition, the causal law represents the information
in the table like a formula in full disjunctive normal form represents a Wit-
tgenstein’s truth-table in propositional logic. We shall now describe how
to read the table and write the causal law.—The action may have precon-
ditions, intended as specific values of certain features at the time when the
action starts. As we read the table, we represent any relevant statement
of type «the feature f j has have value v at time s» by a formula of type
[s] f j = v. Let Antecedent be a logical conjunction of all such formulae.—The
action extends over a time period, where features are influenced. We then
represent the statement «the feature f j is occluded (prevented from being
seen, i.e. neither true nor false) during (s, t] and is explicitly assigned to the
value w at time t» by the formula [s, t] f j := w. We represent unoccluded
change by a finite conjunction of [τ] f j := w assignments, where τ ∈ (s, t].
Let Consequent be a finite non-empty conjunction of such formulae.—Let s
and t be temporal variables, and let M be the mapping by definition 2.2.6.
We write the causal law for the action A as follows:
[s, t]AV Antecedent→ Consequent
We represent alternative results by disjunctive statements:
[s, t]AV
n∨
i=1
Antecedenti → Consequenti
We read the causal law as follows: if the action A starts at time M(s),
ends at time M(t), and the formulae in M(Antecedenti) are true in the state
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σM(s), then the influenced features change according to the formulae in
M(Consequenti). [169, p. 128,136,137,238,170]
Example 2.2.1 Let consider a simple action A, with preconditions, dura-
tion and alternative results, where the value of influenced features is un-
known during its execution. The features f1 and f2 are expected to be true
at the time when A starts. Both features are occluded during the execu-
tion of the action. The first possible result makes both features false. The
second possible result makes f1 false and f2 true. Thus, the action A is
nondeterministic with respect to f2 and deterministic with respect to f1.
These are given raw-data, intended as a natural and experimental history,
carefully and precisely collected from experimental observations of an ac-
tion performed in the environment (step 1). Generally, we have plenty of
raw-data; the purpose of the table (In f l, Trajs) is to reduce and arrange
such raw-data with method and order (step 2). The following table states
the observational behaviour of the simple action A.
σs In f l(A, σs) Trajs(A, σs)
{. . . , ( f1, T), ( f2, T), . . .} { f1, f2} {({( f1, F), ( f2, F)}),
({( f1, F), ( f2, T)})}
{. . . , ( f1, T), ( f2, F), . . .} ∅ {(∅)}
{. . . , ( f1, F), ( f2, T), . . .} ∅ {(∅)}
{. . . , ( f1, F), ( f2, F), . . .} ∅ {(∅)}
The first row of the table reads as follows. Let σs be a state of the envi-
ronment at time point s, where σs = {. . . , ( f1, T), ( f2, T), . . .}, f1 is true, f2 is
true also, and other elements (feature,value) in S may be known explicitly
but are not relevant (column 1). When starting the action A in any such
time point s, the action A influences (changes the values of) the features f1
and f2 only (column 2). The respective values of f1 and f2 change as stated
in the table, according to two different trajectories (column 3). We then in-
terpret the table to form the causal law (step 3). We obtain the following
logical formula:
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[s, t]A V (Antecedent→ Consequent1)∨
(Antecedent→ Consequent2)
where
Antecedent ≡ [s] f1 = T ∧ [s] f2 = T
Consequent1 ≡ [s, t] f1 := F ∧ [s, t] f2 := F
Consequent2 ≡ [s, t] f1 := F ∧ [s, t] f2 := T
Definition 2.2.10 (Rules of the game) We define the function ⊕ : S × S →
S such that σ? = σ ⊕ σ′ is the state where σ?( f ) = σ′( f ) if σ′( f ) is
defined and σ?( f ) = σ( f ) otherwise. Given a state σ and a trajectory
h = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σt), we define the abbreviation σ B h for (σ ⊕ σ1, σ ⊕
σ2, . . . , σ ⊕ σt). If H is a history over B = [0, t] and h = (σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′k)
is a trajectory, then H′ = H B h is the updated history over B′ = [0, t + k],
where
H′(s) =
H(t)⊕ σ′i if s = t + i > tH(s) if s ≤ t
HB (∅) updates H from t to t+ 1 so that H(t+ 1) = H(t), where (∅) is the
null trajectory.—Let (B = {0}, M, H(0),P , C) be an initial configuration of
the board, where H(0) is a nondeterministically chosen initial state of the
environment. Let the players take turns.
• The ego can do one of the following at its turn:
• start a single new action: C ′ = C ∪ {(s, A)}, s = nB
• end a running action: C ′ = C \ {(s, A)}, P ′ = P ∪ {(s, t, A)}, t = nB
• The environment can do one of the following at its turn:
• if (s, A) ∈ C then
B′ = B ∪ {s + k}
H′ = HB h, where h = (σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′k) ∈ Trajs(A, H(s))
P ′ = P ∪ {(s, s + k, A)}
• if C = ∅ then
B′ = B ∪ {nB + 1}6
6There is an inconsistency between the general definition of image-level world in [169, p.
20] and its specialisation in [169, p. 76]; the former definition requires B′ = B and the latter
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H′ = HB (∅)
P ′ = P .
We use the single term action to refer both actions with definite duration
and actions with indefinite duration. When executing an action with indef-
inite duration, k is a variable in T and its definite value will be decided by
the ego. No action with definite duration can be ended by the ego. [169,
p. 19,20,74,76,78]
The last part of def. 2.2.10 implements the property of strict inertia: no
feature changes its value except under the explicit effect of an action, within
the duration of the action. The frame problem is the problem of describ-
ing in a compact form what does not change when an action is performed
[134]. The frame axiom is built in the property of strict inertia by requiring
σ?( f ) = σ( f ).
The game is nondeterministic, because of the nondeterministic initial
configuration of the board and the nondeterministic selection of the traject-
ory h from Trajs. The environment, therefore, is a player with non-fixed
strategy.
Definition 2.2.11 (Reasoning problem, scenario or narrative) A scenario is
a description of the environment and its state transitions. A scenario in the
class K-IA is a five-tuple
Υ ≡ (K,O, (IA, law), scd∪ tc, obs)
whose components are as follows:
• obs ⊂ T ×F × V = H is a finite set of observations.
• scd ⊂ B × B × E is the P component of the board at the end of all
games. Temporal variables are allowed, universally quantified over B.
• tc is a possibly empty set of temporal constraints for scd members.
• law is a set of causal laws defining the actions in scd.
• IA is the family of characteristics regarding the ontological nature of the
environment. The environment must enjoy the property of strict inertia
requires B′ = B ∪ {nB + 1}. We prefer the latter requirement, because the former would
stop the flux of time between actions, thus failing with the Hanks-McDermott problem [90].
2·2 methods (part ii) 49
and time points must be non-negative integer numbers (I). Actions may
have alternative results (A). There are no concurrent actions.
• K is the agent’s epistemological constraint, meaning that knowledge
about actions is explicit, accurate and complete. K is defined as follows.
(1) each element of scd is specified in terms of action symbol, paramet-
ers, starting and ending times; (2) there are no additional actions besides
those specified in scd; (3) each causal law in law must explicitly specify
all the features it may influence (a void Consequent is not allowed), to-
gether with a set of preconditions for its applicability (a void Antecedent
is allowed); (4) for every A ∈ E and σs ∈ S , it is Trajs(A, σs) 6= ∅ and
there is a causal law in law that defines how to perform A when started
at time point s. [169, p. 8,25,26,35,42,44,160 and §8.2]
Definition 2.2.12 (Intended models) Let Υ be a scenario in K-IA. The set
of intended models for Υ is as follows:
ΣK-IA(Υ) = {(M, H) | (B, M, H,P , C) ∈ Mod(Υ)}
where the set Mod(Υ) is as follows: (1) construct the unique environment
that is precisely specified by (IA, law) in Υ, then select an arbitrary ego and
an arbitrary initial configuration of the board; (2) generate all possible con-
figurations of the board as correct revisions resulting from games between
the ego and the environment; (3) restrict this set of configurations to those
where the set of actions P is exactly the set of actions specified by scd in
Υ, and where all formulae of scd ∪ tc and obs in Υ are satisfied. [169,
p. 46,180,182-185]—For any (t, f , v) ∈ H and model set Σ(Υ), we say that
(t, f , v) is true in Σ(Υ) if and only if it exists an intended interpretation
(M, H) such that (B, M, H,P , C) ∈ Mod(Υ) and ( f , v) ∈ H(t).—We use
the binomial nomenclature K-IA to represent the described family of epi-
stemological and ontological characteristics.
Monotonicity and non-monotonicity are formal properties of formal
reasoning methods. For a given formal language L and consequence rela-
tion Cn, Cn is monotonic iff for any set of premises Γ and for any sentence α
in L, Cn(Γ) ⊆ Cn(Γ ∪ {α}). Cn is non-monotonic otherwise. Monoton-
icity is based on the scientific ideal that truth is absolute. Non-monotonicity
is based on the common experience in science that truth is defeasible.
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Proposition 2.2 ΣK-IA is non-monotonic.
Proof scd ⊆ scd′ does not imply ΣK-IA(Υ) ⊆ ΣK-IA(Υ′). [169, p. 194]
q.e.d.
The full class K-IA allows for qualitative uncertainty in the form of
incomplete initial states and nondeterministic effects of actions. The IA
family of ontological characteristics constrains the environment to features
whose value persists unchanged unless there is a sequentially executed ac-
tion that changes them explicitly. This is the classical case since the time of
the strips [68] and tweak [36] planning systems. In addition to this clas-
sical case, IA includes actions with extended duration, metric time, condi-
tional effects, incomplete specification of the order of the actions and non-
determinism [169, p. 25].
We can define sub-classes of K-IA by imposing constraints upon the
epistemological and ontological characteristics in definition 2.2.11 [169,
p. 28,42,208]. The class Ks-IA, for example, is defined as K-IA with the
additional constraint of complete knowledge about the initial state of the
environment, consisting in a complete initial set of elements (0, f , v) of obs,
all elements being relevant to the specific reasoning problem at hand. The
class K-IA \ Ks-IA is the class of all K-IA scenarios whose initial state is
either partially or completely unspecified, i.e. some or all the features are
neither true nor false. To allow neither true nor false sentences is to meet
both Prior’s recommendation in [155] [156, ch. VIII] and the common sense
experience that only a fraction of all possible aspects of the environment
falls within the scope of personal knowledge. The class Kp-IA restricts
K-IA to the case of no observations about any later state than the initial
one, i.e. the class of pure prediction problems. The class Kr-IA restricts
K-IA to the case of pointwise consistency retaining scenario, i.e. scenarios
Υ such that [[Υ]] 6= ∅ ⇒ ΣK-IA(Υ) 6= ∅. Examples of constraints
upon the ontological characteristics are the following. Ad restricts A to the
case of deterministic actions, Is restricts I to single time-step actions, and
Ib restricts I to boolean features, i.e. V = {T, F}. We can also combine
constraints; for example, Ksp-IAd = Ks-IA ∩ Kp-IA ∩ K-IAd.
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Definition of the class K-RA
The notion of time in K-IA is Aristotelian7. In fact, the following holds by
definition 2.2.10: (i) when an action is started by the ego, i.e. the current-ac-
tion set C is not empty, then the environment increases the current now by
k time points, where k is the duration of this action; (ii) when no action
is started by the ego, i.e. the current-action set C is empty, then the envi-
ronment starts, executes and ends a null action whose trajectory is the null
trajectory (∅) of duration 1, so to increase the current now by a single time
point. The causal laws justify the state transitions, and the state transitions
justify the flux of time. Actions may have reversible effects on feature val-
ues without compromising the direction of time; in fact, b ∈ B′ \ B implies
b > nB by definition 2.2.8.
In pursuing the aim of amending K-IA’s notion of time to the continuum
case, we meet the following problems.
The first problem is that no action can be physically started and ended
such that its duration is infinitesimal and its repeated execution is the im-
age-level justification to continuous time. The environment could just beat
time by increasing the current now by an infinitesimal quantity ε > 0, only
to lose a continuum of time points between the now nB and nB + ε. The prob-
lem of beating the continuous time consists in the non-existence of the successor
function for real numbers.
The second problem is the well-known paradox of Zeno (Elea, Italy,
489 B.C.), for which the trajectory of a running action can not describe the
continuous change during the scheduled time interval. The problem of de-
scribing the continuous change consists in the non-existence of the successor state
function. Furthermore, if we use continuous domains for both feature val-
ues and time points, then the set-theoretic description of the environment
(definition 2.2.9) results in a continuum of possible initial states, together
with a pair (In f l(A, σ), Trajs(A, σ)) for each initial state σ and action A,
and a continuum of ordered partial states for each trajectory in Trajs(A, σ),
7The available literature dates back to Aristotle the notion of time as measurable order of
change [7, IV.11]. Time is the measure of change according to a before and an after. Time
evolves because of change, and thus the absence of change causes the end of the world.
Aristotle assumed the world eternal. The emphasis on the irreversibility of change, due to
the second principle of thermodynamics was later made by Reichenbach [158] for which
time has a growth direction.
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but no such an infinite amount of information can be stored explicitly in a
propositional table (see example at p. 46).
There are additional open problems. The task of scientific modelling re-
quires evidence of the object to be modelled. When the object is human
causal reasoning itself, relevant evidence is given by its linguistic repres-
entations, and thus, the collection of a natural and experimental history
ranges from plain sentences in natural language, such as newspaper art-
icles, to formal models themselves, such as Newtonian Mechanics. In its
simplest form, we reason about actions and their effects on objects using
transitive verbs in a natural language [157, p.149-50, ch. 4]. Some of us
represent time and actions by tenseless verbal languages [44, p. 50] which
can be included in the corpus. When taking transitive verbs as evidence,
how do we model them? Different authors are entitled to their views, al-
though the resulting models may not be the most general ones. For ex-
ample, McCarthy’s 1969 model is limited to the perfect aspect of non-con-
current actions with implicit time; it does so using lisp-like sentences of
type (action2, (action1, state0)) [134]. Allen’s 1983 model uses explicit time
periods, preserving McCarthy’s ontological limitation to the perfect aspect
[5]. Kowalski’s 1986 model includes the progressive aspect of discrete non-
concurrent actions with explicit time points; it does so using Horn clauses
to model the verbs hold and do [103]. Recent models go beyond those on-
tological limitations. The underlying semantics must encompass all the
available models. This is an ongoing process where research leads to more
general underlying semantics.
We solve the above problems introducing the notion of partial fluent, be-
ing a function of time. Like a transitive verb in a natural language, a partial
fluent describes an action when the action affects an object. Like a vector in
Newtonian Mechanics, a partial fluent describes a force exerted on objects.
In doing so, partial fluents are versatile objects. In summary, we define
K-IA’s converse approach using partial fluents, where the notion of change
is built upon the notion of time: a master clock beats time and partial flu-
ents describe continuous change. We redefine trajectories as a continuum of
ordered partial states; their set-theoretic description is a characteristic func-
tion that defines the partial states implicitly, by selection from a common
domain. This stores an infinite amount of information in a finite system.
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Rather than working on a case-by-case basis with all the infinite elements
of the set, we work directly with the definition of the set.
We shall now proceed by amendment to K-IA.
Definition 2.2.13 (Features and Fluents) We amend def. 2.2.5 as follows.
T = R+ ∪ {0} is the domain of time points; the time structure is the
classical structure for the non-negative real numbers, where the Dede-
kind-Cantor axiom of completeness holds true. Let clock0 be a strictly
monotonic rising function with no parameters. We distinguish between
two types of clock: the computable function and the oracle (for example,
the function which reads the clock pulse of a computer). In the first case,
the agent is rationally aware of the flux of time, to know exactly how the
time is beaten. In the second case, the agent is still aware of the flux of time,
but has no given knowledge of how the time is beaten. Let V be an unsor-
ted domain for features8. We call partial fluent any function ϕ such that
ϕ : T 3 → V and Domain(ϕ) = {(s, τ, t) ∈ T 3 : s ≤ τ ≤ t}. Partial fluents
are single-feature trajectory descriptors during time periods. We distin-
guish between four types of partial fluent. Internal and static: a computable
function whose definition is known to the agent and it does not change
passing time. Internal and dynamic: a computable function whose defin-
ition is known to the agent and it can only change according to internal
criteria, for example, machine learning. External of the first type: a comput-
able function whose definition is known to the agent and it can only change
according to external criteria. External of the second type: a partial function
whose definition is not necessarily known to the agent.
Example 2.2.2 (Aristotelian clock)
clock =

0 initial value
clock + duration(h) if C = {(nB , E)} and h ∈ Trajs(E, H(nB))
clock + 1 if C = ∅
8We may define V = [0, 1] ⊂ R, but this would restrict the classification to fuzzy logics
[216, 217]. We may define V = R, but this would not allow for problem domains with
many-sorted features. We may allow explicitly for many-sorted features, but this would
restrict the classification to many-sorted logics. On the other hand, many-sorted logic re-
duces to unsorted logic [62, p. 277] [139, p. 483], hence the choice for an unsorted domain
for features.
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An instance of the Aristotelian clock is the Linnaean Floral Clock [119,
pg. 274–276], where time is beaten by the blooming of flowers at differ-
ent seasons of the year; to perceive the change, the definition uses an ex-
ternal partial fluent of the second type. In the above examples, time is
built upon a notion of change. A different example, where time is an or-
acle and free from any notion of change, it is our Continuously Branch-
ing Clock [30], where time can be pictured as a tree with a continuum of
branches, obtained by removing the total-order relation in the axiomatisa-
tion of non-negative real numbers.
Definition 2.2.14 (Causal Laws) We amend def. 2.2.9 as follows. Let A ∈
E be an action, let σs be any state of the environment such that In f l(A, σs) 6=
∅, and let n be the number of alternative results of A. We associate par-
tial fluents to features using elements (τ, f , ϕ(s, τ, t)) ∈ T × F × V = H,
meaning that at time τ the feature f has value ϕ(s, τ, t), where t − s is
the duration of an executed action A such that f ∈ In f l(A, σs). Let
ϕ1j, . . . , ϕij, . . . , ϕnj be the partial fluents that are associated to each feature
f j in In f l(A, σs). The i-th trajectory of A, for i = 1, . . . , n, is the non-empty
and totally-ordered set (Ti(A, σs);≤), where
Ti(A, σs) = {(τ, f j, ϕij(s, τ, t)) ∈ H : f j ∈ In f l(A, σs)}.
The set Trajs(A, σs) is the set of all possible trajectories of the action A star-
ted at time point s. The table (In f l, Trajs) is the set-theoretic description of
the action. We shall now represent the information in the table by a logical
formula. We represent antecedents and consequents of influenced features
by partial fluents. We represent occlusion by discontinuities. We represent
the natural language sentence «the feature f j is expected to have value v at
time τ = s, it is occluded at time τ ∈ (s, t) and is explicitly assigned to the
value w at time τ = t» by the partial fluent
ϕj(s, τ, t) =

v if τ = s
undefined if τ ∈ (s, t)
w if τ = t
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We associate partial fluents to features using the first-order formula
Sij ≡ ∀ τ ∈ [s, t] ⊂ T . [τ] f j = ϕij(s, τ, t)
A causal law is a formula of the form
[s, t]AV
n∨
i=1
(
m∧
j=1
Sij)
where the formula [s, t]A is expanded into a formula in Full Disjunctive
Normal Form, that is, into a disjunction of conjunctions of Sij formulae,
each of which corresponds to the feature f j in the action alternative i. The
expressiveness of causal laws depends directly on the expressiveness and
type of partial fluents in it.
Example 2.2.3 We re-write the causal law in example 2.2.1 as [s, t]A V∨2
i=1(
∧2
j=1 Sij), where the partial fluents in Sij are defined as follows:
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ϕ11(s, τ, t) =

T if τ = s
T ∨ F if τ ∈ (s, t)
F if τ = t
ϕ12(s, τ, t) =

T if τ = s
T ∨ F if τ ∈ (s, t)
F if τ = t
ϕ21(s, τ, t) =

T if τ = s
T ∨ F if τ ∈ (s, t)
F if τ = t
ϕ22(s, τ, t) =

T if τ = s
T ∨ F if τ ∈ (s, t)
T if τ = t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
We observe that, in the above matrix of partial fluents, it is ϕ11 = ϕ12 =
ϕ21, and thus we re-write the matrix as follows:∣∣∣∣∣ ϕ11(s, τ, t) ϕ11(s, τ, t)ϕ11(s, τ, t) ϕ22(s, τ, t)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ a11 a12a21 a22
∣∣∣∣∣
We can describe concisely actions with numerous features and altern-
ative results. Any element aij of the matrix is the descriptor of the fea-
ture j in the action alternative i. Each row of the matrix describes an action
alternative. Each column of the matrix describes the corresponding fea-
ture in each action alternative. This embodies our view that causal laws
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should be stated clearly and concisely, and be suitable for database stor-
age and update, away from any awkward and error-prone process where
formulae are handwritten, parsed, reduced and compiled before usage.
Ideally, the agents should be able to observe an action and infer its causal
law autonomously, and thus models of causal reasoning should rather in-
clude inductive-learning techniques [140, 141] than reduction algorithms.
We consider the matrix of partial fluents a step forward in this direction.
Definition 2.2.15 (Perception) When writing causal laws, we use external
partial fluents of the second type as perception function, to sense the phys-
ical environment as often as desired, then we verify the correspondence
between the physical environment and its abstract representation. The res-
ulting notion of truth is Aristotelian.—When we associate a partial fluent
ϕij to the feature f j in the action alternative i, we are associating a specific
sensor with a specific feature. The partial fluent ϕij hides the hardware; its
definition depends on the specific hardware and its machine language. The
partial fluent ϕij reads the raw data from its sensor, interprets the raw data,
and uses the interpreted data as value for its corresponding feature f j. Ac-
tion alternatives are allowed, and thus ϕij may be defined to offer different
interpretations of the same raw data. If one wishes to perform these inter-
pretations explicitly, ϕij can be defined as the null interpretation, to use the
raw data as direct value.
The resulting approach differs from both the traditional perception-
thought-action model [33, p. viii] and the perception-action model by Brooks
[33, p. xi]. It differs from the traditional model because the perception sub-
system is here part of the action subsystem: to perceive means to act in
order to perceive, and actions are controlled by the reasoning subsystem.
It differs from Brooks’s model because agents here act in order to perceive,
selecting what to observe, and for how long (we retain control of sensors
on resource-bounded agents and use them when needed, for as long as
necessary). No such ability is possible in Brooks’s model, because it lacks
the reasoning subsystem. Those perceptions that in a biological system
may not involve a deliberate action, such as feeling heat through the skin,
they are formally described as «internal» actions.
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Example 2.2.4 (Aristotelian truth) «Such appears to be the truth, judging
from theory and from what are believed to be the facts about them; the
facts, however, have not yet been sufficiently grasped; if ever they are,
then credit must be given rather to observation than to theories, and to
theories only if what they affirm agrees with the observed facts.» (Aristotle
[8, iii.10])—Let ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3 be partial fluents such that ϕ1 changes the en-
vironment, ϕ2 perceives the environment, and ϕ3 verifies the correspond-
ence between them, namely between theoretical truth (values of featured in
the logical environment, as resulting from reasoning) and observed exper-
imental facts (values of features in the physical environment, as resulting
from perception). The feature f1 has an internal value (ϕ1 is an internal
static partial fluent), and f2 has an external value (ϕ2 is an external partial
fluent of the second type). The corresponding causal law is as follows:
[s, t]AV
3∧
i=1
∀ τ ∈ [s, t] ⊂ T . [τ] fi = ϕi(s, τ, t)
where
ϕ3(s, τ, t) =
1 if [τ] f1 = [τ] f20 otherwise
Definition 2.2.16 (Rules of the game) Let (B = [0, clock], M, H(0),P , C)
be an initial configuration of the board, where H(0) is a nondeterminist-
ically chosen initial state of the environment. We amend def. 2.2.10 as fol-
lows. The partial fluent clock starts beating time. Let the players take turns.
The rules for the ego are not amended. The rules for the environment are
amended as follows.
• At time s = clock the ego communicates its decision to start a new
action A by adding the element (s, A) to C. Then the move of the
environment consists in revising the board as follows: At time s, the
environment nondeterministically selects a trajectory h = Ti(A, H(s))
from the trajectory set Trajs(A, H(s)). From s to t = s + k, where
k = duration(h), the state changes according to h: ( f j, ϕij(s, ρ, k)) ∈ H(ρ)
for all ρ ∈ [s, s + k]. At time t the environment adds the element (s, t, A)
to P and resets C to the empty set.
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• At time t = clock the ego communicates its decision to end the running
action A by removing (s, A) from C and adding (s, t, A) to P . Then the
environment persists in its values during [t, clock], until the ego starts a
new action.
• The ego has not yet decided to start a new action, i.e. the current-action
set C is empty at nB = ν. Then the environment persists in its values
during [ν, clock], until an initialisation message is received from the ego.
The agent does not perceive necessarily, although it may do so; in this
case, we use []A instead of [s, t]A in scd, meaning that the action A is
executed at all times. All sensors are part of the agent’s body, which is
an object of the physical environment, and thus the «environment», as a
player, is in charge of their management during the game.
The property of strict inertia (p. 48), including the frame axiom, is im-
plemented by requiring ( f j, ϕij(ν, ρ, l)) ∈ H(ρ) for all ρ ∈ [ν, ν + l]. As a
corollary, sensing actions do not influence features other than those expli-
citly specified in the causal law.
The game is nondeterministic because of the nondeterministic initial
configuration of the board and the nondeterministic selection of the tra-
jectory h from Trajs. The environment, therefore, is a player with non-fixed
strategy.
Definition 2.2.17 (Reasoning problem, scenario or narrative) We amend
definition 2.2.11 as follows. Let T be the time point domain, F the set of
all feature symbols, V the domain for features, E the set of all names for
actions. Let (H,v) be the lattice whose elements, called observations, are
members of H = T × F × ℘(O)× V and the order relation v applies as
follows: (t1, f1, v1) v (t2, f2, v2) iff t1 v t2. The element (t, f , unknown) is
an abbreviation for
∨
i(t, f , vi), varying i over all possible elements (t, f , vi)
of H. Let (D,v) be the lattice whose elements, called rigid occurrences of
actions, are members of D = T ×T ×E and the order relation v applies
as follows: (s1, t1, A1) v (s2, t2, A2) iff s1 v s2. The order relation @ is
an abbreviation for v ∧ 6=. The relation (s1, t1, A1) = (s2, t2, A2) means
that A1 and A2 start at the same time point, while (s1, t1, A1) @ (s2, t2, A2)
means that A1 starts earlier than A2. Let Υ be a scenario.
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• The part obs of Υ is a sub-lattice of (HΥ,v), whose elements are mem-
bers ofHΥ = T ×FΥ×℘(O)×V ⊆ H, where FΥ is the set of all features
explicitly occurring in Υ.
• The part scd of Υ is a sub-lattice of (D,v). Each element of scd specifies
an action scheduled for execution, with the timepoint when the action
starts, the timepoint when the action ends, and the action’s own name.
• The function V : D → ℘(HΥ) maps each element of scd to a set of
non-empty lattices of observations. The function V is parametric on
the action type, and the part law of Υ consists in the definition ofV as
a set of causal laws in Full Trajectory Normal Form, one causal law for
each action type. The Full Trajectory Normal Form for the causal laws
is a mapping (s, t, A) V ∨ni=1 ∧mj=1 Sij for which the action occurrence
(s, t, A) is expanded into a formula in Full Disjunctive Normal Form, that
is into a disjunction of conjunctions of trajectory formulae Sij, each of
which corresponds to the feature f j in the alternative i. For a given fea-
ture f j in F and partial fluent ϕj defined over D ⊆ [s, t] ⊂ T , s 6= t, a
trajectory formula is the following first-order formula:
Sij ≡ ∀ τ ∈ [s, t] ⊂ T . [τ] f j = ϕj(s, τ, t)
• RA is the family of characteristics regarding the ontological nature of the
environment. The environment must enjoy the property of strict inertia,
time points must be non-negative real numbers (R), and actions may
have alternative results (A). There are no concurrent actions.
Definition 2.2.18 (Intended Models) We amend definition 2.2.12 as fol-
lows. The family of ontological characteristics is RA, instead of IA. The
set Mod(Υ) is obtained, at point (2), using the rules of the game by defini-
tion 2.2.16.
Proposition 2.3 ΣK-IA(Υ) ⊆ ΣK-RA(Υ) ⊆ [[Υ]].
Proof The model set ΣK-RA(Υ) equals ΣK-IA(Υ) in case of discrete
environments with Aristotelian Clock, and ΣK-IA(Υ) is empty in case of
continuous or many-sorted environments, so that ΣK-IA(Υ) ⊆ ΣK-RA(Υ).
The set [[Υ]] allows models which do not satisfy inertia and models
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where there are additional actions besides those specified in scd, so that
ΣK-RA(Υ) ⊆ [[Υ]]. q.e.d.
Definition of the class K-RACi
In K-RA only one action can be executed at a time, including sensing ac-
tions; the environment is inhabited by a single agent, the agent can execute
a single action at a time, and the action takes complete control of the influ-
enced features. We shall now amend K-RA to the case of concurrency of
independent actions. Following the binomial nomenclature [169, p. 26], the
case is designated with the ontological characteristic Ci.
We make no structural extensions to K-RA. We first amend its rules
to allow the case of n ego players, where each ego plays its game with
the environment, concurrently and independently from each other. Each
ego player is also allowed to start several concurrent independent actions.
We then amend the scenario to allow more than a single element of the
current-action set. The construction of the intended model set for K-RA is
identical to K-RACi’s own. We finally show the relation between K-RACi
models and K-RA models.
Definition 2.2.19 (Rules of the game) Using definition 2.2.16, if an ego
starts several independent actions at the same time τ, then the environ-
ment selects one trajectory function nondeterministically. If the partial
fluents ϕ1j , . . . , ϕ
n
j describe the same feature f j during [τ, µ], then only one
partial fluent is considered for that feature, namely the composed partial
fluent ϕ = ϕ1j ◦ · · · ◦ ϕnj of the given partial fluents, and Domain(ϕ) is the
time period [τ, µ]. When such composed function is a constant function c,
then persistence holds for the influenced feature if and only if it exists a
small positive ε ∈ T such that H(τ − e) = c(ξ), for all ξ in [τ, µ] (inertia
with influencing actions).
At the beginning of the game the ego may start all sensing actions for
the sensors in its body, each running concurrently and independently with
the others. If a new sensor becomes available, a new sensing action can be
added. If a sensor dies, its sensing actions may end.
Definition 2.2.20 (Reasoning problem, scenario or narrative) We amend
definition 2.2.17 as follows. The family of ontological characteristics is
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RACi. The environment must enjoy the property of strict inertia and time
points must be non-negative real numbers (R). Actions may have alternat-
ive results (A). Actions may be concurrent, i.e. #C ≥ 0 at any time point
(C). Concurrent actions must be independent from each other although
their set of influenced features may overlap, i.e. the set
⋂k
i=1 In f l(Ai, σs)
may not be empty (Ci).
Proposition 2.4 Let Υ1, . . . ,Υn be scenarios, each of which is of the form
Υi = (K,O, (RA, lawi), scdi, obs)
Let ∪ni=1scdi be a schedule appropriate for the RACi ontological family.
The following relation holds.
ΣK-RACi(
n⋃
i=1
Υi) =
n⋃
i=1
ΣK-RA(Υi)
Proof Independent concurrent actions are compositional, because their
joint effect is the sum of their individual effects. q.e.d.
Corollary 2.5 ΣK-RA(Υ) ⊆ ΣK-RACi(Υ) ⊆ [[Υ]]
2.3 Results (summary)
In summary, the method consists in collecting models as data, arrange the
collection in a table, according to shared epistemological and ontological
characteristics, and decide equivalence and subsumption relations with
former classified models. The results consist in proofs by structural induc-
tion on the length of the causal chain, thus accepting the recommendation
of Bacon and Frege about making progress using induction.
The table at page 63 summarises the results obtained using the described
method, spanning seventy-two years of research in the field. The table
includes the Handbook’s former summary of results [174, p. 492]. The new
results are identified with a star.
2.4 Discussion
By comparison with the original results [174, p. 492], the new results show
the broader scope of the extended method. Formerly unclassifiable mod-
els can now be compared. Brandano’s Calculus of Fluents has the broadest
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range of correct applicability, and subsumes all classified models to date.
The results also show that various models have essentially the same under-
lying structure, that is, they show how different authors discovered essen-
tially the same reasoning using different languages.
Our experience of research shows that the classification of any given
reasoning model generates more than just another theorem. The classific-
ations are instructive, because they communicate the distilled essence of a
model’s thought processes with a detailed examination of its elements and
structure. For any given model, the research exercise begins by collecting
relevant literature, reading broadly and thoroughly to understand both the
anatomy and physiology of the model, seeking for its characteristics. The
research unfolds in a refinement process, where data and patterns build up,
being guided by the classification method. From the first sketch of classi-
fication up to its final version, one understands the model deeply enough
to purge its original literature from any appeal to intuition, and thus write
a new concise description of the model in addition to its classification. We
did not add confusion to an already chaotic field of research. We believe
we attained order and clarity.
m
o
d
el
o
f
ca
u
sa
l
re
a
so
n
in
g
cl
a
ss
co
m
pl
ex
it
y
cl
a
ss
*
B
ra
nd
an
o’
s
C
al
cu
lu
s
of
Fl
ue
nt
s
(n
a
s,
or
N
on
-s
im
ul
at
iv
e
A
lg
eb
ra
ic
Se
m
an
ti
cs
)
..
K
-R
A
C
i[
26
]
*
C
la
ss
ic
al
M
ec
h
an
ic
s
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
sp
-R
A
dC
i
*
C
al
cu
lu
s
of
E
ve
nt
s
(C
ir
cu
m
sc
ri
pt
iv
e,
C
on
ti
nu
ou
s,
re
d
es
ig
ne
d
)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
sp
-R
A
*
C
al
cu
lu
s
of
E
ve
nt
s
(C
ir
cu
m
sc
ri
pt
iv
e,
C
on
ti
nu
ou
s)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
sp
-R
A
pm
o
n
(P
oi
nt
w
is
e
M
in
im
is
at
io
n
of
O
cc
lu
si
on
w
it
h
N
o-
ch
an
ge
pr
em
is
se
s)
..
..
..
..
K
-I
A
[1
69
,p
.2
43
,2
47
]
ca
m
c
(C
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
A
ss
ig
nm
en
ta
nd
M
in
im
is
at
io
n
of
C
ha
ng
e)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
-I
A
[1
69
,p
.2
18
,2
28
]
gm
o
n
f
(g
m
o
n
w
it
h
Fi
lt
er
in
g)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
-I
A
[1
69
,p
.2
43
,2
48
]
ca
m
o
c
(C
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
A
ss
ig
nm
en
ta
nd
M
in
im
is
at
io
n
of
O
cc
lu
si
on
an
d
C
ha
ng
e)
K
-I
A
[1
69
,p
.2
41
,2
45
]
cm
o
c
(C
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
M
in
im
is
at
io
n
of
O
cc
lu
si
on
an
d
C
ha
ng
e)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
-I
A
e
[1
69
,p
.2
40
,2
46
]
pg
m
f
(p
gm
w
it
h
Fi
lt
er
in
g)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
-I
A
e
[1
69
,p
.2
14
,2
15
]
pc
m
f
(p
cm
w
it
h
Fi
lt
er
in
g)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
-I
A
ex
[1
69
,p
.2
13
,2
15
]
*
A
ns
w
er
Se
t(
St
ab
le
M
od
el
)P
ro
gr
am
m
in
g
[8
1]
[6
5,
p.
25
1]
[9
4]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
-I
bs
A
d
*
L
og
ic
Pr
og
ra
m
m
in
g
w
it
h
A
bd
uc
ti
on
an
d
In
te
gr
it
y
C
on
st
ra
in
ts
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
-I
bs
A
d
co
N
P-
co
m
pl
et
e
*
pd
l
(D
yn
am
ic
L
og
ic
)[
70
,1
54
]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
-I
bs
A
d
a
d
l
by
Pe
d
na
ul
t[
14
7]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
-I
bs
A
d
[1
74
,p
.4
88
],
[9
5]
E
xp
la
na
ti
on
-c
lo
su
re
ap
pr
oa
ch
by
R
ei
te
r
[1
63
]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
-I
bs
A
d
[1
74
,p
.4
88
],
[9
5]
St
at
e-
sp
ac
e
ap
pr
oa
ch
by
B
ak
er
[1
9]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
-I
bs
A
d
[1
74
,p
.4
88
],
[9
5]
*
C
al
cu
lu
s
of
E
ve
nt
s
(C
ir
cu
m
sc
ri
pt
iv
e,
D
is
cr
et
e)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
sp
-I
A
*
Tu
ri
n
g’
s
C
h
oi
ce
M
ac
h
in
es
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
sp
-I
A
*
L
og
ic
Pr
og
ra
m
m
in
g
(s
a
s,
or
Si
m
ul
at
iv
e
A
lg
eb
ra
ic
Se
m
an
ti
cs
)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
sp
-I
A
d
[2
4]
*
Tu
ri
n
g’
s
A
u
to
m
at
ic
M
ac
h
in
es
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
K
sp
-I
A
d
*
C
al
cu
lu
s
of
E
ve
nt
s
(C
ir
cu
m
sc
ri
pt
iv
e,
B
oo
le
an
)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
sp
-I
bA
[2
8]
*
Tu
ri
n
g’
s
C
om
p
u
ti
n
g
M
ac
h
in
es
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
K
sp
-I
bA
d
tm
o
c
(T
w
o-
st
ag
e
M
in
im
is
at
io
n
of
O
cc
lu
si
on
an
d
C
ha
ng
e)
[1
48
]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
⊆
K
r-
IA
[1
69
,p
.2
44
,2
50
,2
76
]
gm
o
n
(G
lo
ba
lM
in
im
is
at
io
n
of
O
cc
lu
si
on
w
it
h
N
o-
ch
an
ge
pr
em
is
se
s)
[1
27
,1
28
]
.
⊆
K
r-
IA
[1
69
,p
.2
42
,2
49
,2
76
]
pg
m
(P
ro
to
ty
pi
ca
lG
lo
ba
lM
in
im
is
at
io
n)
[1
27
,1
28
]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
⊆
K
r-
IA
[1
69
,p
.2
00
,2
08
,2
76
]
pc
m
(P
ro
to
ty
pi
ca
lC
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
M
in
im
is
at
io
n)
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
.
⊆
K
r-
IA
[1
69
,p
.1
98
,2
03
,2
76
]
o
cm
(O
ri
gi
na
lC
hr
on
ol
og
ic
al
M
in
im
is
at
io
n)
[9
7]
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
..
⊆
K
r-
IA
[1
69
,p
.1
99
,2
06
,2
76
]
Ta
bl
e
2.
1:
R
es
ul
ts
3MODELS (PART I)
3.1 Introduction
The search for a small number of laws that could explain the whole range
of observed phenomena has been the aim of Physics for centuries, where
Physics played the role of experimental science and Mathematics provided
both the formal language and the computational theories for its models.
The result of this endeavour is Classical Mechanics, a mathematical model
of causal reasoning about the physical environment. This model, described
in three laws, demolished the common sense picture of the world that the
pre-Galileans were trying to develop within Mathematics. Although it was
a common sense absurdity that objects could exert mutual influence if they
were not in contact, this model proved that the physical environment is
governed by forces that one could neither see with naked eye nor touch
with bare hands. Four hundred years later, the aim of using Mathematical
Logic for representing natural-language information about the effects of
natural and artificial events in the physical environment led to the frame
problem [134, p. 487]. Since then, a community has been trying to develop a
common sense picture of the world within Mathematical Logic [180].
Despite all efforts, Classical Mechanics is a renown mathematical model
of causal reasoning that no mathematical logic has yet succeeded to emu-
late. Classical Mechanics involves epistemological and ontological as-
sumptions. Our aim is to classify this model, to measure the distance of
classified logics with respect to the target class.
3.2 Methods
We used the systematic paradigm, as precisely described in chapter 2. The
assessment required extensions to the paradigm. We described these exten-
sions in chapter 2. In the following sections we therefore proceed with the
development of the theory and assume that it is understood what is meant
64
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by «correctness», «classification», «relations of equivalence and subsump-
tion», «full abstraction», and the definition of the class K-RACi.
3.3 Results
Let us recall the fundamental laws of Classical Mechanics and a relevant
theorem by Cauchy. Summarised by Newton [143], the first two laws
were known to Galilei [80], the third law was known to work on fluids
by Archimedes.
First Law: «Every body persists in its state of either rest or uniform mo-
tion along a straight line, unless compelled to change that state by forces
impressed thereon.» Second Law: Whenever a net force F acts on a body
it produces an acceleration a, along the direction of the force, which is pro-
portional to the magnitude of the force and inversely proportional to the
mass m of the body, that is F = ma. Third Law: «To every action there
is always opposed an equal reaction: or the mutual actions of two bodies
upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.» Prin-
ciple of independence of simultaneous actions: The net force exerted on
a body is the vectorial sum of the individual forces exerted on the body by
the material systems interacting with it.
Theorem 3.1 (Cauchy [35]) Let a and b be continuous functions over a time
period I ⊂ R. Given t0 ∈ I and x0 ∈ R, it exists and is unique the solution
to the following problem:x(t0) = x0x′(t) = a(t) x(t) + b(t)
The solution x(t) is computable with the following formula:
x(t) = eA(s)
(
x0 +
∫ t
t0
e−A(s)b(s) ds
)
, where A(s) =
∫ t
t0
a(s) ds.
We shall now prove the following.
Proposition 3.2 The epistemological and ontological characteristics of
Classical Mechanics are Ksp-RAdCi.
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Proof Let F be the component of the external force along the direction
of the movement, let m be the mass (constant) of the object, let a be the
acceleration of the object, and let x(t) be the position in space of the ob-
ject at time t. The equation F = ma is the second order differential
equation F(t, x(t)) = mx′′(t), which is valid for any point in time t. To
mathematically describe the motion of the object exactly means to find
a function x(t) as the solution to such differential equation that satisfies
the initial conditions of position and velocity of the object. The equation
x′′(t) = 1m F(t, x(t)) then reduces to the following problem:v′1(t) = v2(t)v′2(t) = 1m F(t, v1(t)) where
v1(t) = x(t)v2(t) = x′(t)
By Cauchy’s theorem, given the initial conditions v1(0) and v2(0), the solu-
tion to the resulting system exists and is unique, that is the motion is deter-
ministic.
Newton’s laws and Cauchy’s theorem call for the Ksp-RAdCi family of
characteristics. The first law, or principle of inertia, jointly with the use of
the continuum in both Newton’s theory and Cauchy’s theorem, finds an
immediate correspondence with the property of strict inertia in continu-
ous time, which is built explicitly in the underlying semantics for K-RACi.
The epistemological sub-characteristic s restricts K to the case of complete
knowledge about the initial state, which is the necessary condition to apply
Cauchy’s theorem. The epistemological sub-characteristic p restricts K to
the case of no information at any later state than the initial one, because
such information is not required to apply Cauchy’s theorem. The onto-
logical sub-characteristic d restricts A to the case of deterministic change,
for which the effect of an action is completely determined by the state of
the physical environment at the time when the action started, which is
properly the result of applying Cauchy’s theorem. The ontological sub-
-characteristic i restricts C to the case of concurrency of independent ac-
tions, whose definition, by construction, finds an immediate correspond-
ence with the principle of independence of simultaneous actions, where
the net force exerted on a body B and consisting of n forces, corresponds
to n simultaneous actions influencing the feature position in space of the
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object B. The second and third law involve information that can be repres-
ented explicitly in the scenario. q.e.d.
We note that although Kuipers did not acknowledge Cauchy in his work
[106, p. 316], he did refer to a Cauchy problem as the definition of a «dy-
namical system».
3.4 Discussion
The following positive examples are merely demonstrative of the result.
Example 3.4.1 (Galilei’s inclined plane [80]) Given both a horizontal and
an inclined plane, let α ≥ 0 be the angle between the two surfaces. We
place an iron ball of mass m on the inclined place, and we release it. Will
this object move along the inclined plane? What are the involved actions at
any given point in time τ and what is their effect?
Figure 3.1: Galilei’s inclined plane
It easily verified that all theories of causal reasoning, as summarized by
Shanahan [180], they all fail to reason correctly about this problem. Indeed,
according to their temporal inertia, the object will persist in its initial state,
because no action is directly exerted on the object by an agent.
We shall now translate the above reasoning problem from its natur-
al-language description to a formal scenario. The knowledge about the
initial state of the environment is complete. The mass of the object is m, the
angle between the inclined plane and the horizontal plane is α, and thus
we write both [0]mass =ˆ m and [0]angle =ˆ α in the obs part of the scenario.
Two forces are always exerted on the object, the weight force W = mg and
the reaction R of the plane. As no other force is exerted, the scd part of the
scenario consists of the two formulae []W(o) and []R(o), where o ∈ O
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is an object constant. Finally, the law part of the scenario consists of the
causal laws for W and R:
[s, t]W(obj)V ∀τ ∈ [s, t].[τ] f orce(obj) = ϕ1(s, τ, t)
[s, t]R(obj)V ∀τ ∈ [s, t].[τ] f orce(obj) = ϕ2(s, τ, t)
where s and t are temporal variables, obj is an object variable, and f orce is
the feature we are interested in. If ◦ is the symbol for the vectorial sum,
then the partial fluent ϕ1 is defined as the vectorial sum of [0]mass ∗ g ∗
sin([0]angle) and [0]mass ∗ g ∗ cos([0]angle), and ϕ2 is defined as−[0]mass ∗
g ∗ cos([0]angle). According to the underlying semantics, the force exer-
ted on the object o at time τ is H(τ, f orce(obj)) = ϕ1(s, τ, t) ◦ ϕ2(s, τ, t) =
mg sin(α). The following may occur:
mg sin(α) =

> 0 if 0 < α < pi2
< 0 if pi2 < α < pi
= 0 if α = 0 or α = pi
= mg if α = pi2
If 0 < α < pi2 or
pi
2 < α < pi, then the object moves along the inclined
plane with uniformly-accelerated motion. If α = 0 then the object is lying
on a horizontal plane; this is the case of inertia with influencing actions. If
α = pi2 , then the inclined plane is a vertical plane and ϕ2(s, τ, t) = 0. (If
we use glue or a magnet to exert adequate resistance on the object, then
ϕ2(s, τ, t) = −ϕ1(s, τ, t).) Passing time α may change because of a lifting
action; the underlying semantics is elaboration tolerant in this respect, be-
cause the causal laws have α as parameter.
Figure 3.2: Galilei’s inclined plane: case of inertia
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Galilei’s inclined plane involves the frame problem, as well as the pre-
diction and causal-qualification problems. The prediction problem is de-
scribed as follows [90]; «given an initial description of the physical envi-
ronment [known values for a set of features at time point 0], the occurrence
of some events, and some notion of causality (that an event occurring can
cause a fact to become true), what facts are true once all the events have
occurred?» The qualification problem is «the phenomenon that if an ac-
tion normally causes an effect at a later time, the effect may be modified or
inhibited because of other events in the intervening period» [167].
The frame problem has its solution with Newton’s principle of inertia.
The property of strict inertia (p. 48, 58) is a generalisation of Newton’s prin-
ciple to all features of objects in the environment, where the position in
space is one of the possible features. The temporal projection problem here
consists in predicting the motion of the object given the initial conditions
of position and velocity, and is addressed in its general terms by proposi-
tion 3.2. The causal-qualification problem occurs as follows. The gravity
force normally causes the objects to fall; the phenomenon may be fully
inhibited because of the friction exerted by the horizontal plane, which
causes the object to rest in its position according to the principle of iner-
tia. The underlying semantics gives the same solution via the operator ◦;
the free-fall situation corresponds to the case α = pi2 without friction; the
situation where the phenomenon is inhibited corresponds to any α with
sufficient friction to exert a force equal and opposite to mg sin(α).
The inclined plane scenario is useful in practical applications. Robots
are physical agents with limited resources, and a robot with wheels, for
example, may have to climb an inclined platform with the available energy,
taking into account its own weight and the minimum expense of energy
that is required to achieve this goal with a certain desired speed. The above
formulation shows how this problem can be represented in a Ksp-RAdCi
scenario.
The following variant of the above scenario leads to the dividing-instant
problem. The dividing-instant problem is described as follows: determ-
ine the value of a feature at that instant in time dividing two periods where
the feature has neat different values. One either violates the law of contra-
diction, by claiming both values, or the law of excluded third, by claiming
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neither. The problem is commonly attributed to Plato [150].
Example 3.4.2 (Newton’s apple, variant of) Given the above scenario
3.4.1, let be α = 0 and let F be an initial force that throws the object.
The object will raise along a straight vertical line. When the object reaches
a certain hight h, it returns to the horizontal plane. Is the object raising or
falling at the apex of its revolution?
In mathematics, if a continuous function f (x) admits two different val-
ues for the same x, then the function admits a discontinuity in that point.
If the function admits no value for a given x, then the function is simply
not defined for that x. In classical logic, the former case corresponds to
the law of contradiction; the latter corresponds to the law of excluded
third. With no need to violate neither laws, continuity models the com-
mon experience that things change smoothly. An immediate consequence
of continuity, which is respected by all systems of qualitative reasoning, is
that a changing quantity must pass through all intermediate values9, thus
passing through the dividing-instant point. The solution to the above prob-
lem is, that at the apex of its revolution the object is neither raising nor
falling.
The problem of establishing whether the object is at rest or at motion
admits immediate solution. By common sense, in fact, an object is resting
if it is lying motionless, which situation corresponds to the above case of
inertia with influencing actions, with h = 0 and R > 0. In the present
scenario, the object is not resting, because h 6= 0 and R = 0, even though it
is neither raising nor falling at the apex of its revolution.
The dividing-instant problem seems to arise only if actions with instant-
aneous effects are allowed in the theory. In that case, the consequences of
waiving classical logic, when violating either laws, must be accepted. The
dividing-instant problem does not occur for K-RACi scenarios, because tra-
jectories are nonempty sets, and thus instantaneous effects are not allowed.
The following variant of Galilei’s inclined plane scenario leads to the struc-
9By Bolzano’s theorem, if f is a continuous function on a closed interval [a, b] and f (a)
and f (b) have opposite signs, then there exists a number c in the open interval (a, b) such
that f (c) = 0.
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ture-based ramification problem. The ramification problem is «the phe-
nomenon where the physical environment consists of a number of objects
with relationships between them, and changes in one object (for example,
the effects of actions on that object) are dependent on features of adjacent
objects in the structure» [167].
Example 3.4.3 Given the above scenario 3.4.1, let be α = 0 and let a wet
ice-cube o2 stand on a block o1. We push gently on o1. By common experi-
ence, we know that o2 will move along with o1.
The scenario is similar to Baker’s ice-cream scenario [19], where an agent
(o1) holds the ice-cream (o2) while moving slowly to a different location. We
represent the problem using the operator ◦. The block o2 rests on the block
o1 according to the known case of inertia with influencing actions; the force
F is so tiny that block o2 does not fall off o1. At the same time, block o1
moves along a straight line with constant velocity. The block o2, which
forms a single system with o1, moves with o1. If, however, the force F is
sufficiently strong, we know by common experience that o2 will fall off o1.
To address this case, we can introduce inertia in the equations, and ◦ still
represents the problem successfully.
The following scenario involves concurrent actions with both cumulat-
ive and cancelling effects.
Example 3.4.4 Given the above scenario 3.4.1, we place an edged stand
on the horizontal plane, the inclined plane on top of the stand, and a wet
ice-cube on top of the inclined place. Two distinct lifting/lowering actions
can be exerted at the edges of the inclined plane. The first task consists in
moving the inclined plane so that the ice-cube will stand still on it. We then
remove the stand, or lift the inclined plane, to achieve the same result.
A similar scenario was studied by Gelfond, Lifschitz and Rabinov [83],
and Shanahan [181], where an agent moves a soup bowl sideways, trying
not to spill the soup (move the ice-cube). The scenario is also a classical
problem of control theory in various industrial applications. The prob-
lem admits immediate solution using the operator ◦. The ice-cube moves
along the inclined plane, i.e, the bowl spills soup, iff the effect of the lift-
ing/lowering actions are not cancelling, i.e., the net force exerted on the
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object is not null.
Example 3.4.5 (Domino Effect) We align five Domino tokens so that if the
token i− 1 falls then the token i is pushed. If we push the first token and
wait, we expect the last token to fall after a short while. We run the exper-
iment, and observe that the last token falls as expected. If we realign the
tokens, insert and hold a card between the fourth and the fifth token, we
expect the last token to persist in its initial state. We run the experiment,
and observe that the last token does not fall, as expected. We then general-
ise the first experiment to any number of tokens, using any arrangement of
multiple paths, where any token falls only if at least two preceding tokens
in its path fall on it.
A domino effect is a situation in which one event causes a series of
similar events to happen one after the other (Oxford English Diction-
ary). The situation involves the following problems of causal reasoning:
cause-and-effect chains, structure-based ramification, delayed effects of
actions, concurrency of independent actions, and may also involve causal
qualification. In the above example, and in particular in its last but one
case, all these problems occur at once. Despite its apparent complexity, we
readily solve the example via the operator ◦. Any token obj falls only if
the net force exerted on obj is sufficiently strong, i.e., only if the following
holds:
H(τ, f orce(obj)) = ϕ1(s, τ, t) ◦ . . . ◦ ϕi(s, τ, t) ◦ . . . ◦ ϕk(s, τ, t) ≥ C
where k ≥ 1 is the number of independent forces that are exerted concur-
rently on obj, C = 1 in any case of the example except the last one where
C = 2, and the pushing is described as follows:
ϕi(s, τ, t) =
0 if τ ∈ [s, t)1 if τ = t
We use a single causal law to model the action exerted on a generic token:
[s, t]Press(obji, objj) V ∀ τ ∈ [s, t].[s] f ollows(obji, objj) → [τ] f orce(objj) =
ϕi(s, τ, t). We represent the occurrence of our initial action with the single
formula [0]Press(thumb, t1) in the part scd of the scenario. Finally, we rep-
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resent any specific arrangement of possibly multiple paths via relations
between tokens, with formulae of type [0] f ollows(ti, tj) in the part obs of
the scenario. It is easily verified that the underlying semantics models the
scenario as expected.
Example 3.4.6 (Achilles and the tortoise, by Zeno) The tortoise defied the
fleet-footed Achilles to a single contest. They would have competed in
running, which according to the tortoise would have made her victorious,
on condition of a small initial advantage (one step) which Achilles would
have allowed.
The given scenario is properly an example of rectilinear and uniform
motion in Classical Mechanics. We describe the scenario as follows:
obs: [0.0]position(Achilles) =ˆ 0.0
[0.0]position(Tortoise) =ˆ 1.0
[] @ (s2, s1) =ˆ true
scd: [s1, t1]Run(Achilles)
[s2, t2]Run(Tortoise)
law: [s, t]Run(athlete)V ∀τ ∈ [s, t].[τ]position(athlete) = ϕ(s, τ, t)
where s1 and s2 are temporal constants, and s, t, t1, t2 are variables. The
scenario assumes rectilinear motion with null speed variation, therefore
the partial fluent ϕ is ϕ(s, τ, t) = V(athlete) ∗ τ for all τ in [s, t], and repres-
ents the covered space by a certain running athlete. The velocity V(athlete)
is a certain constant velocity VA for Achilles, and a certain constant velocity
VT for the tortoise, where VA > VT > 0. The scenario clearly falls within
Ksp-RAdCi, and the trajectory of the running action describes the continu-
ous change during the scheduled time period. Let now solve Zeno’s riddle.
Is there a point in time and space where Achilles reaches the tortoise?
Let A and T be the points in space representing Achilles and the tortoise.
If d = 1.0 is the initial distance between A and T, then the covered spaces
ST and SA are described by the law for the uniform motion: SA(τ) = VA ∗ τ
and ST(τ) = d + VT ∗ τ. Let denote with τ1 the point in time where A
reaches the new position ST(τ1), that is SA(τ2) = ST(τ1). As τ2, τ3, etc, are
denoted in the similar way, we define the succession (τn) as SA(τ1) = d and
SA(τn+1) = ST(τn), and thus SA(τn+1) = VA ∗ τn+1 = d+VT ∗ τn = ST(τn).
The following relations hold, because VA ∗ τ1 = SA(τ1) = d:
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τ1 =
d
VA
, τn+1 =
d +VT ∗ τn
VA
, τn+1 − τn =
(
VT
VA
)n
∗ τ1
Zeno asserts that Achilles will never reach the tortoise, that is the sum
of all time periods (τn+1 − τn) diverges. The famous argument goes that
in order for Achilles to overtake the tortoise he must first reach the posi-
tion where the tortoise is, which is impossible, because by the time he gets
there the tortoise has crawled forward. The argument remained valid for
about 2300 years until Leibniz, Newton, Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind
and Cantor devised a proper definition of length, distance and sum of an
infinite series. According to the resulting account on series, we have:
τ1 +
+∞
∑
k=1
(τk+1 − τk) = τ1 +
+∞
∑
k=1
(
VT
VA
)k
∗ τ1 = τ1 ∗
(
1+
+∞
∑
k=1
(
VT
VA
)k)
=
= τ1 ∗
+∞
∑
k=0
(
VT
VA
)k
?= τ1 ∗ 1
1− VTVA
=
VA ∗ τ1
VA −VT =
d
VA −VT = τ
∗
where (?) VTVA < 1 by hypothesis. The fleet-footed Achilles will then
reach the tortoise at τ∗, in fact is SA(τ∗) = ST(τ∗). It is readily veri-
fied that the underlying semantics meets the mathematical solution, that
is: [τ∗]position(Achilles) = [τ∗]position(Tortoise).
In the following example, we use an external partial fluent of the first type
as a function ϕi : R3+ → R3 to represent the i-th airway within a certain
airspace, as generated by an air-traffic scheduler (which is “external” to
the aircraft) so that for any τ ∈ [s, t] no other aircraft is using the i-th air-
way at τ (the row i of the matrix is null except at column j). Passing time,
the agent receives a ϕi from the air-traffic scheduler, to control the aircraft
accordingly. The aircraft is the agent and the co-pilot system is its ego. The
airspace is represented by the matrix of partial fluents, where rows are air-
ways, columns are aircrafts, and the resulting causal law is part of a Traffic
Collision Avoidance System.
Example 3.4.7 (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) Given an air space
with n air-ways in it, we assume the followings. Let ϕw be the partial flu-
ent describing the air-way w, for any w = 1 . . . n. Let awi be the i-th aircraft
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using the air-way w, for any i = 1 . . . f (w), where f (w) is the number of
aircrafts that can fly along the air-way w at the same time (w is a pipeline
of length f (w)). Suppose each awi is moving of rectilinear and uniform
motion, on cruise control, and its position along ϕw is given by its GPS.
Further, suppose that each awi has a TCAS such that, if a
w
i has distance≤ dwi
from another aircraft, then they both start collecting information on their
respective positions in space, via the GPS and the radar, and a safety action
is performed when needed, so to keep the safety distance and avoid a col-
lision. Given the initial position of all aircrafts at time t0, will the aircrafts
avoid the collisions?
Example 3.4.8 (static obstacles) The air space has no predefined airways,
and a single aircraft has to fly safely through skyscrapers.
Example 3.4.9 (dynamic cooperating and negotiating obstacles) The air
space has no predefined airways, and skyscrapers are replaced by other
aircrafts. Each aircraft is moving freely and independently from the others.
All aircrafts cooperate and negotiate to avoid collisions.
Example 3.4.10 (dynamic hostile obstacles) The air space has no pre-
defined airways. The dynamic obstacles are non-cooperating and non-ne-
gotiating.
The scenario 3.4.7 falls within the Ksp-RAdCi family of characterist-
ics; it is similar to the «Achilles and the tortoise» problem, where ath-
letes run along various directions at different speeds. It is a simple exer-
cise to write a causal law such that the property alert(ai) becomes ’true’
if H(ν)position(ai) − H(τ)position(ai) = di, where ν is the present time
point and τ is the point in time where the collision would otherwise take
place. The difference between this scenario and its three variants rests en-
tirely in the representation of trajectories: scenario 3.4.8 uses no trajectories
at all, scenario 3.4.9 uses external partial fluents of the first type, and scen-
ario 3.4.10 uses external partial fluents of the second type. Scenario 3.4.9
requires the extension of K-RACi to the case of concurrency of interacting
actions.
The following examples show limitations of the result.
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Scenario 3.4.11 (Ghost Forces) Suppose two agents are sitting one in front
of the other. The table between them is perfectly horizontal and frictionless.
One of the players gently pushes away the disk of dry ice, along the table,
towards the other player. The table is long enough for both players to ob-
serve the trajectory of the disk. The player knows exactly how to push the
disk, and knows also that the trajectory will ideally follow a straight line.
The experiment is repeated a number of times, where the disk behaves as
expected. The experiment is then repeated once more. At this time, the disk
follows an unexpected trajectory, still being able to reach the other side of
the table. The players, surprised, can not explain the phenomenon.
This is a reasoning scenario for a theory of relative truth. According to
Classical Mechanics (Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity), an observer is
needed. It can be located in an inertial or non-inertial system of co-ordin-
ates, with consequences in his comprehension of phenomena. Two cameras
recorded the experiment from above. One camera was fixed to the table,
the other to the ceiling. The first camera recorded the experiment as we
described it. According to the other camera, instead, during all the exper-
iments the disk moved along a straight line. The first camera was located
in the inertial system, the second camera in the non-inertial one. During
the last experiment the table was rotating gently, so to affect the disk; the
players, surrounded by wholes, could not be aware of it.
The class K-RACi is unable to describe (represent and reason correctly
about) this type of problems, namely to observe the same situation from
different viewpoints, which we regard as a special case of the more gen-
eral ability to change either the context or the reasoning. Logic models of
viewpoints do exist; see, e.g. [14, 188, 15, 16, 17]. The open problem then
consists in defining a relevant extension of K-RACi, sufficient and good to
assess this type of scenarios.
Also known as the principle of action and reaction, the third law deduces one
of the fundamental and most popular principles of the whole Physics, the
principle of preservation of the quantity of motion: «the total quantity of motion
(Q = mv) of a system with two point-like objects which are subject exclus-
ively to their mutual interaction, remains constant passing time». The lat-
ter principle deduces the former as well, and both are well-known classical
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constructions. There are no known exceptions to the principle of preser-
vation of the quantity of motion. In any isolated system, each time the
principle seems violated during an experiment, a third interacting object is
discovered which is external to the (known) system, and the validity of the
principle is reestablished by including the object in the system. That was
the case, for example, with the neutron and the photon, and the planet Nep-
tune. To establish a similar principle within formal nonmonotonic reason-
ing, hence within the underlying semantics, it would mean to establish a
reasoning rule for which when reasoning with incomplete knowledge leads
to conclusions that are inconsistent with the known facts, what becomes
crucial is the ability to postulate additional knowledge and to validate the
consistency of the resulting theory. It was Turing who first introduced the
idea that being intelligent implies also making errors. He then imagined
a machine equipped with a method of drawing conclusions by induction.
Methods of drawing conclusions and conjecturing hypothesis by induction
have then been developed since the eighties, like the program bacon [108]
and inductive learning in Logic Programming [140, 141]. Although the in-
formation provided by the third principle can be explicitly represented in
the scenario and involves no evident additional characteristics, the prin-
ciple itself is equivalent to the principle of preservation of the quantity of
motion, which use involves the reasoning skill we have just mentioned.
An additional limitation arises from a letter of Einstein to Popper [153, p.
522]: «I would like to repeat that, in my opinion, you are not right in sus-
taining the thesis that it is impossible to derive statistical conclusions out
of a deterministic theory. It is sufficient to think about classical statistical
Mechanics (gas theory or the theory of the Brownian motion). Example: a
material dot moves of constant velocity along a closed circle; I can calcu-
late the probability of finding it, at a certain given time, at a certain position
along the perimeter. What is essential is the following: I do not know the
initial state, or I do not know it with precision!»—Although the full K-RACi
class allows for environments with incomplete knowledge about the initial
state, Einstein’s example clearly does not belong to the class. The work by
Pearl [145, 146] may be a starting point in this respect.
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3.4.1 Conclusions
Using a theorem by Cauchy on the solution of first-order linear differen-
tial equations, the subclass Ksp-RAdCi of K-RACi is shown to include the
epistemological and ontological assumptions that were implicitly involved
in the three laws of Classical Mechanics. The boundaries of the result are
outlined, suggesting two growth directions: viewpoints and learning from
inconsistencies.
This report updates [25, 27]. For a relation between non-monotonic reas-
oning and Quantum Physics, see the 2002 report by Gabbay and Engesser
[64], although their work does not include any assessment result.
4MODELS (PART II)
4.1 Introduction
The Horn-clause fragment of Tarskian first-order logic, also known as the
angelic fragment of positive logic programming [100, 213], is a renown
model of human reasoning and general purpose model of computation.
Despite being computationally complete [192, 176], this model has been
extended with negation [41, 42, 81], abduction [65], temporal constraints,
causal laws and axioms [103] tailored for solving test examples of the frame
problem at a time where non-monotonic reasoning seemed to be a prom-
ising direction for research beyond the limits of both Tarskian logic and
Turing machines.
Is it really true that the angelic fragment of positive logic programming
is inadequate as a model of causal reasoning and, specifically, as a solu-
tion to the frame problem? What is the added value of its non-monotonic
extensions?
4.2 Methods
The standard method of research for such models consisted in «appeals to
intuition» through test examples of common sense reasoning [46, 180]. For
a given theory, a progress report consisted in evidence of its failure through
a test example, the description of an ad-hoc extension, and appeals to in-
tuition to support the claim that the resulting theory passed the new test.
According to both Dijkstra [56] and McCarthy [129, 132], this corresponds
to the activity of pragmatic engineers, although Dijkstra despises it and
McCarthy argues for it.
Our interest is the scientific modeling of human causal reasoning. Our
aim is not to make a program to solve a test example. Our aim is to decide
equivalence and subsumption relations between the classes of computa-
tions for which scientific models of human causal reasoning are provably
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correct, and thus we depart from the above method of research. We use the
systematic paradigm [chapter 2] as gold standard for the assessments.
We can solve different problems using essentially the same reasoning.
We refer to this ability as problem (domain) independence. We can also
express essentially the same reasoning using different languages. We refer
to this ability as language independence. We expect these human abilit-
ies to have a correspondence in the formal models. For any given model
of causal reasoning, we assess its problem independence by classifying its
range of correct applicability; indeed we know that any classified model is
correctly applicable to a whole class of reasoning problems, and not only
to single examples, and that full-abstraction follows from the classification.
We assess language independence by observing the effect of induced lan-
guage shifts on its range of correct applicability. We conjecture that pos-
itive logic programming may not be language independent, namely that
changing its language changes its problem-solving power. The following
assessments shall answer to this conjecture.
In the following sections we therefore proceed with the development of
the theory and assume that it is understood what is meant by «correctness»,
«classification», «relations of equivalence and subsumption», «full abstrac-
tion», and the definition of the class K-RACi. Working knowledge of lattice
theory is also required, jointly with the original work by van Emden and
Kowalski [100, 213].
4.3 Results
A scenario Υ (def. 2.2.11 at p. 48) is a recursive definition where the for-
mulae in obs and scd are regarded as facts and the formulae in law are re-
garded as rules which infer new facts from a number of known facts given
as premisses. In the specific case of law, inferred facts are elements of H.
The semantics of Υ can be defined as the least fixpoint of a mapping T as-
sociated with Υ itself. An interpretation for Υ is any subset of HΥ. The set
of interpretations for Υ is the power set ℘(HΥ), which is a complete lattice
under the partial order of set inclusion. The top element of this lattice is
HΥ, the bottom element is the empty set. For all I ∈ ℘(HΥ), we define the
mapping TΥ : ℘(HΥ)→ ℘(HΥ) as follows:
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TΥ(I) = {(τ, f , v) ∈ HΥ :
(τ, f , v) ∈ obs and τ = 0, or
exists (s, t, A) ∈ scd,
exists (s, t, A)V ∧mj=1 Sj ∈ law and
exists a valuation θ = {s/M(s), t/M(t)}
such that:
(τ, f , v) ∈ Consequents(sθ, τ, tθ, Sj(θ))
and Antecedents(sθ, τ, tθ, Sj(θ)) ⊆ I }
Antecedents(s, τ, t, S) = {(s, f , ϕ(s, s, t)) ∈ S : s v τ v t }
Consequents(s, τ, t, S) = {(τ, f , ϕ(s, τ, t)) ∈ S : s @ τ v t }
By construction, the reasoning performed by TΥ is identical to the reas-
oning of van Emden and Kowalski’s TP function:
TP(I) = {A ∈ BP :
A← A1 ∧ . . . ∧ An is a ground instance
of a clause in P and {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ I}
The order in which causal laws are retrieved in Υ is not relevant for
its semantics, as all matching occurrences are taken into account and, by
construction, there is exactly one occurrence of Sj for each feature in a given
causal law. The selection rule of Sj in the body of the causal law is the same
as the selection of the atom in the body of a definite Horn clause.
The above compositional model-theoretic fixpoint semantics is a formal
model originally designed to speak the formal language of definite Horn
clauses. Using the above construction, this model now speaks the language
of K-IA. The reasoning model is still the original reasoning model by van
Emden and Kowalski. We shall now study this model in detail. The fol-
lowing are formal properties of TΥ.
Proposition 4.1 An interpretation I is a model for Υ iff TΥ(I) ⊆ I.
Proof I is a model for Υ iff for all (s, t, A) ∈ scd, Antecedents(τ, A) ⊆ I
implies Consequents(τ, A) ⊆ I iff TΥ(I) ⊆ I. q.e.d.
Proposition 4.2 TΥ : ℘(HΥ)→ ℘(HΥ) is a monotonic mapping.
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Proof We have to prove that I1 ⊆ I2 implies TΥ(I1) ⊆ TΥ(I2), for each
I1, I2 ∈ ℘(HΥ). If I1 ⊆ I2, then is I2 = I1 ∪ {(t1, f1, v)1, . . . , (tn, fn, vn)}. By
definition of TΥ, if I1 ⊆ I2 then is TΥ(I2) = TΥ(I1) ∪ I3, where I3 ∈ ℘(HΥ)
is the set of all consequences of those actions whose preconditions are sat-
isfied in I2 but not in I1; if no such actions exist, I3 is simply the empty set.
As Υ meets the K epistemological characteristic, its actions are not allowed
to have an empty set of postconditions, so that I3 may never be an empty
set for successfully executed actions. Then TΥ(I1) ⊆ TΥ(I2) is true. q.e.d.
As ℘(HΥ) is a complete lattice and TΥ : ℘(HΥ)→ ℘(HΥ) is a monotonic
mapping, the ordinal powers of TΥ can be defined as follows:
TΥ ↑ 0 = {(0, f , v) ∈ HΥ : (0, f , v) ∈ obs}
TΥ ↑ τ = {(τ, f , v) ∈ HΥ :
exists (s, t, A) ∈ scd,
exists (s, t, A)V ∧mj=1 Sj ∈ law and
exists a valuation θ = {s/M(s), t/M(t)}
such that:
(τ, f , v) ∈ Consequents(sθ, τ, tθ, Sj(θ)) and
Antecedents(sθ, τ, tθ, Sj(θ)) ⊆ TΥ ↑ (τ − 1)}
Theorem 4.3 (Tarski, 1955 [200]) Let U = (A,≤) be a complete lattice and
let f : A→ A be a monotonic mapping. Then f has a least fixpoint, l f p( f ),
and a greatest fixpoint, g f p( f ). Furthermore, g f p( f ) = lub{x : f (x) =
x} = lub{x : f (x) ≥ x} and l f p( f ) = glb{x : f (x) = x} = glb{x :
f (x) ≤ x}.
Corollary 4.4 TΥ admits a least fixpoint that is equal to the greatest lower
bound of its pre-fixpoints, that is l f p(TΥ) = glb{I : TΥ(I) = I} = glb{I :
TΥ(I) ⊆ I}.
The corollary guarantees the existence of l f p(TΥ). The construct-
ive characterisation is given in terms of the ordinal powers of TΥ, i.e.
l f p(TΥ) ⊇ TΥ ↑ ω.
Proposition 4.5 TΥ is a continuous mapping.
Proof We have to prove that TΥ(lub(X)) = lub(TΥ(X)), for each direc-
ted subset X of ℘(HΥ). Let X be a directed subset of ℘(HΥ), and let
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be (τ, f , v) ∈ HΥ. (τ, f , v) ∈ TΥ(lub(X)) if and only if both (τ, f , v) ∈
Consequents(τ, A) and Antecedents(τ, A) ⊆ lub(X), for some executed ac-
tion A. This is true if and only if both (τ, f , v) ∈ Consequents(τ, A) and
Antecedents(τ, A) ⊆ I, for some I ∈ X. This is true if and only if (τ, f , v) ∈
TΥ(I), for some I ∈ X. This is true if and only if (τ, f , v) ∈ lub(TΥ(X)).
q.e.d.
Theorem 4.6 (Kleene, 1952 [99, p. 349]) Let U = (A,≤) be a complete lat-
tice and f : A→ A be continuous. Then, l f p( f ) = f ↑ ω, where ω is the
first limit ordinal.
Corollary 4.7 l f p(TΥ) = TΥ ↑ ω.
The fixpoint semantics of Υ is defined as the least fixpoint of TΥ. Given a
scenario Υ and a query (t, f , v) ∈ H, the semantics of (t, f , v) is defined as
the truth-value resulting from the application of the membership function
for l f p(TΥ) to (t, f , v) itself.
We have a finite lifetime, and thus any model of human causal reasoning
must take this limitation into account. We then assume that the interaction
between any agent and the environment leads to a finite game. This implies
that any scenario has a finite description Υ. Using this limitation, we can
apply another well-known result of fixpoint theory: as Υ is finite, then TΥ is
a monotonic function over the finite and complete lattice (HΥ,v), so that
TΥ just needs a finite number of iterations to reach its least fixpoint. More
precisely, there exists an ordinal τ such that TΥ ↑ (τ + 1) = TΥ ↑ τ. If Υ
has the same intended model set for Υ(µ), where µ is the maximum time
point occurring in Υ, then TΥ ↑ ω = TΥ(µ) ↑ ω = TΥ(µ) ↑ µ. Thus, the
fixpoint semantics may also be understood as an operational semantics for
finite Υs, although its practical application would be inefficient.
We shall now assess the described model. Let the relation (t, f , v) ∈
Σ(Υ) be a shorthand for «(t, f , v) is true in Σ(Υ)», i.e. «it exists an inter-
pretation (M, H) such that the development (B, M, H,A, C) is in Mod(Υ)
and H(t, f ) = v», according to the known definitions of intended model
set.
Theorem 4.8 (Classification) For any Υ ∈ Ksp-IAd and for any (t, f , v) ∈
HΥ, the following relation is true: (t, f , v) ∈ TΥ ↑ ω ⇔ (t, f , v) ∈
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ΣKsp-IAdΥ.
Proof The game between the ego and the environment starts at time τ = 0.
Because of the epistemological sub-characteristic s, the initial state of the
environment is known and is represented by elements (0, f , v) of obs. This
corresponds to TΥ ↑ 0 = {(t, f , v) ∈ HΥ : (t, f , v) ∈ obs and t = 0},
and thus the thesis is true for t = 0. – The environment persists until
the ego communicates its intention to perform an action, i.e. no element
occurs in scd whose starting time is τ − 1 and σ0 = σ1 = . . . = στ−1.
This corresponds to TΥ ↑ 0 = . . . = TΥ ↑ (τ − 1), and thus the thesis
is true for t = τ − 1. – Suddenly, the ego adds the element (τ, E) to the
current-action set C, where τ is the current time. Then, by definition, the
environment executes the action and ends it at τ′ by removing (τ, E) from
C and adding (τ, τ′, E) to the past-action set A. The ego may also decide
to end E earlier, let say at τ′′ ∈ (τ, τ′), i.e. it may autonomously remove
(τ, E) from C and add (τ, τ′′, E) to A. The correspondence with T is as
follows. By definition, TΥ ↑ τ finds the element (τ, τ′, E) (or (τ, τ′′, E))
in scd, then evaluates whether the antecedents for E are satisfied. If the
antecedents are satisfied, the knowledge is increased accordingly; other-
wise the action is executed without any effect and the knowledge is not
increased (we already proved TΥ is rising monotonic). Because of the epi-
stemological sub-characteristic p, no observation occurs in obs at later time
points than the origo, and no alternative results of actions are allowed be-
cause of the ontological restriction d upon A. The game ranges to infinity,
where the intended model set is defined. By Kleene’s theorem, TΥ reaches
the greatest lower bound of its pre-fixpoints with its least fixpoint, that is
l f p(TΥ) = glb{I : TΥ(I) = I} = glb{I : TΥ(I) ⊆ I} = TΥ ↑ ω. q.e.d.
Corollary 4.9 For all Υ ∈ Ksp-IAd, TΥ ↑ ω ⊆ [[Υ]].
Proof TΥ ↑ ω = ΣKsp-IAdΥ ⊆ ΣK-IAΥ ⊆ [[Υ]]. q.e.d.
The full abstraction of any model with respect to the equivalence
of causal reasoning scenarios is a default corollary of its classification
chapter 4.
We can translate the model in theorem 4.8 into a prolog program. It is
sufficient to rewrite any member (τ, f , v) of obs into atoms HoldsAt(τ, f , v),
any member (s, t, A) of scd into atoms Happens(s, t, A), any member
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(τ, f , ϕ(s, τ, t)) of the S part of law into HoldsAt(τ, f , ϕ(s, τ, t)) atoms, and
any member (s, t, A) V ∧mj=1 Sj of law into Happens(s, t, A) ← ∧mj=1 Sj
definite Horn clauses. We remark the absence of negation symbols. We
also remark that this is not a program, to solve a reasoning problem; this is
a class of computations that display a desired behaviour, to solve a class of
reasoning problems.
Theorem 4.10 (Classification) Abductive Logic Programming with integ-
rity constraints (alp) belongs to the class K-IbsAd and the computational
complexity of its entailment problem is coNP-complete.
Proof alp is sound and complete with respect to the Action Language A
[50, 49, 51] [82]; the result consists in a sound and complete transformation
from A scenarios to open logic programs with integrity constraints, where
the reasoning procedure adopted for the resulting programs is the sldnfa
Resolution Rule. The range of correct applicability of the Action Language
A is K-IbsAd and the computational complexity of its entailment problem
is coNP-complete [111]. The thesis is true by transitivity on these results.
q.e.d.
Theorem 4.11 (Classification) Answer Set Programming belongs to the
class K-IbsAdCi.
Proof Answer Set Programming is sound with respect to the Action Lan-
guage A [82].The range of correct applicability of the Action Language A
is K-IbsAd. The thesis is true by transitivity on these results. q.e.d.
4.4 Discussion
As a model of human causal reasoning, the range of correct applicability
of positive logic programming is null if we use its original language. As we
know well, the model fails with the Hanks-McDermott problem [89, 90],
and Ksp-IAd is the smallest class to include its correct solution [169]. This
means that there is at least one problem in Ksp-IAd for which the model
fails, and thus, the model is correctly applicable to either a sub-class of
Ksp-IAd or no class at all. The available evidence suggests that Ksp-IAd is
the elementary class, and thus the above cases overlap.
However, theorem 4.8 shows that positive logic programming is ad-
equate as a model of causal reasoning. The model is not language inde-
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pendent, because its range of correct applicability changes with the lan-
guage. The correctness result was obtained inducing a language shift: we
divided the reasoning from the original language of definite Horn-clauses,
and used K-IA’s own language for the classification. The language shift
changed the language but not the logic. Using ordinals as time points
and the upward inductive process as master-clock, the proof shows the
model’s ability to simulate the game semantics of K-IA when the environ-
ment has a fixed strategy, leading precisely to the class Ksp-IAd. The proof
also shows the model’s ability to simulate a many-valued non-monotonic
temporal reasoning with a two-valued monotonic non-temporal semantics.
We can demonstrate this ability by solving the renown Hanks-McDermott
problem. We represent this problem as follows.
obs is the set {(0, alive, true), (0, loaded, f alse)}
scd is the set {(2, 4, Load), (6, 8, Shoot)}
law is the set containing the following elements:
[s, t]LoadV ∀ τ ∈ [s, t] . [τ]loaded = to_load(s, τ, t)
[s, t]ShootV ∀ τ ∈ [s, t] . [τ]alive = to_die(s, τ, t) ∧
[τ]loaded = to_shoot(s, τ, t)
The actions are described by the following partial fluents:
to_load(s, τ, t) =
unknown if τ ∈ (s, t)true if τ = t
to_shoot(s, τ, t) =

true if τ = s
unknown if τ ∈ (s, t)
f alse if τ = t
to_die(s, τ, t) =
unknown if τ ∈ (s, t)f alse if τ = t
The following is true by theorem 4.8.
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(5, alive, true) ∈ TΥ ↑ ω (5, loaded, true) ∈ TΥ ↑ ω
(9, alive, f alse) ∈ TΥ ↑ ω (9, loaded, f alse) ∈ TΥ ↑ ω
The proof of theorem 4.8 gives step-by-step instructions into how this
is done, and ensures that the reasoning model gives the correct answers to
this specific reasoning problem as well as to any other problem in the class
Ksp-IAd of epistemological and ontological characteristics.
The thesis of theorem 4.8 cannot be improved. It is readily verifiable
by counter-examples that any problem Υ in the class K-IA \ Ksp-IAd falls
beyond the scope of the given model. Indeed, for any Υ using K \ Ksp, TΥ
fails because it is unable to perform backward reasoning. Further, for any
Υ using IA \ IAd, TΥ fails because it is unable to perform nondeterministic
reasoning.
By measuring the progress with respect to both alp and asp, the classi-
fications show that part of the original problem-solving power of positive
logic programming was lost in these non-monotonic extensions: the epi-
stemological characteristics improved from Ksp to full K, but an ontological
characteristics regressed from I to Ibs. This suggests a growth direction for
both theories alp and asp.
5MODELS (PART III)
5.1 Introduction
The Calculus of Events [103] is a useful application of logic programming
with negation [100, 213, 42], where programs are designed to solve prob-
lems in legal reasoning, medical informatics and cognitive robotics. As
chiefly reviewed by Shanahan [180], many designs aimed at improving the
problem-solving power of such programs, where the proposed correctness
consisted in appeals to intuition through test examples. This approach to
program correctness is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of disciplined
programming. The test examples can be an effective way to show the pres-
ence of errors and limitations on a design, as shown by Hanks and McDer-
mott [90], but are hopelessly inadequate for proving the absence of errors
[56] and the range of correct applicability [56, 174]. Further, the appeals
to intuition do not generalise to relevant computational properties, such as
the full abstraction of the calculus (the program function) with respect to
the equivalence of reasoning scenarios (the input), and give no formal in-
strument to decide equivalence and subsumption relations of the calculus
with respect to other models of causal reasoning.
The aim of this work is to answer to the above problems. We thus
present assessments for the Calculus of Events in its latest descrip-
tions, namely Shanahan’s circumscriptive axiomatisations defined using
Sandewall’s filtering technique [179, 180, 181, 182], to gain more insight
into this model of causal reasoning and raise the confidence level of its
programs significantly.
5.2 Methods
We used the systematic paradigm, as precisely described in chapter 2. The
assessments required extensions to the paradigm. We described these ex-
tensions in chapter 2. In the following sections we therefore proceed with
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the development of the theory and assume that it is understood what is
meant by «correctness», «classification», «relations of equivalence and sub-
sumption», «full abstraction», and the definition of the class K-RACi.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Boolean cce (Full Event Calculus)
The following description consists in the original 1986 [103] Calculus of
Events based on predicate completion [41, 42, 162], simplified in 1992 [102],
extended in 1995 [179] to use filtered predicate circumscription [166] [180,
ch. 16 and p. 81] [115, 128, 126], further extended in 1997 [180, ch. 16] to
model actions over time periods, further simplified in 1999 [181, §1,3] and
2000 [182, p. 209], and thus referred to as Full Event Calculus. The de-
scription preserves the original decisions to use time points and events as
a primary notion. The reasoning model truly is Kowalski’s Calculus of
Events, extended with Sandewall’s filtering technique and McCarthy’s pre-
dicate circumscription, then reduced to Clark’s predicate completion via
the Lifschitz reduction theorems to compute circumscription [115, 112].
Definition 5.3.1 (Boolean cce) The model uses classical first-order logic as
base logic, augmented with the formulae in fig. 5.1 (p. 105) and axioms in
fig. 5.2 for representing the scenario of interest and for controlling deduc-
tion, it then uses predicate circumscription [128] with forced separation as
model-preference criterion. The formal language is defined in fig. 5.1. Let
Γ1 be a finite conjunction of Initiates, Terminates and Releases formulae
(the scenario). Let Γ2 be a finite conjunction of InitiallyP and InitiallyN
formulae (the initial situation) and of Happens and temporal ordering for-
mulae (the narrative). Let Γ3 be a finite conjunction of Uniqueness of
Names Axioms for the actions and the features mentioned in Γ1. Following
Tarski’s definition of logical consequence, the set of logical consequences
is {α : ∆ ∧ Γ  α}, where α is a finite conjunction of (¬)HoldsAt formulae,
∆ is the conjunction of axioms A1 . . . A7 in fig. 5.2 and Γ is the following
formula, where circ is the circumscription of the given predicates:
circ(Γ1; Initiates, Terminates, Releases) ∧ circ(Γ2; Happens) ∧ Γ3
The minimisation of Happens corresponds to the default assumption
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that no unexpected events occur. The minimisation of Initiates, Terminates
and Releases corresponds to the default assumption that actions have no
unexpected effects. We interpret time points as natural numbers, with 0 as
initial element. The structure of time is the classical structureN of natural
numbers with a total order relation, i.e. linear (non branching) time.
Although the structure of time in Shanahan’s own text is R+ [178] [181,
p. 411], the ontological characteristic of continuous time is only useful to
model continuous change, and thus the above restriction to N does not
affect the classification.
The given description shows that the Calculus of Events is not merely a
logic program: it is a full-blown preferential logic. Preferential logics [187,
p. 74] [121] are the result of associating a preference relation on interpret-
ations to any base logic with compositional model-theoretic semantics. In
this case, the base logic consists in the Horn clause fragment of classical,
Tarskian first-order logic. The conceptual basis of the adopted preference
relation on interpretations is the partitioning of the set of premisses and the
application of local preference relations to their interpretations; the set of
preferred interpretations is chosen by filter preferential entailment, using
predicate circumscription as preference relation. The definition combines
filtering with occlusion [166], a technique to block temporal inertia for spe-
cified formulae at specified times.
We shall now classify the described model. Let the relation (t, f , v) ∈
Σ(Υ) be a shorthand for «(t, f , v) is true in Σ(Υ)», that is, «it exists
an intended interpretation (M, H) such that (B, M, H,P , C) ∈ Mod(Υ)
and ( f , v) ∈ H(t)» according to the known definition of intended
model set. Let the relation (t, f , true) ∈ S(T(Υ)) be a shorthand for
∆ ∧ Γ  HoldsAt( f , t). Let the relation (t, f , f alse) ∈ S(T(Υ)) be a short-
hand for ∆ ∧ Γ  ¬HoldsAt( f , t), where ∆ is the conjunction of axioms
A1 . . . A7, Γ is the formula
circ(Γ1; Initiates, Terminates, Releases) ∧ circ(Γ2; Happens) ∧ Γ3
and, by definition 5.3.2, all formulae in Γ1 and Γ2 are in T(Υ).
Definition 5.3.2 Let LM be the set of legal sentences in K-IA, and let LO
be the set of legal sentences of Boolean cce. We define T : LM → LO as
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follows.
• T((0, f , true)) = {InitiallyP( f )} and
T((0, f , f alse)) = {InitiallyN( f )};
• T((s, t, a)) = {Happens(a, s, t − 1)} if s and t are temporal constants,
and T((s, t, a)) = {∀s, t.Happens(a, s, t− 1)} otherwise;
• T(s < t) = {s < t} and T(s ≤ t) = {s ≤ t};
• T((s, t, a) V ∨ni=1 ∧mj=1 Sij), where n ∈ {1, 2}, is translated into the fol-
lowing set of formulae. A single Initiates(a, f , s) formula for each fea-
ture f becoming true as the effect of a deterministic action a. A single
Terminates(a, f , s) formula for each feature f becoming false as the effect
of a deterministic action a. A single Releases(a, f , s) formula for each fea-
ture f becoming either true or false as the effect of a nondeterministic ac-
tion a. A single HoldsAt( f , s) formula for each antecedent (s, f , true) to
the successful execution of the action a, and a single ¬HoldsAt( f , s) for-
mula for each antecedent (s, f , f alse) to the successful execution of the
action a. The antecedents are explicit conditions for the truth of Initiates,
Terminates and Releases formulae.
The first rule maps the part obs of Υ into a Boolean cce initial situation.
The second and third rule map scd and tc into a Boolean cce narrative.
The fourth rule maps law into a Boolean cce scenario.
The reason for mapping t into t− 1 in the second rule is the following.
For any successfully executed action a during [t1, t2], the occlusion predic-
ate prevents the value of influenced features from being seen during (t1, t2)
[169, p. 234,238], while the Releases predicate prevents the value of influ-
enced features from being seen during (t1, t2]. In fact, the constraint t2 < t
in the cce axioms A2 and A5 causes the action a to be neither true nor false
at t2. The semantics by the metalanguage and the object language are then
identical during (t1, t2) but differ at t2; in the object language, the effect
of a is exerted at any time t > t2, while in the metalanguage it is exerted
at any time t ≥ t2.—The alternative mapping would be the linear map-
ping T((s, t, A)) = Happens(A, s, t), and the modification of axioms A2
and A5 by replacing the constraint t2 < t with t2 ≤ t. This would trigger
the need for an additional modification, namely the substitution of t1 ≤ t2
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with t1 < t2 in axiom A7, to allow actions with non-null duration only,
and avoid the dividing-instant problem. Please note that this would be a
modification, not a correction. It is our aim to classify the original reasonin
model, as given by its authors, and thus no modification is welcome.
Theorem 5.1 (Classification) For any reasoning scenario Υ in Ksp-IbA ⊂
K-RACi and for any element (t, f , v) of H = T × F × V the following
relation holds true: (t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) iff (t, f , v) ∈ ΣKsp-IbA(Υ).
To prove this thesis we need two propositions by Lifschitz; we repro-
duce them as in Shanahan [180, p. 280].
Proposition 5.2 [115, prop. 3.1.1] circ(Γ ∧ ∀ x.ρ(x) ← φ(x); ρ) is equival-
ent to Γ ∧ ∀ x.ρ(x)↔ φ(x) if Γ and φ(x) do not mention the predicate ρ.
Proposition 5.3 [115, prop. 7.1.1] An occurrence of a predicate symbol in
a formula φ is positive if it is in the scope of an even number of negations
in the equivalent formula ψ that is obtained by eliminating the connectives
→ and ↔ from φ. Let ρ be the n-tuple of predicate symbols ρ1, . . . , ρn.
If all occurrences in Γ of the predicate symbols in ρ are positive, then
circ(Γ; ρ) = circ(Γ; ρ1) ∧ . . . ∧ circ(Γ; ρn).
Proof of theorem 5.1 The following standard reduction applies to Γ. By
prop. 5.3, the second-order formula
circ(Γ1; Initiates, Terminates, Releases)
reduces to the following second-order formula:
circ(Γ1; Initiates) ∧ circ(Γ1; Terminates) ∧ circ(Γ1; Releases)
By prop. 5.2 each circ minimisation in both the above formula and in
circ(Γ2; Happens) reduces to first-order predicate completion. In what fol-
lows, this reduction is used at each evaluation of S(T(Υ)), and the reference
to any cce axiom involves the application of the Uniqueness of Names Ax-
ioms in Γ3. The proof is by induction.
(i) The simulative game starts at time τ = 0. The initial state of the
environment is represented by elements (0, f , true) or (0, f , f alse) of obs
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in Σ(Υ). This results either in HoldsAt( f , 0) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A1, or in
¬HoldsAt( f , 0) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A4 respectively.
(ii) The environment, as a player, persists until the ego player commu-
nicates its intention to perform an action, so that no element of scd starts
at the present time τ. This results in temporal inertia, by either axiom A1
or A4 depending on how f was initialised, or by axiom A2 or A5 depend-
ing on how f was last modified.
(iii) At time point τ, the ego player suddenly adds (τ, E) to the cur-
rent-action set C. Then the environment executes the action, and ends it at
τ′ by removing (τ, E) from C and adding (τ, τ′, E) to the past-action set P .
The ego may also decide to end E earlier than τ′, let say at τ′′ ∈ (τ, τ′),
so that it may autonomously remove (τ, E) from C and add (τ, τ′′, E) to P .
Let show the corresponding logical consequences of Boolean cce, point-
wise. By definition 5.3.2, it exists either a single Happens(E, τ, τ′ − 1) or a
single Happens(E, τ, τ′′ − 1) formula to refer to. If the feature f does not
belong to the set of those features which would be modified by a success-
ful execution of E, i.e. f /∈ In f l(E, σt), then the feature is neither Clipped
nor Declipped, and the situation described at (ii) then holds up to τ′ (τ′′).
Otherwise is f ∈ In f l(E, σt), and the following holds. If at least one ante-
cedent for the successful execution of the action E is not met, the action E
is executed without any effect and the situation described at (ii) then holds
up to τ′ (τ′′). Otherwise, if all antecedents for the action E are successfully
met (i.e. all HoldsAt and ¬HoldsAt test conditions for Initiates, Terminates
and Releases clauses are met by axioms A3 and A6), or no antecedent ex-
ists at all (in which case the above tests are immediately met), then E is
successfully executed and the following holds.
• If t = τ, then either of the following holds by temporal inertia:
• (t, f , true) ∈ Σ(Υ),
InitiallyP( f ) by definition of T(Υ),
¬Clipped(0, f , t) by axiom A3 and
HoldsAt( f , t) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A1, or
• (t, f , f alse) ∈ Σ(Υ),
InitiallyN( f ) by definition of T(Υ),
¬Declipped(0, f , t) by axiom A6 and
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¬HoldsAt( f , t) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A4.
• If τ < t < τ′, it is ( f , v) ∈ Trajs(E, σt), (t, f , v) ∈ Σ(Υ) and either of the
following holds:
• Initiates(a, f , τ) ∨ Releases(E, f , τ) by definition of T(Υ) and
Declipped(τ, f , τ′) by axiom A6, or
• Terminates(a, f , τ) ∨ Releases(E, f , τ) by definition of T(Υ) and
Clipped(τ, f , τ′) by axiom A3,
so that it is neither HoldsAt( f , t) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A2 nor
¬HoldsAt( f , t) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A5 and v = true ∨ f alse (occlu-
sion).
• If t = τ′, it is ( f , v) ∈ Trajs(E, σt), (t, f , v) ∈ Σ(Υ) and one of the follow-
ing holds:
• v = true, then
Initiates(a, f , τ) by definition of T(Υ) and
HoldsAt( f , τ′) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A2, or
• v = f alse, then
Terminates(a, f , τ) by definition of T(Υ) and
¬HoldsAt( f , τ′) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A5, or
• v = true ∨ f alse, then
Releases(a, f , τ) by definition of T(Υ), then it is both
Declipped(τ, f , τ′) and Clipped(τ, f , τ′), so that it is neither
HoldsAt( f , t) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A2, nor ¬HoldsAt( f , t) ∈
S(T(Υ)) by axiom A5 (nondeterminism).
The case for τ′′ in place of τ′ is identical to the above case.
(iv) The simulative game ranges to infinity, where the intended-model
set is completely defined. The situations described at (ii) and (iii) repeat
themselves to the infinity, for both semantics, the semantics mirroring the
underlying semantics.
q.e.d.
The use of definition 5.3.1 for solving a few celebrated test examples was
demonstrated by Shanahan [181] [180, p. 322-323]. The above result gives
general insight into how this is done, and guarantees that the reasoning
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model gives the correct answers for those specific scenarios, as well as for
all other problems in the class Ksp-IbA.
Corollary 5.4 Boolean cce is fully abstract with respect to the equivalence
of reasoning scenarios in Ksp-IbA.
Proof True by proposition 2.1 at p. 40. q.e.d.
5.3.2 Continuous cce (Extended Event Calculus)
The following description is a fragment of the Extended Event Calculus
[181, p. 424] [180, §16.4]; it extends Boolean cce to the case of unoccluded
change for non-Boolean features.
Definition 5.3.3 (Continuous cce) The language of Boolean cce is exten-
ded with formulae of type InitiallyP( f 2(v)) to express the initial value v of
a non-Boolean feature f 2, and formulae of type Trajectory( f 1, t, f 2(v), d) to
express the unoccluded change of f 2. The intended meaning of the latter
formula is as follows: if the feature f 1 is initiated at time t then the fea-
ture f 2 has value v at time t + d. The logical machinery of Boolean cce is
extended accordingly, with the following axiom.
HoldsAt( f 2, t3)←− Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Initiates(a, f 1, t1) ∧ (A8)
t2 < t3∧ t3 = t2+ d ∧ Trajectory( f 1, t1, f 2, d) ∧
¬Clipped(t1, f 1, t3)
Definition 5.3.4 Let LM be the set of legal sentences of K-RA, and let LO
be the set of legal sentences of discrete cce. The mapping T : LM → LO is
identical to def. 5.3.2 for Boolean features and their respective actions. The
following extension only applies to non-Boolean features and their respect-
ive actions.
• T((0, f , v)) = {InitiallyP( f (v))}
• T((s, t, a)) = {Happens(astart, s, s), Happens(aend, t− 1, t− 1)} if s and t
are temporal constants, and
T((s, t, a)) = {∀t.Happens(astart, t, t), ∀t.Happens(aend, t− 1, t− 1)} oth-
erwise.
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• T(s < t) = {s < t} and T(s ≤ t) = {s ≤ t}
• (s, t, a) V ∨ni=1 ∧mj=1 Sij is translated into the following set of formulae.
For each pair (i, j), where i = 1 . . . n, j = 1 . . . m,
∀t.Initiates(astart, f 1, t)
∀t.Terminates(aend, f 1, t)
∀t, v.Releases(astart, f 2(v), t)
∀t, v.Initiates(aend, f 2(v), t) ← HoldsAt( f 2(v), t)
∀t, d.Trajectory( f 1, t, f 2(v), d) ← v = ...
The first rule maps the part obs of Υ into a cce initial situation, the sec-
ond and third rule map scd and tc into a narrative, and the fourth rule
maps law into a cce scenario. The actions astart and aend are introduced
to initiate and terminate the Boolean feature f 1, as required by defini-
tion 5.3.3.
We shall now assess the described model. Let the relation (t, f , v) ∈
Σ(Υ) be a shorthand for «(t, f , v) is true in Σ(Υ)», that is, «it exists an inten-
ded interpretation (M, H) such that (B, M, H,P , C) ∈ Mod(Υ) and ( f , v) ∈
H(t)», according to the definition of intended model set for K-RACi. Let
the relation (t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) be a shorthand for ∆ ∧ Γ  HoldsAt( f (v), t),
where ∆ is the conjunction of axioms A1 . . . A8, Γ is the known conjunctive
formula
Γ ≡ circ(Γ1; Initiates, Terminates, Releases) ∧ circ(Γ2; Happens) ∧ Γ3
and, by definition 5.3.4, all formulae in Γ1, Γ2 and Γ2 are in T(Υ).
Theorem 5.5 (Classification) For any reasoning scenario Υ in the class
Ksp-RA and for any element (t, f , v) of H = T × F × V the following
relation holds true: (t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) iff (t, f , v) ∈ ΣKsp-RA(Υ).
Proof By theorem 5.1 the thesis is true for any Υ in Ksp-IbA ⊂ Ksp-IA ⊂
Ksp-RA. We must prove the thesis for any Υ in Ksp-RA \ Ksp-IbA. The
proof is identical to the given one for Boolean cce, except for the following.
When reasoning about non-Boolean features, the axioms A4 and A5 always
fail. By absurd, the meaning of a successful axiom A4 (A5) would be that
the non-Boolean feature f does not have the value v at time 0 (t). As v is
not a truth-value, however, this would cause an infinite computation (if v
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ranges on the naturals, for example) and the computed answers would not
be the intended ones. Concerning the unoccluded change, the following
holds. If τ < t < τ′ (point 3b of the proof), then both Happens(astart, τ, τ)
and Initiates(astart, f 1, τ) hold by definition 5.3.4; thus Clipped(τ, f 1, t)
does not hold, and Trajectory( f 1, τ, f (v), d) computes the value v; thus
HoldsAt( f (v), t) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A8. If t = τ′ (point 3c of the proof),
then both Happens(astart, τ, τ) and Initiates(astart, f (), τ) hold by definition
of T(Υ), and the axiom A3 always fails; thus HoldsAt( f (v), t) ∈ S(T(Υ))
by axiom A2. q.e.d.
Corollary 5.6 Continuous cce is fully abstract with respect to the equival-
ence of reasoning scenarios in Ksp-RA.
Corollary 5.7 (Classification of Discrete cce) When Continuous cce is
applied to discrete scenarios, we refer to it as Discrete cce. For any
reasoning scenario Υ in the class Ksp-IA and for any element (t, f , v)
of H = T × F × V the following relation holds true: (t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) iff
(t, f , v) ∈ ΣKsp-IA(Υ).
5.3.3 Continuous cce (redesigned)
The Continuous cce does not include a standard representation of tra-
jectory descriptors. This is due to the original mathematical error
of specifying the value of a function as its parameter in the formula
Trajectory( f 1, t, f 2(v), d). We solve this problem using partial fluents as
new trajectory descriptors. The partial fluents can be implemented by
functions in any prolog system where such objects are formally allowed,
and by the usual prolog gymnastics otherwise.
Definition 5.3.5 (Continuous cce) We extend the language of Boolean cce
with formulae of type InitiallyP( f , v) to express the initial value of non-
Boolean features, and formulae of type
∀t, d.Trajectory(a, t, d, f , v)← v = ϕ(t, t + d, t + d)
to express the unoccluded change, where ϕ is a partial fluent. The intended
meaning of the latter formula is as follows. Let a be an action such that
Happens(a, t1, t2) holds. The feature f has value v at time t + d only if the
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Boolean feature f ′ was initiated at time t1 and it was not terminated or
released between times t1 and t. The logical machinery of Boolean cce is
extended accordingly, with the following axiom.
HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ t1 < t2∧
t1 < t ∧ t =< t2∧
d = t− t1∧ Trajectory(a, t1, d, f , v).
We described the resulting axiomatisation in figures 5.5–5.6 (p. 107). It
is evident from it that axioms A4, A5, A6, and the formulae InitiallyN ,
Initiates, Terminates and Releases are now redundant. We then redesigned
the model, as described in figures 5.7–5.8 (p. 108).
Definition 5.3.6 Let LM be the set of legal sentences of K-RA, and let LO be
the set of legal sentences of the redesigned Continuous cce (p. 108). We
define T : LM → LO as follows.
• T((0, f , v)) = {Initially( f , v)};
• T((s, t, a)) = {Happens(a, s, t)} if s and t are temporal constants, and
T((s, t, a)) = {∀s, t.Happens(a, s, t)} otherwise;
• (s, t, a) V ∨ni=1 ∧mj=1 Sij, for each pair (i, j), where i = 1 . . . n, j = 1 . . . m,
it is translated as ∀t, d.Trajectory(a, s, d, fij, v) ←− Precondition ∧ v =
ϕij(s, s+ d, s+ d), where Precondition consists in a single HoldsAt(s, f , v)
formula for each antecedent (s, f , v) to the successful execution of the
action a.
The first rule maps the part obs of Υ into a cce initial situation. The
second and third rule map the scd and law part of Υ into a cce scenario.
We shall now classify the described model. Let the relation (t, f , v) ∈
Σ(Υ) be the usual shorthand for «(t, f , v) is true in Σ(Υ)», that is, «it exists
an intended interpretation (M, H) such that (B, M, H,P , C) ∈ Mod(Υ)
and ( f , v) ∈ H(t)», according to the definition of intended model set
for K-RACi. Let the relation (t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) be a shorthand for
∆ ∧ Γ  HoldsAt(t, f , v), where ∆ is the conjunction of axioms A1 . . . A4, Γ
is the conjunctive formula Γ ≡ circ(Γ2; Happens) ∧ Γ3 and, by definitions
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5.3.5, 5.3.6 , all formulae in Γ2 and Γ3 are in T(Υ).
Theorem 5.8 (Classification) For any reasoning scenario Υ in the class
Ksp-RA and for any element (t, f , v) of H = T × F × V the following
relation holds true: (t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) iff (t, f , v) ∈ ΣKsp-RA(Υ).
Proof By proposition 5.2, circ(Γ2; Happens) reduces to first-order predic-
ate completion. In what follows, this standard reduction is used at each
evaluation of S(T(Υ)), and the reference to any cce axiom involves the
application of the Uniqueness of Names Axioms in Γ3. The proof is by
induction.
(i) The simulative game starts at time τ = 0. The initial state of the
environment is represented by elements (0, f , v) of obs in Υ. This results in
HoldsAt(0, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A1.
(ii) The environment, as a player, persists until the ego player commu-
nicates its intention to perform an action, so that no element of scd starts
at the present time τ. This results in temporal inertia, by either axiom A1,
depending on how f was initialised, or by axiom A2, depending on how f
was last modified.
(iii) At time point τ, the ego player suddenly adds (τ, E) to the cur-
rent-action set C. Then the environment executes the action, and ends it
at τ′ by removing (τ, E) from C and adding (τ, τ′, E) to the past-action set
P . The ego may also decide to end E earlier than t′, let say at τ′′ ∈ (τ, τ′),
so that it may autonomously remove (τ, E) from C and add (τ, τ′′, E) to
P . Let show the corresponding logical consequences of the redesigned
Continuous cce, pointwise. By definition 5.3.6, it exists either a single
Happens(E, τ, τ′) or a single Happens(E, τ, τ′′) formula to refer to. If the
feature f does not belong to the set of those features which would be mod-
ified by a successful execution of E, i.e. f /∈ In f l(E, σt), then the feature is
not Clipped, and the situation described at (ii) then holds up to τ′ (τ′′). Oth-
erwise is f ∈ In f l(E, σt), and the following holds. If Precondition fails, then
the action E is executed without any effect and the situation described at
(ii) then holds up to τ′ (τ′′). If Precondition succeeds, then E is successfully
executed and the following holds.
• If t = τ, then is Initially( f , v) by definition of T(Υ), ¬Clipped(0, f , t) by
axiom A4, and HoldsAt(t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A1;
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• If τ < t ≤ τ′, then is Clipped(τ, f , τ′) by axiom A4, and
HoldsAt(t, f , v) ∈ S(T(Υ)) by axiom A3.
The case for τ′′ in place of τ′ is identical to the above case.
(iv) The simulative game ranges to infinity, where the intended-model
set is completely defined. The situations described at (ii) and (iii) repeat
themselves to the infinity, for both semantics, the semantics mirroring the
underlying semantics.
q.e.d.
Corollary 5.9 The redesigned Continuous cce is fully abstract with respect
to the equivalence of reasoning scenarios in Ksp-RA.
5.3.4 Abductive cce
Ksp-IA is the subclass of K-IA with the following characteristics: accurate
and complete information about actions (K), complete knowledge about
the initial state of the environment (Ks) and no information at any later
state than the initial one (Kp), together with strict inertia in integer time
(I) of actions with alternative results (A). In Ksp-IA are the problems of
reasoning forwards in time, from causes to effects. In K-IA \ Ksp-IA are
the problems of reasoning backwards in time, from effects to causes, and
problems of reasoning both forwards and backwards in time for a single
query. The part obs of any reasoning scenario in K-IA \ Ksp-IA explicitly
includes observations about features at strictly later states than the initial
one. However, by definition, cce can only represent information about the
initial state of the environment, to reason forwards in time, and thus any
scenario in K-IA \Ksp-IA falls beyond cce’s expressiveness and reasoning
ability. In cce’s literature, reasoning backwards in time is understood as
abductive reasoning. Abductive cce was first studied in [177] [180, p. 330,
347-361], then defined as follows [182].
Definition 5.3.7 (Abductive cce) Following definition 5.3.1, let α be the
goal (ground). A plan for α is a narrative Γ′ such that ∆ ∧ Γ  α, where
∆ ∧ Γ is a ground and consistent set of premisses, and Γ is the following
conjunctive formula:
circ(Γ1; Initiates, Terminates, Releases) ∧ circ(Γ2 ∧ Γ′; Happens) ∧ Γ3.
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As mentioned above, K-IA \Ksp-IA is partitioned in the set of problems
requiring pure backward reasoning and the set of problems requiring both
backward and forward reasoning for a single query. The following scen-
arios are not necessarily the most representative members of this latter set,
yet they show that this latter set is not empty, and Abductive cce does not
represent and reason correctly about them.
Scenario 5.3.1 obs = {(8, f , true)}, scd = {(4, 6, a)},
law = {(s, t, a)V (s, f , true)⇒ (t, g, true)}.
Scenario 5.3.2 obs = {(15, g, f alse)}, scd = {(4, 6, a), (8, 10, a2)},
law = {(s, t, a)V (s, f , true)⇒ (t, g, true),
(s, t, a2)V (s, f , true)⇒ (t, g, f alse)}.
Scenario 5.3.3 Any variant of the above scenario where arbitrarily many
actions are executed between a and a2 which are either independent from
f or use f as precondition.
In these scenarios, the reasoning problem consists in deciding whether
the action a was executed successfully. This is not a planning problem; we
know that a has been executed, because it appears explicitly in the sched-
ule. In the first scenario, the action a was successfully executed during
[4, 6]; in fact, f holds both at 8 and at any previous time point, including
the starting point 4. In the second scenario, a was executed successfully,
for exactly the same reason. The only difference between the two scenarios
is, that g is known to be true in the former, and is true as precondition of
the action a2 in the latter (a2 is successfully executed, because g is false
at τ = 15). Abductive cce fails with the scenarios due to both its object
language and its reasoning.
Concerning the object language, Abductive cce has the same express-
iveness of ground Boolean cce. In fact, definition 5.3.7 does not extend the
expressiveness of definition 5.3.1; on the contrary, it constrains its express-
iveness to the case of ground scenarios. If we translate the first scenario
into the language of Abductive cce, we obtain the following.
Happens(a, 4, 6)
Initiates(a, g, 4)← HoldsAt(4, f )
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The element in obs. The element represents information about the en-
vironment at later states than the initial one. Abductive cce has the same
expressiveness of ground Boolean cce, where such information can not be
represented. This type of information could only be represented as part of α
(the goal), but this representation of knowledge is not desirable, because it
confuses the data with the query. We recall that this is not a planning prob-
lem; we know that a has been executed, because it occurs in the schedule.
Concerning the reasoning, we observe that Boolean cce and Abductive
cce work independently from each other, thus requiring two distinct hu-
man-triggered runs for the same query. By definition of Boolean cce, the
action a is executed successfully only if the antecedent f is true by past
information only, which turns out to be false by axioms A1 and A4. By
Abductive cce, the set Γ′ = {Happens(4, 6, A)} is a plan for α, but this
does not help Boolean cce in solving the problem. For the similar reasons,
Boolean cce also fails with the second and third scenarios.
5.3.5 Concurrent cce
The class Ksp-RACi is the extension of Ksp-RA to concurrency of possibly
independent actions. The part scd of any reasoning scenario in Ksp-RACi \
Ksp-RA explicitly includes scheduled actions at strictly overlapping time
periods.
Concurrent cce, or Extended Event Calculus is built upon Continuous
cce. The language of Continuous cce is extended with formulae of type
Happens(a1&a2, t1, t2), meaning that a1&a2 is the compound action com-
prising the two actions a1 and a2 occurring during the time period [t1, t2],
with formulae of type Cancels(a1, a2, b), meaning that «the occurrence of a1
cancels the effect of a simultaneous occurrence of a2 on feature b», and for-
mulae of type Cancelled(a, b, t1, t2), meaning that «some event occurs from
time t1 to time t2 which cancels the effect of acion a on feature b». The lo-
gical machinery of Continuous cce is extended accordingly, including the
following:
Happens(a1&a2, t1, t2)←− Happens(a1, t1, t1) ∧ Happens(a2, t1, t2).
The following simple scenarios are not necessarily the most represent-
ative members of Ksp-RACi \ Ksp-RA, yet they show that this latter set is
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not empty. It is easily verified that Concurrent cce does not reason cor-
rectly about them.
Scenario 5.3.4 obs = {()}, scd = {(4, 8, a1), (2, 6, a2)}, law = {...}.
Scenario 5.3.5 obs = {()}, scd = {(4, 8, a1), (6, 10, a2)}, law = {...}.
Let a1 compute, say, mg ∗ sin(30) and a2 compute mg ∗ cos(30). In both
scenarios, a1 and a2 do not cancel each other, but blend into the vectorial
sum mg, respectively during [4, 6] and [6, 8]. The logical ∧ is not sufficient
to model this case correctly.
5.4 Discussion
In summary, we presented assessments for the Calculus of Events in its
various Circumscriptive axiomatisations defined using the filtering tech-
nique (cce). The available axiomatisations reduced to five models. Boolean
cce is correct with respect to Ksp-IbA. Continuous cce, both original
and redesigned with partial fluents, belongs to the class Ksp-RA. Dis-
crete cce belongs to Ksp-IA. Abductive cce is not correctly applicable to
K-IA \ Ksp-IA. Concurrent cce is not correctly applicable to Ksp-RACi.
The results show a general limitation of the cce models to the family Ksp
of epistemological characteristics, and no cce model is correct for K-RACi \
Ksp-RA. This suggests work towards a better design of Concurrent and
Abductive cce, and their integration into a single formal model.
Shanahan raises the following open question [183]: «knowing that a lo-
gic has sufficient expressive power to represent a given problem domain
is no help when it comes to actually constructing such a representation».
Our answer to Shanahan consists in a three step process: (1) to learn about
the expressive power of a reasoning model, we classify the model accord-
ing to the systematic paradigm; (2) to establish whether the given reas-
oning model solves a given reasoning problem, we establish whether the
reasoning problem belongs to the class for which the reasoning model is
provably correct; (3) to construct the representation of the problem, we ap-
ply the described synthesis technique, which consists in a corollary of the
formal classification. By construction, if we supply the representation of
the problem to the reasoning model, the reasoning model accepts this in-
put as syntactically correct, and its output is formally correct. This holds
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because the formal classification is also a formal correctness result of the
reasoning model with respect to any reasoning problem in the class, and
the synthesis technique is a corollary of the formal classification. This oc-
curs within the systematic paradigm. By comparison, the method based
upon «appeals to intuition» offers opinions on the expressive power of the
logic, no synthesis technique for the reasoning problems, and no general
evidence of correctness.
Specification and Synthesis. If we read the metalanguage as a spe-
cification language, then Υ is a formal specification for the correspond-
ing cce formalisation, for any scenario Υ in the correctness class. For any
such Υ, the corresponding formalisation is ∆ ∧ T(Υ), where ∆ is the con-
junction of axioms A1, A2, A3, . . . and T(Υ) results from the mechanical
application of the translator T to Υ. Plain knowledge of the metalanguage,
and the use of a compiler for T, allows anyone to use the calculus correctly.
Preliminary knowledge of cce is no longer a requirement for its correct use.
Verification. For any cce formalism, not necessarily written using
the above synthesis technique, the inverse mechanical application of T is
an immediate technique to verify whether the formalisation corresponds
to any Υ in the target class, that is, to decide whether the given formalism
fulfills the set of specified requirements.
The above technique to synthesise and verify the scenarios answers to
the open question posed by Shanahan in [183, p. 142]. The whole work
answers to the open problem posed by Sandewall in [172, p. 272].
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Figure 5.1: The language of Boolean cce
Formula Meaning
t time point (natural number)
f feature
a action
What is true when (obs):
InitiallyP( f ) f holds true from time 0
InitiallyN( f ) f does not hold from time 0
What happens when (scd):
Happens(a, t1, t2) a starts at time t1 and ceases at time t2
Temporal Constraints (tc):
t1 < t2, t1 ≤ t2 standard order relations between natural numbers
What actions do (law):
Initiates(a, f , t) f starts to hold after action a at time t
Terminates(a, f , t) f ceases to hold after action a at time t
Releases(a, f , t) f is not subject to inertia after action a at time t
Logical Machinery (table 5.2):
HoldsAt( f , t) f holds at time t
Clipped(t1, f , t2) f is terminated/released between times t1 and t2
Declipped(t1, f , t2) f is initiated/released between times t1 and t2
Figure 5.2: The axioms of Boolean cce
HoldsAt( f , t)←−InitiallyP( f ) ∧ ¬Clipped(0, f , t) (A1)
HoldsAt( f , t)←−t2 < t ∧ (A2)
Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Initiates(a, f , t1) ∧
¬Clipped(t1, f , t)
Clipped(t1, f , t4)←→∃ a, t2, t3 [ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4∧ (A3)
Happens(a, t2, t3) ∧
[Terminates(a, f , t2) ∨ Releases(a, f , t2)]]
¬HoldsAt( f , t)←−InitiallyN( f ) ∧ ¬Declipped(0, f , t) (A4)
¬HoldsAt( f , t)←−t2 < t ∧ (A5)
Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Terminates(a, f , t1) ∧
¬Declipped(t1, f , t)
Declipped(t1, f , t4)←→∃ a, t2, t3 [ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4∧ (A6)
Happens(a, t2, t3) ∧
[Initiates(a, f , t2) ∨ Releases(a, f , t2)]]
Happens(a, t1, t2) −→t1 ≤ t2 (A7)
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Figure 5.3: The language of Continuous cce
Formula Meaning
t time point (natural number)
f feature
a action
What is true when (obs):
InitiallyP( f ) f holds from time 0
InitiallyN( f ) f does not hold from time 0
What happens when (scd):
Happens(a, t1, t2) a starts at time t1 and ends at time t2
What actions do (law):
Initiates(a, f , t) f starts to hold after action a at time t
Terminates(a, f , t) f ceases to hold after action a at time t
Releases(a, f , t) f is not subject to inertia after action a at time t
Trajectory( f ′, t, f , d) f starts to hold at time t + d
if f ′ is initiated at time t
Temporal Constraints:
t1 < t2, t1 ≤ t2 standard order relations between natural numbers
Logical Machinery (table 5.4):
HoldsAt( f , t) f holds at time t
Clipped(t1, f , t2) f is terminated/released between times t1 and t2
Declipped(t1, f , t2) f is initiated/released between times t1 and t2
Figure 5.4: The axioms of Continuous cce
HoldsAt( f , t)←− InitiallyP( f ) ∧ ¬Clipped(0, f , t) (A1)
HoldsAt( f , t)←− Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Initiates(a, f , t1) ∧ (A2)
t2 < t ∧ ¬Clipped(t1, f , t)
HoldsAt( f 2, t3)←− Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Initiates(a, f 1, t1) ∧ (A8*)
t2 < t3∧ t3 = t2+ d ∧ Trajectory( f 1, t1, f 2, d) ∧
¬Clipped(t1, f 1, t3)
Clipped(t1, f , t4)←→∃ a, t2, t3 [ Happens(a, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4∧ (A3)
[Terminates(a, f , t2) ∨ Releases(a, f , t2)]]
¬HoldsAt( f , t)←− InitiallyN( f ) ∧ ¬Declipped(0, f , t) (A4)
¬HoldsAt( f , t)←− Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Terminates(a, f , t1) ∧ (A5)
t2 < t ∧ ¬Declipped(t1, f , t)
Declipped(t1, f , t4)←→∃ a, t2, t3 [ Happens(a, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3∧ t2 < t4∧ (A6)
[Initiates(a, f , t2) ∨ Releases(a, f , t2)]]
Happens(a, t1, t2) −→ t1 ≤ t2 (A7)
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Figure 5.5: The language of Continuous cce (first redesign)
Formula Meaning
t time point (natural number)
f feature
a action
What is true when (obs):
InitiallyP( f , v) f has value v from time 0
InitiallyN( f , v) f does not have value v from time 0
What happens when (scd):
Happens(a, t1, t2) a starts at time t1 and ends at time t2
What actions do (law):
Initiates(a, ( f , v), t) f starts to have value v after action a at time t
Terminates(a, ( f , v), t) f ceases to have value v after action a at time t
Releases(a, ( f , v), t) f is not subject to inertia after action a at time t
Trajectory( f ′, t, ( f , v), d) f starts to have value v at time t + d
if f ′ is initiated at time t
Temporal Constraints:
t1 < t2, t1 ≤ t2 standard order relations between natural numbers
Logical Machinery (table 5.6):
HoldsAt(t, f , v) f has value v at time t
Clipped(t1, f , t2) f is terminated/released between times t1 and t2
Declipped(t1, f , t2) f is initiated/released between times t1 and t2
Figure 5.6: The axioms of Continuous cce (first redesign)
HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−InitiallyP( f , v) ∧ ¬Clipped(0, f , t) (A1)
HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Initiates(a, ( f , v), t1) ∧ (A2)
t2 < t ∧ ¬Clipped(t1, f , t)
HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ t1 < t2∧ (A8)
t1 < t ∧ t =< t2∧
d = t− t1∧ Trajectory(a, t1, d, f , v).
Clipped(t1, f , t4)←→∃ a, t2, t3 [ Happens(a, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3 ∧ t2 < t4∧ (A3)
[Terminates(a, ( f , v), t2) ∨ Releases(a, ( f , v), t2)]]
¬HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−InitiallyN( f , v) ∧ ¬Declipped(0, f , t) (A4)
¬HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ Terminates(a, ( f , v), t1) ∧ (A5)
t2 < t ∧ ¬Declipped(t1, f , t)
Declipped(t1, f , t4)←→∃ a, t2, t3 [ Happens(a, t2, t3) ∧ t1 < t3∧ t2 < t4∧ (A6)
[Initiates(a, ( f , v), t2) ∨ Releases(a, ( f , v), t2)]]
Happens(a, t1, t2) −→t1 ≤ t2 (A7)
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Figure 5.7: The language of Continuous cce (redesigned)
Formula Meaning
t time point (natural number)
f feature
a action
What is true when (obs):
Initially( f , v) f has value v at time 0
What happens when (scd):
Happens(a, t1, t2) a starts at time t1 and ends at time t2
What actions do (law):
Trajectory(a, t, d, f , v) f has value v at time t + d
Temporal Constraints:
t1 < t2, t1 ≤ t2 standard order relations between natural numbers
Logical Machinery (table 5.8):
HoldsAt(t, f , v) f has value v at time t
Clipped(s, f , t) f is influenced between times s and t
Figure 5.8: The axioms of Continuous cce (redesigned)
HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−Initially( f , v) ∧ ¬Clipped(0, f , t) (A1)
HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ t1 < t2∧ (A2)
t2 < t ∧ ¬Clipped(t2, f , t) ∧
d = t2− t1∧ Trajectory(a, t1, d, f , v).
HoldsAt(t, f , v)←−Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ t1 < t2∧ (A3)
t1 < t ∧ t =< t2∧
d = t− t1∧ Trajectory(a, t1, d, f , v).
Clipped(s, f , t)←−Happens(a, t1, t2) ∧ t1 < t2∧ (A4)
s < t2∧ t1 < t ∧
d = t2− t1∧ Trajectory(a, t1, d, f , _).
6MODELS (PART IV)
6.1 Introduction
We present the Calculus of Fluents in its up-to-date description and assess-
ment [26]. The aim of the assessment is threefold: to give the distilled
essence of the model’s though processes, with a detailed explanation of its
elements and structure, to classify its epistemological and ontological char-
acteristics, and compare it with former classified models.
The name Calculus of Fluents originates from our interest in computing
partial fluents, being our extension of Sandewall’s notion of fluent to con-
tinuous change. The name distinguishes our model from both the Calculus
of Events [180, 103] and the Calculus of Situations [164, 134]. The difference
is both methodological and conceptual. Our model follows the systematic
paradigm, while both rival models are «constrained by appeals to intu-
ition». Concerning the underlying conception, the Calculus of Events deals
with histories and global states, using Clark’s negation as failure, the Cal-
culus of Situations deals with histories and local events, still using negation
as failure, and the Calculus of Fluents deals with the punctual value of fea-
tures traced over time, using a new algebraic semantics of our design. The
rival models proved inadequate to represent and reason correctly about the
class K-RACi of epistemological and ontological characteristics. By com-
parison, the Calculus of Fluents provably encompasses the target class.
6.2 Methods
We used the systematic paradigm, as precisely described in chapter 2. The
assessment required extensions to the paradigm. We described these exten-
sions in chapter 2. In the following sections we therefore proceed with the
development of the theory and assume that it is understood what is meant
by «correctness», «classification», «relations of equivalence and subsump-
tion», «full abstraction», and the definition of the class K-RACi. Work-
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ing knowledge of lattice theory is also required, jointly with the original
work of classification for positive logic programming, here referred to as
sas (chapter 4).
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Description of the model
Let Υ be a scenario and let (τ, f , v) be an element of H. The decision prob-
lem we are about to address consists in assigning the intended truth-value
to (τ, f , v) using the set of premisses Υ. The problem is equivalent to ask-
ing whether Υ, augmented with (τ, f , v) in its obs part, is a consistent set.
As more than one intended model is possible, we also want to identify that
single set V of values in V such that, for any v ∈ V, (τ, f , v) is true in at least
one intended model. The ultimate task is to conclude everything about the
values of features at different points in time.
According to sas, an interpretation for Υ is any subset of HΥ and the
model for Υ is the least fixpoint of a continuous mapping TΥ : ℘(HΥ) →
℘(HΥ), where the power set ℘(HΥ) is a complete lattice under the par-
tial order of set inclusion. The reasoning is model-theoretic; it consists of
a step-by-step approach to temporal inertia, where the ordinals are used
as time points and the upward inductive process is used as master-clock.
The model is built by successive approximations, iterating from the origo
of time points up to the limit ordinal. The decision problem consists in de-
ciding whether the element (τ, f , v) belongs to the set TΥ ↑ ω. As shown by
its classification, this model builds the preferred history of game develop-
ments for K-IA when the environment has a fixed strategy, leading to the
proven restricted range of applicability.
We shall now design the converse non-simulative model. The decision
problem is addressed immediately, by focusing the formalised reasoning
on the set of all action alternatives that are strictly relevant to the feature
of interest. The model relies heavily on the order relation of the temporal
structure; time is assumed as given, and thus no master-clock is necessary.
The following is the bottom-up scheme underlying the overall top-down
construction: (1) for every (t, f , v) in obs, (t, f , v) is true in all models; (2) for
every (t, f , v) that may be generated as the effect of at least one alternative
of a causal law without antecedents, (t, f , v) is true in at least one model;
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(3) for every (t, f , v) that may be generated as the effect of at least one al-
ternative of a causal law for which every antecedent is satisfied, (t, f , v)
is true in at least one model; (4) for every (t, f , v) that may be generated
as the abductive effect of at least one alternative of a causal law for which
every consequent is satisfied, (t, f , v) is true in at least one model; (5) for
every (t, f , v) for which none of the above hold, (t, f , v) is true in all mod-
els. Points 3 and 4 are then weakened by allowing not every antecedent
(consequent) satisfied, but a non empty subset of them, while others must
correspond to unknown feature values. The scheme is an extension of the
fixpoint scheme to backward and forward reasoning about actions with al-
ternative results.
The converse top-down construction consists in (1) analysing the con-
tribution of feature values at τ and at past time points with respect to τ,
gathered under the name of greatest lower observations (glo) for f at τ; (2)
analysing the contribution of feature values at future time points with
respect to τ, gathered under the name of least upper observations (luo)
for f at τ; (3) determining the solution to the decision problem (τ, f , v)
as the consistent union of glo(τ, f ) and luo(τ, f ), which is, by definition,
the non-simulative History. A number of complete lattices are associated
to Υ, being sub-lattices of (℘(I);v) and hence referred to as causal chains,
so that temporal priorities determine the candidate answers glo(τ, f )
and luo(τ, f ).
Definition 6.3.1 (consistent union) We define the function
∗∪ : ℘(H) ×
℘(H) → ℘(H) as follows. For any O1 and O2 non-empty sets, O1
∗∪ O2
is the set of all σ1 ∪ σ2 ∈ ℘(H) such that σ1 ∈ O1, σ2 ∈ O2 and σ1 ∪ σ2 is
consistent. If both O1 and O2 are empty sets, we impose O1
∗∪ O2 = H.
For example, let the following be candidate partial-states:
σ11 = {(_, f , true), (_, g, true)} σ12 = {(_, f , true), (_, g, f alse)}
σ21 = {(_, f , true)} σ22 = {(_, f , f alse)}
If O1 = {σ11, σ12}, O2 = {σ21, σ22}, then O1
∗∪ O2 = {σ11 ∪ σ21, σ12 ∪
σ21}. In the last case of the definition, the reason for having O1
∗∪ O2 = H
rather than the empty set, as one would otherwise expect, it is due to the
underlying semantics itself, as shown by lemma 6.3 of the classification.
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Definition 6.3.2 (non-simulative history) We define the function History :
T × F → ℘(V) as follows:
History(τ, f ) = {v ∈ V : (t, f , v) ∈ glo(τ, f ) ∗∪ luo(τ, f )}.
For any scenario Υ and element (τ, f , v) ∈ H, we say that (τ, f , v) is true if
and only if v ∈ History(τ, f ).
Note that History has its values in ℘(V), while the function history of
the underlying semantics has its values in V . For a given feature f , it is
our aim to collect all the values that are intended for the feature f at the
given time point τ. For example, in the tossing-coin scenario, the underly-
ing semantics generates two possible developments as the effect of tossing,
namely 1 and 0 for head and cross respectively, so that if the tossing ends
at τ, the function history(τ, f ace) generates the feature value 1 for a game
simulation, and 0 for the other, and thus History(τ, f ace) = {1, 0}. The fol-
lowing three important functions are strictly defined in terms of History,
the third of them formally defining the model itself.
Fluent( f ) = {(t, v) ∈ T × V : v ∈ History(t, f )}
Given a scenario Υ and a feature f ∈ F , Fluent( f ) is the set of all values
per f on flowing time, according to Υ.
State(τ) = {( f , v) ∈ F × V : v ∈ History(τ, f )}
Given a scenario Υ and a time point τ ∈ T , State(τ) is the state of the
environment at time point τ, according to Υ.
Comp(Υ) = {(t, f , v) ∈ H : ( f , v) ∈ State(t)}
Given a scenario Υ, the Completion Set of Υ, written Comp(Υ), is the set of
all relevant states of the environment on flowing time. This set defines the
non-simulative algebraic semantics for Υ (nas).
To complete the description of the model, we shall now define the
concept of relevant action alternative, when it is successfully executed,
what is meant by causal chains, and thus define the greatest-lower and
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least-upper sets of formal observations.
Definition 6.3.3 (relevant action alternative) Let A be an action scheduled
for execution, that is, it exists (s, t, A) in scd for some temporal expres-
sions s and t. Let (s, t, A) V ∨ni=1 ∧mj=1 Sij be the corresponding causal law
in law, where n ≥ 1 is the number of action alternatives, and let θ be a
valuation such that θ = {s/M(s), t/M(t)}. An instantiated alternative of the
action A (iaa) is the element
(sθ, tθ,
m⋃
j=1
Sij(θ)) ∈ T × T × ℘(H)
For a given feature f we say that the iaa (sθ, tθ, Sij(θ)) is relevant to f if and
only if exist τ and v such that (τ, f , v) ∈ (sθ, tθ, Sij(θ)).
For a given feature and a relevant action alternative, we must decide
whether its execution was successful, namely, whether the feature changes
by its execution. Let first recall the approach adopted in sas.
TΥ(I) = {(τ, f , v) ∈ HΥ :
(τ, f , v) ∈ obs and τ = 0, or
exists (s, t, A) ∈ scd,
exists (s, t, A)V ∧mj=1 Sj ∈ law and
exists a valuation θ = {s/M(s), t/M(t)}
such that:
(τ, f , v) ∈ Consequents(sθ, τ, tθ, Sj(θ))
and Antecedents(sθ, τ, tθ, Sj(θ)) ⊆ I }
where
Antecedents(s, τ, t, S) = {(s, f , ϕ(s, s, t)) ∈ S : s v τ v t }
Consequents(s, τ, t, S) = {(τ, f , ϕ(s, τ, t)) ∈ S : s @ τ v t }
According to the definition of TΥ, the action A is successfully executed
if and only if Antecedents(s, τ, t, S) ⊆ I, reasoning from premisses to con-
sequences. Differently from TΥ, our approach consists in the following
three consistency checks.
Sat_Obs : I → {true, f alse}
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Sat_Obs((s, t, S)) succeeds if and only if, for any (τ, f , v) ∈ obs such that
s v τ v t, it is (τ, f , v) ∈ S. The contribution of Sat_Obs is analogous
to the intersection of [[obs]] with Min(, [[law[scd]]]) in filter preferential
entailment.
Sat_Pre : I → {true, f alse}
Sat_Pre((s, t, S)) succeeds if and only if Sat_Obs((s, t, S)) succeeds and the
preconditions (s, f , v) ∈ S are either members of glo(s, f ) or correspond to
unknown feature values. An empty set of preconditions is allowed. We say
that it succeeds explicitly if and only if at least one of its preconditions is a
member of glo(s, f ).
Sat_Post : I → {true, f alse}
Sat_Post((s, t, S)) succeeds if and only if Sat_Obs((s, t, S)) succeeds and the
postconditions (t, f , v) ∈ S are either members of luo(t, f ) or correspond
to unknown feature values. An empty set of postconditions is not allowed.
We say that it succeeds explicitly if and only if at least one of its postcondi-
tions is a member of luo(t, f ).
Causal Chains
We mentioned that sas beats time with the master clock and builds a se-
mantic model from the origo of time points up to τ. By comparison with
sas, we focus on the feature f of the query, using the order relation of the
given temporal structure. We do so by collecting all relevant action altern-
atives that have been successfully executed before τ, because they have
influenced f . This collection is the set of all lower causal chain (lcc) for f at τ.
We also collect all relevant action alternatives that have been successfully
executed after τ, because they have influenced f . This collection is the set
of all upper causal chain (ucc) for f at τ.
Let I = T × T × ℘(H) be the domain of all relevant action alternatives
that have been successfully executed. The order relation v associated with
the basic time structure applies as follows on members of I : (s1, t1, S1) v
(s2, t2, S2) iff s1 v s2, for any (s1, t1, S1) and (s2, t2, S2) in I . The order
relation v is a partial order on ℘(I), because for any I1 and I2 in ℘(I) it
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is I1 v I2 if and only if i1 v i2 for any i1 ∈ I1 and i2 ∈ I2. Furthermore,
℘(I) is a complete lattice under v, because the least upper bound (unionsq) of a
collection of subsets of I is their minimum element and the greatest lower
bound (u) is their maximum element ((T ,v) is a complete lattice). The
function Min : (℘(I);v) → (℘(I);v) is a monotone (order-preserving)
function, because I1 v I2 ⇒ Min(I1) v Min(I2) for any I1, I2 ∈ ℘(I). The
function Min is also complete, since Min(unionsqI) = unionsq(Min(I)) = Min(I) =
unionsq(I) for every directed subset I of ℘(I). The similar property holds for the
function Max : (℘(I);v)→ (℘(I);v).
Definition 6.3.4 (lower causal chain)
lcc : T × F → ℘(I)
Let P(τ, f ) be the set of all relevant action alternatives that have been suc-
cessfully executed before τ, or that are being currently executed at τ.
We compute this set as follows. For each relevant action alternative
(s, t, S), occurring as mentioned, we check wether both Sat_Pre((s, t, S))
and Sat_Post((s, t, S)) succeed, ensuring that at least one of them succeeds
explicitly. We thus define lcc(τ, f ) as the set Max(P(τ, f );v) union the
set of all members of P(τ, f ) that have not been overruled. We say that a
member (s1, t1, S1) ∈ P(τ, f ) is overruled if and only if it exists another
member (s2, t2, S2) ∈ P(τ, f ) such that: t1 v s2, there is no other mem-
ber between them, and either of the followings hold: (a) (s2, t2, S2) has an
empty set of preconditions, (b) both (t1, f , v) ∈ S1 and (s2, f , v) ∈ S2 hold,
(c) f is in the postconditions of S2.
The definition of upper causal chain (ucc) is symmetrical to lcc. The only
difference worth mentioning is that the upper chain does not include cur-
rent activities, and thus the upper causal chain for f at τ consists of all and
only those relevant action alternatives (s, t, S) that have successfully oc-
curred after τ (τ v sθ) and thus exert backward abductive influence on the
feature of interest. To avoid infinite recursion, its consistency check must
be limited to the postconditions.
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Event Horizon
When describing scenarios in natural language, we use a temporal refer-
ence and verbs that acknowledge this temporal reference. The temporal
reference may be an expression like «now» (often implicit), «yesterday»,
«next week», or «in 1620». For a given temporal reference to a past time
(see τ in the diagram), we use the past progressive tense to denote an ongo-
ing action a1, the past perfect tense to denote an action a2 completed before
a1, and the pluperfect tense to denote an action a3 completed before a2. When
t1 overlaps ν, we may denote a1 using the perfect progressive tense or the rare
past perfect progressive tense. The descriptive grammar of the English lan-
guage [157] does not record any tense that can acknowledge the given τ to
denote an action a4 completed before a3; to denote one such action, Eng-
lish speakers use a new temporal reference. Further, there is no record of
a «future in the past» tense [109, p. 52]; to denote a future action a5 with
respect to τ, English speakers either use the uncommon would plus infinit-
ive or ‘was/were to’ plus infinitive, or switch temporal reference to the time
of speaking ν and denote a5 using the ordinary past tense. The used verbs
define a time period (s3, t5), where s3 is the time where a3 starts and t5 is
the time where a5 ends. We refer to this time period as the past event horizon
for a given temporal reference τ.
ν (now)τ
a3
s3 t3
a2
s2 t2
a1
s1 t1
a5
s5 t5
The similar time period occurs when denoting actions with respect to a
temporal reference τ > ν. For a given temporal reference to a future time
(see τ in the second diagram), which may be implicit, we use the future tense
to denote a ‘predicted’ action a1, and the form will plus perfect infinitive to
denote a ‘past in the future’ action a2. Other future tenses have unprecise
temporal references, and are therefore omitted. The used verbs define a
time period (s2, t1), where s2 is the time where a2 starts and t1 is the time
where a1 ends. We refer to this time period as the future event horizon for a
given temporal reference τ.
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ν (now) τ
a2
s2 t2
a1
s1 t1
For a given temporal reference, its event horizon limits the scope of
reasoning, ignoring any action beyond the horizon. Although the act of
changing temporal reference allows visibility of actions beyond the present
event horizon, each temporal reference limits one’s reasoning. This evid-
ence suggests that human causal reasoning does not consist in broad infer-
ence through one large database.
Further evidence of an event horizon is given by the «positional ana-
lysis» in the game of chess. Positional analysis is the understanding of what
is happening at a given spatial reference. The event horizon is still finite,
but is much broader than the above, and each person may broaden their
own through ad-hoc training and exercise. The most successful players do
not waste time with linguistic descriptions, but envision whole strategies
and position. The complete development of a game can always be reduced
to a description in a natural or formal language.
In general, we use the perfect aspect to denote an action viewed as com-
plete, and the progressive aspect to denote an action viewed as incomplete.
According to Quirk et al. [157, p. 190], «approximately ten per cent of finite
verb phrases are perfective». When using natural language, about 90% of
Human causal reasoning is concerned about progressive reasoning, that is,
ongoing actions. Therefore, albeit important, the event horizon concerns
only the 10% of Human causal reasoning.
We model the event horizon as follows: we limit the definition of lower
causal chain to its upper four members, and the definition of upper causal
chain to its lower two members. Without this restriction, the horizon con-
sists in the full lower and upper causal chains.
6.4 Greatest Lower and Least Upper Observations
Definition 6.4.1 (Greatest Lower Observations) We define the function
glo : T × F → ℘(H) as follows. Given a scenario Υ, a time point τ
and a feature f , glo(τ, f ) is the union of the following three sets: the
contribution by explicit observations gloobs(τ, f ) from the obs part of the
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scenario, the contribution by the current actions set glocas(τ, f ) from the
schedule, and the contribution by the past actions set glopas(τ, f ) from the
schedule. Formally, glocas(τ, f ) is the set of all (τ, f , v) ∈ H such that
(s, t, S) ∈ lcc(τ, f ), s @ τ v t and (τ, f , v) ∈ S. Similarly, glopas(τ, f ) is the
set of all (t, f , v) ∈ H such that (s, t, S) ∈ lcc(τ, f ), t @ τ and (t, f , v) ∈ S.
Finally, gloobs(τ, f ) is the set of all (t, f , v) ∈ H such that (t, f , v) ∈ obs,
t v τ and either of the following holds. (a) If lcc(τ, f ) = ∅ then no
relevant action alternative is successfully executed during [t, τ], and thus
(t, f , v) ∈ gloobs(τ, f ) by strict inertia. (b) If (a) failed, and all members
(b, e, S) ∈ lcc(τ, f ) occur before t (e ≤ t), then (t, f , v) ∈ gloobs(τ, f ). (c)
If (b) failed, and exists at least one member (b, e, S) ∈ lcc(τ, f ) occurring
after t (t ≤ b) with an empty set of preconditions, then (b, e, S) is suc-
cessfully executed in all semantic models, and thus (t, f , v) /∈ gloobs(τ, f ).
(d) If (c) failed, all members (b, e, S) ∈ lcc(τ, f ) occurring after t (t ≤ b)
have preconditions. Let D be their set. If it exists (b, e, S) ∈ D such that
glo(b, g) \ {(_, g, w)} = ∅ for at least one of its preconditions (b, g, w) ∈ S,
then (b, e, S) is successfully executed in all semantic models, and thus
(t, f , v) /∈ gloobs(τ, f ). (e) If (d) failed and it exists (b, e, S) ∈ D such
that {( f , v) : (b, f , v) ∈ (S} = {( f , v) : (t, f , v) ∈ glo(b, f )}, then
(t, f , v) /∈ gloobs(τ, f ). It is (t, f , v) ∈ gloobs(τ, f ) otherwise.
Definition 6.4.2 (Least Upper Observations) Given a scenario Υ, a time
point τ and a feature f , luo(τ, f ) is the union of the following two sets: the
contribution by explicit observations luoobs(τ, f ) from the obs part of the
scenario, and the contribution by the future actions set luo f as(τ, f ) from
the schedule. The definitions of luoobs and luo f as are strictly symmetrical to
gloobs and glopas respectively.
6.4.1 Classification of the model
Let the relation (t, f , v) ∈ Σ(Υ) be a shorthand for «(t, f , v) is true in
Σ(Υ)», that is, «it exists an interpretation (M, H) such that the develop-
ment (B, M, H,A, C) is in Mod(Υ) and H(t, f ) = v». Further, let FΥ be the
set of all features occurring in Υ, and let F \ FΥ be the set of all features f
such that Υ is empty of f .
Lemma 6.1 For any Υ ∈ Ksp-IAd and (t, f , v) ∈ T ×FΥ ×V the following
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relation holds: (t, f , v) ∈ ΣKsp-IAdΥ⇔ (t, f , v) ∈ Comp(Υ).
Proof The relation (t, f , v) ∈ ΣKsp-IAdΥ ⇔ (t, f , v) ∈ TΥ ↑ ω holds
by proposition 4.8 at page 83. We must prove that (t, f , v) ∈ TΥ ↑ ω ⇔
(t, f , v) ∈ Comp(Υ). Since Υ is in Ksp-IAd, we assumed complete know-
ledge about the initial state of the environment. This knowledge is rep-
resented by observations (0, f , v) in the obs part of Υ. By definition, it is
TΥ ↑ 0 = {(t, f , v) ∈ BΥ : (t, f , v) ∈ obs ∧ t = 0} and glo(0, f ) =
gloobs(0, f ) ∪ glopas(0, f ) ∪ glocas(0, f ) = {(t, f , v) ∈ obs : t = 0} ∪∅ ∪∅.
Then (t, f , v) ∈ TΥ ↑ 0 iff (t, f , v) ∈ glo(0, f ). Suppose (t, f , v) ∈ TΥ ↑
(τ − 1) iff (t, f , v) ∈ glo(τ − 1, f ). We must prove that (t, f , v) ∈ TΥ ↑ τ iff
(t, f , v) ∈ glo(τ, f ). One of the following holds:
• scd = ∅. Then is TΥ ↑ τ = TΥ ↑ (τ − 1) = . . . = TΥ ↑ 0. As
glocas(τ, f ) = ∅, then is glo(τ, f ) = glo(τ − 1, f ).
• scd 6= ∅. Let (s, t, A) be one of its elements. If Antecedents(τ, A) ⊆ TΥ ↑
(τ − 1) then TΥ ↑ τ = TΥ ↑ (τ − 1) ∪ Consequents(τ, A); otherwise is
TΥ ↑ τ = TΥ ↑ (τ − 1). Concerning nas, it exists (s, t, A) V ∧mj=1 Sj
in law and exists a valuation θ = {s/M(s), t/M(t)} such that f ∈
In f luence(τ, (sθ, tθ, Sj(θ))) and glocas(τ, f j) = {(τ, f , v) ∈ H : (s, t, S) ∈
lcc(τ, f ), s @ τ v t and (τ, f , v) ∈ S} = Consequents(τ, A); otherwise is
glo(τ, f j) = glo(τ − 1, f j) because glocas(τ, f j) = ∅.
In each of the above situations is glo(τ, f )
∗∪ luo(τ, f ) = glo(τ, f ), in
fact for any (t′, f , v′) ∈ luo(τ, f ) such that (t′, f , v′) /∈ glo(τ, f ), then also
(t′, f , v′) /∈ TΥ ↑ τ. q.e.d.
Lemma 6.2 For any Υ ∈ Ksp-RA and (τ, f , v) ∈ T ×FΥ ×V the following
relation holds: (τ, f , v) ∈ ΣKsp-RAΥ⇔ (τ, f , v) ∈ Comp(Υ).
Proof By lemma 6.1, the relation holds for the sub-class Ksp-IAd. How-
ever, the scd part of the scenario is a discrete sub-lattice of (D,v) in fact,
by definition, every action has a non-empty length. As such, there are at
most as many time points in scd as the natural numbers. Then the rela-
tion holds also for that subset of the intended model set for scenarios in
Ksp-RAd where strict inertia in continuous time and discrete deterministic
change are allowed. To reach the full class Ksp-RA we must show that nas
accepts continuous change and alternative results of actions. Let (M, H) be
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an intended model in Σ(Υ) such that exists (s, t, A) in scd, exists (s, t, A)V∨n
i=1
∧m
j=1 Sj in law and exists a valuation θ = {s/M(s), t/M(t)} such that
sθ @ τ v tθ, f = f j, f j ∈ In f l(A, H(sθ)), and H(τ, f j) = ϕij(sθ, τ, tθ) = v,
that is, (τ, f j, v) ∈ HB Sij(θ). The following holds:
f j ∈ In f l(A, H(sθ)) ⇔ f j ∈ In f luence(τ, (sθ, tθ, Sij(θ)))
⇒ (τ, f j, v) ∈ glocas(τ, f j)
⇒ (τ, f j, v) ∈ glo(τ, f j)
Therefore, by definition of consistent union, v ∈ History(τ, f j), ( f j, v) ∈
State(τ) and (t, f j, v) ∈ Comp(Υ). q.e.d.
Lemma 6.3 For any Υ ∈ K-RACi, FΥ = ∅ implies Comp(Υ) = H.
Proof The thesis is a straightforward corollary of the following state-
ment: (τ, f , v) ∈ ΣK-RACiΥ ⇔ (τ, f , v) ∈ Comp(Υ) for any (τ, f , v) ∈
T × F \ FΥ × V . Let first prove that for any (τ, f , v) ∈ T × F \ FΥ × V is
(τ, f , v) ∈ ΣK-RACiΥ. By definition, the game starts with the board in an
initial configuration, where the initial state H(0) is a certain nondetermin-
istically given σ0. Because of the nondeterminism, any value v could be
assigned to f . During the game, the environment will persist in that value
per f until an action is invoked by the ego that influences the feature. No
such action will be invoked, because Υ is empty of f by hypothesis. At the
end of the game, the value per f will be the nondeterministically assigned
initial value v. As no specific choice is made on this initial value, no element
(0, f , v) occurs in the obs part of Υ that may restrict the number of mod-
els, so that for any (τ, f , v) ∈ T × F \ FΥ × V it is (0, f , v) ∈ ΣK-RACiΥ
by point 4 of the definition of complete development set. On the other
hand, for any (τ, f , v) ∈ T × F \ FΥ × V is also (τ, f , v) ∈ Comp(Υ). In
fact, as f ∈ F \ FΥ, both glo(τ, f ) and luo(τ, f ) are trivially empty, so that
(τ, f , v) ∈ Comp(Υ) via the definition of History and, in particular, via the
function of consistent union. q.e.d.
Theorem 6.4 (Classification) The following relation holds true for any Υ ∈
K-RACi and for any (τ, f , v) ∈ H: (τ, f , v) ∈ ΣK-RACiΥ ⇔ (τ, f , v) ∈
Comp(Υ).
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Proof The relation holds true for any (t, f , v) in T × F \ FΥ × V by
lemma 6.3. We must prove the case for f ∈ FΥ 6= ∅. By lemma 6.2,
via the glo function, the relation holds for any Υ in Ksp-RA, that is, for
pure prediction problems, and thus we must prove the case for any Υ in
K-RACi \ Ksp-RA, that is, for pure postdiction and prepostdiction prob-
lems. The former case is straightforward; the definition of luo is sym-
metrical to that of glo, so that lemma 6.2 also proves the relation for pure
postdiction problems, with similar converse technique. Concerning pre-
postdiction problems, the following holds according to the definition of in-
tended model set: it exists (s, t, A) ∈ scd and an elements (M, H) such
that M(s) @ τ v M(t), f ∈ In f l(A, H(M(s))), H(τ, f ) = v, and ex-
ists (M(s), g, w) precondition of A such that H(0, g) = H(M(s), g) = w
and, since Υ ∪ {(τ, f , v)} is a prepostdiction problem, Υ is empty of g for
any t ∈ [0, M(s)). Thus, the problem of deciding whether (τ, f , v) belongs
to Comp(Υ) reduces to the problem of deciding whether (M(s), g, w) be-
longs to Comp(Υ), which is a pure postdiction problem. q.e.d.
The full abstraction of this model with respect to the equivalence
of causal reasoning scenarios is a default corollary of its classification
chapter 4.
6.4.2 Computability
We consider the problem of computing the completion set for Υ.
Proposition 6.5 For any Υ ∈ K-IA, Comp(Υ) is recursively enumerable.
Proof By definition, Comp(Υ) = {(t, f , v) ∈ H : ( f , v) ∈ State(t)}, where
State(τ) is the set of all elements ( f , v) ∈ F ×V such that v ∈ History(τ, f ),
for any τ ∈ N. The set History(τ, f ) is finite; in fact, if a(i) is the number
of action alternatives of the action i, and m is the number of action occur-
rences in the part scd of Υ, then the number of relevant and successfully
executed action alternatives for f at τ is at most ∑mi=1 a(i). Time points are
recursively enumerable, being natural numbers, ans thus Comp(Υ) is a re-
cursively enumerable set. q.e.d.
The above fact does not hold for scenarios in K-RACi, because their com-
pletion set is continuous. However, the problem of computing the whole
completion set is unrealistic. Would we really ask for more information
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that we could ever hope to use? The purpose of scenarios is to describe the
environment as perceived by a human being. In such situations, resources
are limited. Any scenario Υ is therefore a finite scenario, that is, the obs,
scd and law components of Υ are finite sets, and thus, both the set TΥ of
all time points occurring in Υ and the set FΥ of all features occurring in
Υ are finite sets too. In any model for Υ, all changes due to an action are
limited to a finite period in time, because each action occurring in scd has
a finite duration. Since no other event is allowed in K-RACi besides those
specified in scd, the set of all time periods where persistence arise is a fi-
nite set too. The History(τ, f ) consists of a finite set of feature values and
StateΥ(τ), namely State(τ) for those features occurring in Υ, it is a finite
set too. The problem of computing Comp(Υ) then reduces to computing a
finite number of finite states:
Ker(Υ) = {(τ, f , v) ∈ TΥ ∪ {0} × FΥ × V : ( f , v) ∈ StateΥ(τ)}
We shall refer to Ker(Υ) as the kernel of the completion set for Υ, the most
representative of all decidable subsets of Comp(Υ). The value of any fea-
ture at any given time point can always be computed via the History func-
tion, where computable partial fluents are used for characterising features
during time periods where their values change. Computing the set of all
time points for which a given feature f has a given value v requires stand-
ard numerical-analysis techniques over those periods where actions influ-
encing f are performed:
Holds_at( f , v) = {τ ∈ T : v ∈ History(τ, f )}
Adopting the non-simulative algebraic semantics as proof procedure, we
defined a meta-theoretic extension of the Horn Clause Logic, using the non-
ground representation of the object-level variables. The meta-interpreter
consists in the Horn clause representation of the proof procedure, it is built
on top of the epsilon system (esprit project P-530) [45, 110, 48]), and is
executable as a conventional logic program by the sld-resolution rule. The
resulting calculus is domain independent and, due to theorem 6.4, it has a
known range of correct applicability.
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6.5 Discussion
We presented the Calculus of Fluents and its classification. The model is cor-
rect with respect to the full class K-RACi of epistemological and ontological
characteristics.
The model subsumes both Lifschitz’s and Thielscher’s variants of Mc-
Carthy’s Calculus of Situations, and the Calculus of Events in its various
circumscriptive axiomatisations. The Calculus of Fluents subsumes all clas-
sified models to date, spanning seventy-two years of research in the field
(see page 63)
7MODELS (PART V)
7.1 Introduction
In 1936 Turing modelled «a human calculator, provided with pencil and
paper and explicit instructions» [209, 210, 39]. A man had to perceive and
change the local environment by strict instructions. His observational be-
haviour [209, §9a] was «compared to a machine» with a finite number of
internal states [209, §1]. The abstract machine had input and output ac-
tions, it could read and write, perceive and change its local environment.
The class of computations by this machine was independent of the details
of its definition: the same machine could be programmed to compute dif-
ferent functions. Turing named his model of a human calculator «the uni-
versal computing machine», he referred to it as a useful invention [209, p.
241] [211, p. 7], he claimed that it «can be used to compute any computable
sequence» and commented that «all [supporting] arguments which can be
given are bound to be, fundamentally, appeals to intuition, and for this
reason rather unsatisfactory mathematically» [209, p. 249]. Turing’s claim,
or «Church-Turing thesis» [98, p. 232], it is still an unproven conjecture.
Turing’s abstract machine is still the core reference in the theory of compu-
tation. Turing’s own interest in thinking machines [212], studies on what
Turing machines cannot do [122, 123], and the challenge to explore farther
than the computational limits of Turing machines, led to various computa-
tional models of causal reasoning [174, 180, 116]. An objective measure of
the added value of those models with respect to Turing’s original model is
still unknown.
Our aim is to classify the epistemological and ontological characteristics
of Turing’s model, to measure the distance of classified models with respect
to the target class.
124
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7.2 Methods
We used the systematic paradigm, as precisely described in chapter 2. In
the following sections we therefore proceed with the development of the
theory and assume that it is understood what is meant by «correctness»,
«classification», «relations of equivalence and subsumption», «full abstrac-
tion», and the definition of the class K-IA.
7.3 Results
Definition 7.3.1 (machine) «We may compare a man in the process of com-
puting a real number to a machine which is only capable of a finite number
of conditions q1, q2, . . . , qR which will be called m-configurations. The ma-
chine is supplied with a ‘tape’ (the analogue of paper) running through
it, and divided into sections (called ‘squares’) each capable of bearing a
‘symbol’. At any moment there is just one square, say the r-th, bearing
the symbol s(r) which is ‘in the machine’. We may call this square the
scanned square. The symbol on the scanned square may be called the
scanned symbol. The scanned symbol is the only one of which the ma-
chine is, so to speak, ‘directly aware’. However, by altering its m-config-
uration the machine can effectively remember some of the symbols which
it has ‘seen’ (scanned) previously. The possible behaviour of the machine
at any moment is determined by the m-configuration qm and the scanned
symbol s(r). This pair qm, s(r) will be called the configuration: thus the
configuration determines the possible behaviour of the machine.» [209, p.
231]—«The [operations] of the machine [are] described [as follows:] ‘R’
means ‘the machine moves so that it scans the square immediately on the
right of the one it was scanning previously’, ‘L’ means ‘the machine moves
so that it scans the square immediately on the left of the one it was scan-
ning previously’, ‘E’ means ‘the scanned symbol is erased’, ‘P[x]’ means
‘prints’ [the symbol x].» [209, p. 233]—«In addition to any of these oper-
ations the m-configuration may be changed. Some of the symbols written
down will form the sequence [which] is being computed. The others are
just rough notes to ‘assist the memory’. It will only be these rough notes
which will be liable to erasure.» [209, p. 231]—«If the machine is supplied
with a blank tape and set in motion, starting from the correct initial m-con-
figuration, the subsequence of the symbols printed by it which are of the
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first kind will be called the sequence computed by the machine. At any stage of
the motion of the machine, the number of the scanned square, the complete
sequence of all symbols on the tape, and the m-configuration will be said
to describe the complete configuration at that stage. The changes of the ma-
chine and tape between successive complete configurations will be called
the moves of the machine.» [209, p. 232-3]—«A computable sequence γ
is determined by a description of a machine which computes γ. [...] The
initial m-configuration is always to be called q1. [...] The lines of the table
are now of form [(configuration, behaviour), where the configuration is
the known pair and the behaviour is the pair (operations, final m-config-
uration)]. [...] Let us write down all expressions so formed from the table
for the machine and separate them by semi-colons. In this way we obtain a
complete description of the machine.» [209, p. 239-240]
Definition 7.3.2 (automatic machine) «If at each stage the motion of a ma-
chine (def. 7.3.1) is completely determined by the configuration, we shall
call the machine an automatic machine.» [209, p. 232]
Definition 7.3.3 (choice machine) We shall call “choice machine” any ma-
chine (def. 7.3.1) «whose motion is only partially determined by the con-
figuration». «When such a machine reaches one of these ambiguous con-
figurations, it cannot go on until some arbitrary choice has been made by
an external operator.» [209, p. 232]
Definition 7.3.4 (computing machine) «If an automatic machine prints
only two kinds of symbols, of which the first kind consists entirely of 0 and
1, then the machine will be called a computing machine.» [209, p. 232]
We shall now describe the Turing machine in the meta-language.
Definition 7.3.5 Let LO be the set of instructions in a complete descrip-
tion of Turing’s machine, and let LM be the set of legal sentences in K-IA.
We define T : LO → LM as follows. The machine is only able to read one
square at the time, and thus the tape belongs to the environment and the
observable features are the scanned square, the symbol in it, and the ma-
chine’s own internal state. This leads to one fluent for each feature, whose
definition shall correspond to Turing’s complete description of the machine.
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Let us call q0 the initial m-configuration, instead of q1. The first m-con-
figuration maps to (0, state, q0) ∈ OBS. The first scanned square maps to
(0, square, r) ∈ OBS. The first scanned symbol maps to (0, symbol, s0) ∈
OBS. The complete description of the machine, namely its set of rows
(con f iguration, behaviour) = (qm, s(r); on, qn), it maps to (, move) ∈ SCD
and
(s, t, move)V
3∧
j=1
∀ τ ∈ [s, t] ⊂ T . [τ] f j = ϕj(s, τ, t) ∈ LAW,
with features f1 = state, f2 = square and f3 = symbol. The correspond-
ing partial fluents are defined as follows: on = R maps to ϕ2(s, τ, t) =
[s]square + 1; on = L maps to ϕ2(s, τ, t) = [s]square − 1; on = E maps
to ϕ3(s, τ, t) = blank; on = Px maps to ϕ3(s, τ, t) = x; qn maps to
ϕ1(s, τ, t) = qn.
Theorem 7.1 (Classification) For any complete description Γ of automatic
machine, (ri, tapei, qi) describes its complete configuration at stage i if and
only if (i, square, ri), (i, symbol, s(ri)), (i, state, qi) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(T(Γ)).
Proof We refer to the initial complete configuration S0 = (r0, tapeo, q0)
as input, and to the final complete configuration Sk as output. The generic
move of the machine is the transition Si → Si+1 determined by the config-
uration qi, s(ri).
We show the thesis true for S0. The initial configuration of the auto-
matic machine is completely specified by the pair q0, s(r0). The in-
put is S0, and thus the machine is only reading the scanned symbol
from the scanned square. By def. 7.3.5, it is (0, square, r0) ∈ OBS,
(0, symbol, s(r0)) ∈ OBS, (0, state, q0) ∈ OBS, and thus, by definition of
K-IA, it is (0, square, r0) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ), (0, symbol, s(r0)) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ)
and (0, state, q0) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ).
We show the thesis true for S1. The configuration of the automatic ma-
chine is completely specified by the pair q0, s(r0), and the resulting be-
haviour is completely specified by the pair o1, q1. The operation o1 can
be either of the followings: R, L, E, P. By definition of K-IA and def.
7.3.5, the following holds: if o1 = R, then [1]square = [0]square + 1
and thus (1, square, s0 + 1) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ); if o1 = L, then [1]square =
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[0]square − 1 and thus (1, square, s0 − 1) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ); if o1 = E, then
[1]symbol = blank and thus (1, symbol, blank) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ); if o1 = Px,
then [1]symbol = x and thus (1, symbol, x) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ). It is also true
that (1, state, q1) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ).
We assume the thesis true for Si. We shall now prove the thesis for Si+1.
The i+ 1-th configuration of the automatic machine is completely specified
by the pair qi, s(ri), and the resulting behaviour is completely specified
by the pair oi+1, qi+1. The operation oi+1 can be either of the followings:
R, L, E, P. By definition of K-IA and def. 7.3.5, the following holds: if
oi+1 = R, then [i+ 1]square := [i]square+ 1 and thus (i+ 1, square, si + 1) ∈
ΣKsp-IAd(Υ); if oi+1 = L, then [i + 1]square := [i]square − 1 and thus
(i + 1, square, si − 1) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ); if oi+1 = E, then [i + 1]symbol =
blank and thus (i + 1, symbol, blank) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ); if oi+1 = Px, then
[i + 1]symbol = x and thus (i + 1, symbol, x) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ). It is also true
that (i + 1, state, qi+1) ∈ ΣKsp-IAd(Υ).
At any stage of the motion of the machine, the game univocally responds
with the correct observables. q.e.d.
As corollary of the above, Turing’s computing machines belong to the
class Ksp-IbAd, and Turing’s choice machines belong to the class Ksp-IA.
7.4 Discussion
In summary, we presented assessments for Turing’s models of causal reas-
oning. Turing’s computing machines belong to the class Ksp-IbAd, Tur-
ing’s automatic machines belong to the class Ksp-IAd and Turing’s choice
machines belong to the class Ksp-IA.
By comparison with former results (see the table of results at page 63),
we learn that Turing’s computing machines are subsumed by the Cir-
cumscriptive Boolean Calculus of Events, Turing’s automatic machines are
equivalent to Positive Logic Programming (sas), and Turing’s choice ma-
chines are equivalent to the Circumscriptive Discrete Calculus of Events.
Following the systematic paradigm, the scientific study of human causal
reasoning shows a hierarchy of equivalent or subsuming models. In this
framework, subsumption has no implications for Computability Theory.
We then ask the following questions: Is there a subsumed model which can sim-
ulate its subsuming model? Is there a model which can simulate any other model in
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the present taxonomy? The answer to these questions is positive. The model
that subsumes any other model in the taxonomy, namely Brandano’s Cal-
culus of Fluents, admits implementation in Positive Logic Programming
without red cuts, whose fixpoint semantics is equivalent to Turing’s Auto-
matic Machines. Therefore, the class Ksp-IAd is sufficiently broad to in-
clude models of any other class in the present taxonomy.
aNOTES AND COMMENTS
a.1 On McCarthy’s theory and its variants
As a general policy, we call theories and their variants after their original
authors, and then seek for their binomial nomenclature after the formal
classification of their range of correct applicability. Therefore, we refer to
the «situation calculus» [124, 134, 133, 131] as McCarthy’s theory, and we
refer to the collaborative work in Toronto and Roma [164] as Reiter’s vari-
ant of McCarthy’s theory, to acknowledge its chief promoter and researcher.
Other variants of McCarthy’s theory are available, such as Thielscher’s
[205, 206]. According to the Handbook [174, p. 444], «the situation calculus
is basically just a notation. Different authors introduce and use different
axiomatizations for it, reflecting not only technical differences in their lo-
gics but also different notions of what a situation is». A direct classification
of McCarthy’s theory and its variants is still unknown.
The words «situation» and «fluent» are often used by different authors
with different meanings or synonyms. According to McCarthy [130], «a
situation is in principle a snapshot of the environment at an instant». The
theory of computation commonly refers to such objects as states. «One never
knows a situation; one only knows facts about a situation. Events occur in
situations and give rise to new situations. There are many variants of situ-
ation calculus, and none of them has come to dominate. [...] In situation
calculus, the formula s′ = result(e, s) gives the new situation s′ that res-
ults when the event e occurs in situation s. [...] Continuous processes can
be treated in the situation calculus, but the theory is so far less successful
than in discrete cases.» Statements in McCarthy’s theory are lisp-like state-
ments of type result(et, . . . , result(e2, result(e1, result(e0, s0)))). For a given
current state si and event ej, the state si+1 = result(ej, si) is the effect of the
single event ej in the state si. The overall effect is defined as the effect of a
single initial event in the initial state followed by the effect of a new com-
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putation starting in the resulting new state. One writes these statements from
right to left, from the initial state to the final state, to model discrete instantaneous
change using explicit states and implicit discrete time. According to McCarthy,
fluents are «functions of situations in situation calculus» [130]. The above
function result : E × S → S is a «situational fluent» [134]. Situations are
states, and thus McCarthy’s situational fluents are state transitions. Albeit ori-
ginally motivated by the limitations of Turing machines, and described in
terms of Tarskian logic and lisp-like statements, McCarthy’s theory looks
very much like a deterministic one-way finite state machine.
In McCarthy’s own words, «the situation calculus is the most studied
formalism for doing causal reasoning» [130]. We observe that McCarthy
does not refer to the situation calculus as a model of human reasoning,
either supported by scientific evidence or pending scientific validation; he
refers to it as a formalism for doing something, that is to say a useful inven-
tion. However, there is no consent to its usefulness. According to Davis, for
example, «Reiter extended and popularized the situation calculus, which
prior to his work had been widely considered to be too inexpressive to be
useful. [Reiter’s] recent book detailing this exploration, Knowledge in Ac-
tion [164], is an exemplar of the best work of foundationalist researchers:
rigorous yet accessible; formal yet grounded in application» [47, p. 10].
As far as we can see, Reiter’s variant of McCarthy’s formalism consists
in using Peano’s arithmetics as basic execution mechanism of the above
finite state machine, and Kowalski’s notation for the Calculus of Events
as formal notation [164]. Reiter does not refer to the resulting theory as a
model of human reasoning; he refers to it as the specification for golog,
which is a prolog program for controlling academic robots in Toronto.
Therefore, when reading Reiter’s book we expected as main result the proof
of soundness and completeness of golog with respect to its specification.
However, this proof is missing [164, p. 98-100, §6.3.3]. We also observe the
absence of supporting evidence of the following claim: «golog appears to
offer significant advantages over current tools for applications in dynamic
domains» [164, p. 119]. In what respects the logic program golog is better
than other similar programs? How did Reiter measure the claimed advant-
age? Did he describe the method, and the results, so that we can verify his
findings? The answers are all negative, and thus we fear that the use of the
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verb «appears» was truly meant to appeal to intuition, necessarily limited
in scope to the direct experience of local researchers, and implicitly reject
any demand for a scientific methodology by external observers.
The original aim of inventing computing machineries that display hu-
man-level intelligence is necessarily bound to the scientific study of human
thought processes. However, McCarthy’s theory is not presented as a sci-
entific model of human causal reasoning. If the intended aim of both Reiter
and McCarthy was to model human causal reasoning, to use the scientific
results in electro-mechanical engineering (Cognitive Robotics), in what re-
spects the situation calculus can be considered a good scientific theory?
The works of both McCarthy and Reiter fail to answer to this question; the
authors appeal to their own intuition, but make no effort to structure their
work, dividing scientific from engineering research, and using an objective
measure of progress when presenting and comparing their work with the
work of other researchers in the field. Davis is, therefore, in plain error in
his quoted review; in the past four hundred years, the best work of found-
ationalist researchers has always been based on raw facts about the natural
world, and never on appeals to intuition about (unsupported claims of)
useful inventions.
One could approach the above problems as follows: (1) sustain the claim
that McCarthy’s theory is a scientific model of human causal reasoning, (2)
classify this theory, (3) compare it with other previously classified models
of causal reasoning, and then (4) prove the soundness and completeness of
the logic program golog with respect to this theory as formal specification.
On the first of the above mentioned points, we observe that we have
neither natural nor experimental evidence of people who reason about
their environment using states as primary objects, and instantaneous state
transitions. We have evidence of the contrary, however. As reported by
Quirk et al. [157], about 90% of natural language denotations of causal
reasoning are about non-perfect tenses. People like to describe life while
it happens, using pointwise denotations and progressive tenses. Human
reasoning, as represented in natural language, is chiefly concerned about
continuous change over time periods. When modelling human reasoning,
we cannot possibly ignore these facts. Further, states as primitive objects
are a needless computational burden, because their database must stay up-
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-to-date with the reasoning, whose core duty, however, is not to waste time
and space in managing states, but to answer quickly to queries and be
aware of the physical environment. Both McCarthy’s formalism and Re-
iter’s variant fail to address this problem.
a.2 On Allen’s theory
Allen’s theory [5, 6] does not correspond to statistical evidence of human
causal reasoning by Quirk et al. As reported by Quirk et al. [157], time
points do occur in natural language denotations of causal reasoning. Fur-
thermore, about 90% of such denotations use non-perfect tenses, that is,
humans like to describe life while it happens, using pointwise denotations
and progressive tenses. Allen’s theory is strictly based on time periods
as primitive objects, that is, the theory is unable to represent time points.
Allen’s theory is also unable to model progressive tenses, and continuous
change in particular.
a.3 On Kuipers and Shults, «Reasoning in Logic about Continuous Sys-
tems», in J. Doyle, E. Sandewall and P. Torasso eds., Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, Proceedings of the In-
ternational Conference, 1994
The report describes a theory of common sense reasoning about continuous
behaviour in the physical environment, proves its soundness with respect
to the qsim simulator of qualitative physics, and supports the resulting
theory by discussing its applications to control theory. The described the-
ory consists in the adaptation of Emerson’s logic [61] «to work with» qsim
[106]. We raise the following questions.
On qsim. Do we have evidence of correctness and termination of the
qsim algorithm? If it runs continuously, does it generate correct answers
along the way, so that we can use them? What is the advantage of qsim
with respect to, say, computing a set of differential equations to solve a
Cauchy problem? For any given logic, can we use qsim as semantic refer-
ence (virtual environment) with no need to adapt the logic to qsim’s formal
environment? The question is especially relevant when dealing with a so-
ciety of heterogeneous agents. Further, are qsim’s answers generated with
the exact timing that we get from the physical environment? Finally, how
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broad is its range of correct simulation?
On the theory. What are the epistemological and ontological character-
istics of Emerson’s adapted logic? How it compares with previously clas-
sified models of causal reasoning?
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